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Automating empathy – issues and answers

I saw an advertisement today: “Empathy can’t be automated” 

Made me think: What is the evidence pro and con?

The obvious question is “Well, can you?”

The debate is joined. This turns out to be a trick question. The intuition on my part is that one cannot automate empathy, but perhaps one can simulate it, and then the simulation turns out to be something quite like the “automating empathy” of the title.

Defining our terms

However, before further debate, we need to define our terms. “Receiving empathy” is defined in rough-and-ready terms as one person (the speaker expressing/sharing something) “feeling heard” by the other person (the listener). “Feeling heard,” in turn, means the speaker believes he or she has been “understood,” “gotten for who the sharer is as a possibility.” The celebrity psychotherapist Carl Rogers said things about empathy such as getting inside the frame of reference of the other person and experiencing (not just intellectualizing) the other’s point of view: “…to see his [her] private world through his eyes” (Rogers 1961: 34). 

If one wants to get a tad more technical about defining empathy, then consider Heinz Kohut’s approach that empathy is “vicarious introspection,” i.e., one knows what the other individual is experiencing, feeling, etc. because one has a vicarious experience of the other’s experience (Kohut 1959). I listen to you and get “the movie of your life.” Less technically, Kohut famously quotes one of his psychoanalytic patients (he was a medical doctor) as saying that being given a good [empathic] listening was like sinking into a warm bath (Kohut 1971; note I will update this post as soon as I can find the exact page). Presumably that meant it was relaxing, de-stressing, emotionally calming. 

“Simulation” is producing a functionally similar result using a different means or method. For example, in the history of science, Lord Kelvin, one of the innovators of thermo-dynamics simulated the action of the ocean tides using a mechanism of ropes and pulleys [Kenneth Craik 1943: 51 (“Kelvin’s tide-predictor”)]. Thus, one does not have a social relationship with a bot, one has a “para-social relationship.” According to Sam Altman, some 1% of ChatGPT users had a “deep attachment” to the app – a kind of “rapport” – sounds like an aspect of “empathy” to me. Maybe not a therapist, but how about a “life coach”? (https://www.nytimes.com/2025/08/19/business/chatgpt-gpt-5-backlash-openai.html)

One misunderstanding needs to be cleared up. Entry level empathy is often presented as reflecting back on the part of the would-be empathic listener what the potential recipient of empathy expresses in words (and sometimes also in behavior). Though the value of being able to reflect the words the other person expresses is great, this is a caricature of empathy. For example, that the client comes in and says “I am angry at the boss” and the listener responds “You feel angry.” Pause for cynical laugh. 

Now one should never underestimate the value of actually comprehending the words spoken by the speaker. Reflecting or mirroring back what is said, more-or-less literally, is a useful exercise in short-circuiting the internal chatter that prevents a listener from really hearing the words that the other person puts into the interpersonal space of conversation. 

The exercise consists in engaging and overcoming the challenge: “I can’t hear you because my opinions of what you are saying are louder than what you are saying; and my opinions drown out your words!” So the empathic commitment is to quiet and quiesce the listener’s internal chatter and be with the other person in a space of nonjudgment, acceptance, and tolerance. In a certain sense, the empathy automaton (“bot”) has an advantage because, while the bot may have a software bug or generate an inappropriate response, it does not have an “internal chatter.”

Entry level empathy automation: repeating, mirroring, reflecting

So far, there is nothing here that cannot be automated

On background, this entry level of empathy was automated – reflect back what was said in at least in a rough-and-ready way – in 1966 by Joseph Weizenbaum’s MIT prototype of a natural language processor, a very primitive “chat-bot,” ELIZA. This was an attempt at natural language processing at a high level and was not restricted to science, therapy, life coaching, business, education, or any random area of conversation. The approach of ELIZA was to reflect, mirror back, repeat the statements made to it (the computer app) by the human participant in the conversation (which used a key board to type the exchange). 

Here’s the surprising, unpredicted result: The example of the software ELIZA, which mirrors back what the person says to it, was experienced by users to be comforting and even “therapeutic,” granted in a hard-to-define sense. As far as I know, no attempts at a sustained therapeutic or empathic relationship were ever undertaken, so the data is anecdotal, yet compelling. 

Could it be that we persons are designed to attribute “mindedness” – that the other person (or, in this case, participant software) has a human-like mind – based on certain behavioral clues such as responding to the speaker with words and meanings used by the speaker or that support the speaker or even disagree with the speaker in a way that takes the input and provides meaningful feedback? This gets one a caricature of the role of therapist of the school of Carl Rogers (whose many innovative contributions are not to be dismissed), in which the listener mainly reflects back the words of the client and/or asks non-directive questions such as “How do you feel about that?” or “Will you please say more about that?” 

In contrast, we find there is more to empathy than mere mirroring and reflection of words. For example, Heinz Kohut (1971, 1977), an empathy innovator, gives the example of meeting a new prospective client who begins the conversation with a long list of the client’s own failings, short comings, and weaknesses, dumping on himself and building a case that he is really a jerk (or words to that effect). The guy is really going full throttle in dumping on himself. The person then pauses and asks, “What do you think of that?” Based on his empathic listening and the feeling that Kohut got in being with the person, he replies “I think you are feeling very lonely.” The man bursts into tears – finally someone has heard him! Now this is just one vignette from a long and complicated process, in which there were many moments of empathic convergence and divergence. The point is this exchange was not a predictable result, nor likely a result to have been produced by mere mirroring; nor is this vignette dismissible by saying that Kohut was merely a master practitioner (which he was), who could not tell what he was doing but just did it. Kohut wrote several books to document his practice, so he tells a lot about what he was doing and how to do it. 

In a prescient reflection, which anticipates the current debate by nearly half a century, Kohut wrote: 

“…[M]an [people] can no more survive psychologically in a psychological milieu that does not respond empathically to him, than he can survive physically in an atmosphere that contains no oxygen. Lack of emotional responsiveness, silence, the pretense of being an inhuman computer-like machine which gathers data and emits interpretations, do not more supply the psychological milieu for the most undistorted delineation of the normal and abnormal features of a person’s psychological makeup than do an oxygen-free environment…” (Kohut 1977: 253)

Empathy is oxygen for the soul. What Kohut could not appreciate – and which computer science could not even imagine in 1977 – is that large language models would be able to simulate affective responsiveness, chattiness, agreeableness, even humor, that would put to shame the relatively unemotional unresponsiveness of the classic approach to psychoanalysis, in which the analyst is an emotionally neutral (and hence “cold”) screen onto which the client project his issues. It should be noted this classic unresponsiveness is a caricature and stereotype to which few real world psychoanalysts rigidly adhere, rather like the cynical anecdote of the analyst who removes the tissue from his consulting room to prevent indulgent weeping instead of talking.

Granted, one should not assume that a therapeutic bot would (or would not) work as well as a human therapist or empathy consultant; but, for the sake of argument, let us suppose that it does work as well (and work as badly?), either in certain circumstances or new, improved future releases, which are to be anticipated with highly probability. 

Fast forward to today’s large language models (LLMs)

Therefore, fast forward these sixty years from Joseph Weizenbaum’s prototype (MIT 1965) to today’s large language models that beat human beings at playing Jeopardy – an elaborate word game requiring natural language – and what then becomes possible? One of the challenges of talk therapy (or empathy consulting, etc.) is that it is powerful and demonstrably effective, but not scalable. It does not scale up to meet the market demands of thousands of people who are struggling with mental illness or those who, while not satisfying criteria for mental illness, would still benefit from a conversation for possibility. 

A human therapist (or empathy consultant) has eight hours in a standard workday and if the therapist meets with emotionally upset people during all those hours, then the therapist is at risk of upset, too, confronting compassion fatigue, burn out, or empathic distress in somewhere between two weeks and two years. Hence, the popularity of fifteen-minute medication management session on the part of psychiatrists (MDs), the current dominant practice design, an approach presenting challenges of its own. Medications are powerful and can address disordered mood, anxiety, and pathological thinking, yet often the underlying (individual, social, community, nonbiological) issues remain unaddressed, due to finances and schedule, and so remain unengaged and unresolved. 

Hence, the current market of long wait times, high costs, high frustration, challenges to find a good fit between therapist and client, all resulting in suffering humanity – above all suffering humanity. (Note also that, while this article often talks about “therapy,” many of the same things can be said about “life coaching,” “consulting,” “counseling,” and so on; and these latter will not be mechanically repeated, but are implicated.

As regards the market, the problematic scalability of one-on-one talk therapy and the lengthy time needed for professional training and the acquisition of a critical mass of experience, results in a market shortage of competent therapists and related empathy consultants. For the prospective patient (i.e., customer) the question often comes down to:  “how desperate are you?” as a client struggling with emotional, spiritual, behavioral health issues. The cynical (and not funny) response is “Pretty near complete panic!” If one is desperate enough – out of work, relationships in breakdown, attracted to unhealthy solutions such as alcohol – then a “good enough bot” just might be something worth trying. Note that all the usual disclaimers apply here – it would be interesting to consider a double-blind test between real human therapists and therapy bots. Unfortunately, the one really un-overcome-able advantage of a human therapist – the ability to be in-person in the same physical space – cannot be double-blinded (at least at the current state of the art) in a test. Having raised the possibility, I have deep reservations about the personal risks of such an approach. That there is a market for such services is different than having such an automated approach imposed on consumers by insurance corporations to expand would-be monopoly profits.  

Another possible advantage of automation (albeit with a cynical edge): People who are socially awkward might prefer to get started with a virtual therapy bot. One clever startup has called their prototype platform a “Woebot”. Get it? Not a “robot,” but a “Woebot.” (Note – the Woebot uses a database of best practices, not a large language model.) 

Now these socially struggling individuals might be a tad naïve as such an approach would prevent them from engaging with the very issue that is troubling them – interacting with people. On the other hand, one might argue it would be like “exposure therapy,” for example, for the person who has a snake phobia and is presented with a photo or a rubber snake as the first step of therapy. Likewise, in the case of an empathic relationship, one would have to “graduate” to an authentic, non-simulated human presence – the real snake!

What is one trying to automate?

If one is going to automate empathy using a therapy-bot, then presumably one should be able to say what it is that one is trying to automate – that is, simulate. There are four aspects of empathy that require simulation – for the client, (1) the experience (“belief”) that one has been heard – that the meaning of the message has been received and, so to speak, not gotten lost in translation; (2) the communication of affect and emotion – that the listener knows what the speaker is feeling and experiencing because the listener feels it too; (3) who is the other person as a possibility in the context of the standards to which the individual conforms in community; (4) putting oneself in the place of the other person’s perspective (“point of view” (POV)). 

Most of these things – taking the other’s point of view, vicarious experience of the other’s experience, engaging with possibilities of relatedness, commitment to clear communication – come naturally to most people, but require practice. Humans seem to be designed spontaneously to assume multiple perspectives – one assumes other people have minds (beliefs, feelings, wants, impulses) like oneself, but then we get caught up in “surviving the day” on “automatic pilot,” and forget the individual is part of the community, throwing away the assumptions and preferring the egocentric one – it’s all about me! It takes commitment to empathy and practice to overcome such limitations. A person experiences a rush of emotions, but then forget it could be coming from the other person and succumb to emotional contagion. Who the other person is as a possibility is not much appreciated in empathy circles, but it an essential part of the process of getting from stuckness to flourishing and requires empathy at every step. 

There is nothing described here, once again, that cannot in theory be automated. Indeed human beings struggle with all these aspects of being empathic, and the requirements of automation are non-trivial, but can be improved by trial and error. The over-simplifications required to automate a process end up feeding back and giving the empathy practitioner insight into the empathic process as implemented in the human psychobiological complex, the complete human being. 

There is nothing wrong – but there is something missing

Ultimately what is missing from automating empathy is the human body – the chatbot is unable to BE in the space with you in a way that a human being can be with you. The empathy is in the interface. And the empathy for the human being is often the face. The human face is an emotional “hot spot.” The roughly thirty muscles in the human face, some of which are beyond voluntary control, can combine in some 7000 different ways to express an astonishingly wide range of emotions starting with anger, fear, high spirits (happiness), sadness and extending to truly subtle nuances of envy, jealousy, righteous indignation, contempt, curiosity, and so on. The result is facial recognition software of which “emotional recognition” is the next step as implemented by such companies as Affectiva (the corporation) (see Agosta 2015 in references). The software that recognizes the emotions and affects of the speaker based on a calculus of facial expressions (and the underlying muscles) as documented by Paul Ekman (2003). Now combine such an interface with an underling automation of empathy by a not-yet-developed system, and the state-of-the-art advances.

The skeptic may say, but what if the therapist is a psychoanalyst and you are using the couch so that the listener is listening out of sight, hidden behind the client, who is lying comfortably looking at the Jackson Pollack drip painting on the wall in front of him (or her) or at the ceiling? Well, even then, one hears the therapist clear her (or his) throat or one hears the analyst’s stomach gurgle. So the value added of the in-person therapy is gurgling stomachs, farts, and hiccups? Of course, this is the reduction to absurdity of the process (and a joke). Taking a necessary step back, the suspicion is one has missed the point. The point being? The bodily presence of the other person (including but not limited to the face) opens up, triggers, activates, possibilities of relatedness, possibilities of fantasies of love and hate, possibilities of emotional contagion, possibilities of further physical contact including sex, aggression, gymnastics, breaking bread, inhabiting the same space (this list is incomplete) that no virtual connection can as a matter of principle and possibility fulfill at all. This (I assert) is a key differentiator. 

The emotional bond between the client and therapist, counselor, or consultant becomes the path to recovery. But why cannot that bond be with a bot? Well, without taking anything back anything said so far in this article, the bond can be a “bot bond,” if that would work well enough for you. Still, arguably, there is nothing wrong, but there is still something missing. Like in the major motion picture Her ((2013) Spike Jonze with a young Joaquin Phoenix), in which the lonely, socially awkward but very nice guy has a relationship with an online bot of a “girlfriend” – and then gets invited out on a double date. It is like the date – the other “person” (and the quotes are required here!) – is on speaker phone. So, if you are okay with that, then the sky, or at least cyber space, is the limit. There is another shoe to drop. It then turns out that the relationship is not exclusive as the software is managing thousands of simultaneous threads of conversations and relationships simultaneously. One essential aspect of empathy is that the one person is fully present with the other person. Even if the empathy consultant has other clients and other relationships, the listener’s commitment at the time and place of the encounter is to be fully present with the other person. For at least this session, I am yours and yours alone. Now that is a differentiator, and even in our multitasking, attention deficit world, I assert such serial exclusiveness (different than but analogous to serial monogamy) is critical path to get value from the empathy, whether authentic or simulated.

Advantage: Rapport

This matter of “exclusivity” suggests that the rapport between the speaker and listener, between the receptivity for empathy and its delivery, is undivided, unshared outside of the empathic pair, complete, whole. The parent has several children, but when she or he is interacting with one of them, that one gets the parent’s undivided attention. The parent is fully present with the child without any distractions. That such a thing is hard to do in the real world, show what a tough job parenting is. 

If this analysis of exclusivity is accurate, then that would be a further differentiator between real world human empathy and automated empathy. I may be mistaken, but notwithstanding some people who can manage (“juggle”) multiple simultaneous intimate relationships, the issue of exclusivity of empathy is one reason why most such relationships either fail outright or stabilize as multiple serial “hook-ups” (sexual encounters) without the intimacy aspects of empathy.  

On background, this business of the “rapport” invites further attention. “Rapport” is different from empathy, and it would be hard to say which is the high-level category here, but the overlap is significant. “The rapport” first got noticed in the early days when the practice of hypnosis was innovated as an intervention for hysterical symptoms and other hard-to-define syndromes that would today be grouped under “personality disorders” as opposed to major mental illness. The name Anton Mesmer (1734 – 1815) – as in “mesmerism” – is associated with the initial development of “magnetic banquets,” as in “animal magnetism,” the attraction and attachment between people, including but not exclusively sexual attachment. Mesmer had to leave town (Vienna) in a hurry when he was accused of ethical improprieties in the practice of the magnetic banquets. 

The rapport of the hypnotic state is different than “being in love,” yet has overlapping aspects – being held in thrall of the other in a “cooperative,” agreeable, even submissive way. (It should be noted that Mesmer started up his practice again in Paris (a fascinating misadventure recounted in Henri Ellenberger The Discovery of the Unconscious (1971)). Today hypnosis is regarded as a valid, if limited, intervention in medicine and dentistry especially for pain reduction, giving up smoking, and overcoming similar unhealthy bad habits. One could still take a course in Hypnosis from Erika (not Eric!) Fromm in Hypnotism in the 1970s at the University of Chicago (Brown and Fromm 1986). (Full disclosure: I audited her (Fromm’s) dream interpretation course (and did all the assignments!), but not the hypnosis one.) 

This business of love puts the human body on the critical path once again. Of course, no professional – whether MD, psychologist, therapist, counsel, empathy consultant, and so on – would ethically and in most cases even legally perpetrate the boundary violation of a sexual encounter. Indeed one can shake hands with any client – but hugs are already a boundary issue, if not violation. The power differential between the two roles – provider and client – is such that the client is “one down” in terms of power and cannot give consent. 

However, firmly differentiating between thought and action, between fantasy and behavior, what if the mere possibility of a sexual encounter were required to call forth, enable, activate, the underlying emotions that get input to create the interpersonal attachment (the rapport) that occur with empathy? (This is a question.) Then any approach which lacked a human body would not get off the ground. Advantage: human empathy. 

Once again, skepticism is appropriate. Is one saying the possibility of a boundary violation is an advantage? Of course not. One is saying that the risk of a boundary violation is a part of having a human body, and that such a risk is on the critical path to calling forth the communication of emotions (many of which may be imaginary) need for full-blown, adult empathic encounter. Note also this is consistent with many easy examples of entry level empathy where empathy is not really challenged. If someone raises their voice and uses devaluing language, one’s empathy is not greatly tested in concluding that the person is angry. Virtual insensitivity will suffice. 

In the context of actual emotional distress, the matter is further complicated. Regarding bodily, physical presence, the kind of empty depression, meaninglessness, and lack of aliveness and vitality characteristic of pathological narcissism responds most powerfully and directly to the “personal touch” of another human being who is present in the same physical space. Kohut suggests that the child’s bodily display is responded to by gleam in the parent’s eye, which says wordlessly (“I am proud of you, my boy [or girl]!”). Child and parent are not having an online session here, and, I must insist, any useful and appropriate tele-sessions are predicated on and presupposed a robust relatedness based on being, living, and playing together on the ground in shared physical space. One occasionally encounters traumatic events that impact the client’s sense of cohesive self, if the parent recoils from the child’s body (or cannot tolerate lending the parent’s own body to the child for the child’s narcissistic enjoyment). The risk of the self’s fragmentation occurs (Kohut 1971: 117). So where’s the empathy? The need for the parent’s echoing, approving, and confirming is on the critical path to the recovery of the self. The empathy lives in the conversation for possibility with the other person in the same space of acceptance and tolerance in which we both participate in being together. 

Advantage: Embodiment

Another area where humans still have an advantage (though one might argue it is also a disadvantage) is in having a body. Embodiment. You know, that complex organism that enables us to shake hands, requires regular meals, and so on. If further evidence were needed, this time explicitly from the realm of science fiction, the bots actually have a body, indistinguishable from that of standard human beings, in Philip K. Dick’s celebrated “Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep” (1968), which is the basis for the major motion picture Blade Runner. Regardless of whether the “droids” have empathy or not, they definitely have a body in this sci-fi scenario – and that makes all the difference. That raises the stakes on the Voight-Kampff Empathy Test considerably (the latter rather like a lie detector, actually measuring physiological arousal, not truth or empathy). 

And while the production of realistic mechanic-biological robots is an ongoing grand challenge, we have left the narrow realm of computing and into biochemistry and binding bone and tissue to metals and plastics and translating biochemical signals into electrical ones. We are now inside such science fiction films as Blade Runner or Ex Machina. For purposes of this article, we are declaring as “out of scope” why we will soon be able to produce autonomous weapon warriors that shoot guns, but not autonomous automatic empathy applications. (Hint: the former are entropy engines, designed to produce chaos and disorder; whereas empathy requires harmony and order; it is easier to create disorder than to build; and automating empathy is working against a strong entropy gradient as are all humanizing activities.) Along with the movie Ex Machina, this deserves a separate blog post.

The genie is out of the bottle

Leaving all-important early childhood development aside, bringing large language models to empathic relatedness is a game changer. The question is not whether the generative AI can be empathic, but the extent to which the designers want it to function in that way and the extent to which prospective clients decide to engage (both open questions at this date (Q4 2025)).

“The day ChatGPT went cold” is the headline in this case. The reader encounters the protest from some Open AI customers about the new release of Chatbot 5.0. This event was reportedly greeted by a significant number of customers with the complaint that “Open AI broke it!” 

The New York Times article (https://www.nytimes.com/2025/08/19/business/chatgpt-gpt-5-backlash-openai.html) tells of a musician who found comfort (not exactly “empathy,” but perhaps close enough) in talking with ChatGPT about childhood trauma, and, as designed, the bot would keep the conversation going, enabling the individual to work through his issues (or, at least, such is the report, which, however, I find credible). Then the new release (5.0) was issued and it went “cold.” The response of the software lacked the previous set of features often associated with empathy such as rapport, warmth, responsiveness, validation, disagreeing in an agreeable way, humor, and so on. Instead the response was emotionally cold: “Here is the issue – here is the recommendation ___. Conversation over.” In particular, customers who were physically challenged as regards their mobility, ability to type (and were using a voice interface), cognitive issues, as well as standard customers who had established a relationship with the software and the interface, complained that the “rapport” was missing. 

Human beings often know that they are being deceived, but they selectively embrace the deception. That is the basis of theatre and cinema and even many less formal interpersonal “performances” in social media. In the media, the entire performance is imaginary, even if it represents historical events from the past, but the viewer and listener welcome it, not just for entertainment (though that, too) but because it is enlivening, activating, educational, or inspiring. Same idea with your therapy-bot. The client enters the therapy theatre. You know it is fake the way the Battle of Borodino in Tolstoy’s War and Peace is a fictional representation of a real battle. Yet for those able to deal with the compartmentalization, perhaps the result is good enough. This assumes that the therapeutic action of the bot is “on target,” “effective,” “engaging,” which, it should be noted, is a big assumption, especially given that even in the real world it is hard to produce a good therapeutic result.

This matter of faking empathy opens up a humorous moment (though also a serious one – see below). Here the definition of “fake” is “fake” the way a veggie burger is a substitute for an actual hamburger.  That may actually be an advantage for some people, though, obviously, in a profoundly different way in comparing how a hamburger relates to empathy as processed by a human being. The veggie burger influences the lower gastrointestinal tract and the empathy (whether automated or not) influences one’s psyche (the Greek word for “soul”). Not a vegetarian myself, I definitely eat a lot less meat than ten years ago, and, with apologies to the cattle industry (but not to the cattle), applaud the trend. The interesting thing is that by branding the products “veggie burgers” or “turkey Burgers,” the strong inference and implication is that the hamburger still sets the standard regarding the experience and taste that the consumer is trying to capture. Likewise with empathy.

In most cases, the automation of empathy relies on the person’s desire and need for empathy.  Empathy is like oxygen for the soul – without it, people suffocate emotionally. Unfortunately, the world is not generous with its empathy, and most people do not get enough of it. Therefore, people are willing systematically, perhaps as a design limitation of the human psyche, to support a blind spot about the source of their empathy. Some will choose the Stephen Stills song: “If you can’t be with the one you love; love the one you’re with!” (1970), which, in this case, will be the bot mandated by the insurance company or the human resources department of the corporation. Deciding not to think about what is in fact the case, namely, this amalgamation of silicon hardware and software has no human body, is not morally responsible, and lacks authentic empathy, the person nonetheless attributes empathy to it because it just feels right; and yet, unless, the bot goes haywire and insults the person, that is often good enough to call forth the experience of having been “gotten,” of “having been heard,” even if there is no one listening.

For all of its power and limitations, psychoanalysis is right about at least one thing: transference is pervasive on the part of human beings. Nor is it restricted merely to other human beings. The chatbot becomes a new transitional object (to use D.W. Winnicott’s term (1953)). To quote Elvis, “Let me be – your teddy bear.” This is “transference,” an imaginary state in which the client imaginatively project, attributes, and/or assigns a belief, feeling, or role to the therapist, which the therapist really does not have. However, the ins-and-outs of transference are not for the faint of heart. What if the therapist really does behave in a harsh manner, thereby inviting the project on the part of the client of unresolved issues around a hard, bullying father figure? The treatment consists precisely in creating an empathic space of acceptance, to “take a beat,” “take a step back,” and talk about it. Of what does this remind you, dear client?” Is this starting to look and sound familiar? 

The suggestion is that such features, including transference, can be simulated and iteratively improved in software. However, the risk is that in “simulating” some of these features – and the comparison is crude enough – it is rather like putting on blackface and pretending to be African-American. Don’t laugh or be righteously indignant. Things get “minstrel-ly” – and not in a positive way. There are significant social psychology experiments in which people have “gone undercover,” pretending to be black – in order the better to empathize with the struggles of black people. The result was fake empathy. (See A. Gaines (2017) Black for a Day: White Fantasies of Race and Empathy and L. Agosta (2025) “Empathy and its discontents.”) In the case of automated empathy software, no one is pretending to deliver human empathy (though, concerningly, sometimes it seems that they are!) and the program may usefully deliver the disclaimer that the empathy is simulated, multi-threaded, not exclusive, and not the direct product of biologically based experience of a human organism. To paraphrase a disclosure from the bot in Her, “I am currently talking to 3231 people and am in love 231 of them.” 

Ethical limitations of “fake it till you make it”

While one can map these empathic functions one-to-one between human beings in relationship (including therapeutic ones), there is one aspect of the relationship that encompasses all the others and does not apply to the bot. That is the ethical aspect of the relationship. When a person goes to a professional for consultation – indeed whether about the individual’s mental health or the integrity of the individual’s financial portfolio or business enterprise – the relationship is a fiduciary one. (Key term: “fiduciary” = “trust”.) That is, one relies on the commitment to the integrity of the interaction including any transactional aspects. One is not going to get that kind of integrity or, just as importantly, the remedies in case of an integrity outage from a bot. Rather one looks to the designer, the human being, who remains the place where the responsibility lands – if one can figure out who that is “behind the curtain” of the faceless unempathic bureaucracy responsible for the product.

A significant part of the ethical challenge here is that automated neural networks – whether the human brain implemented in the organic “wetware” of the human biocomputer or, alternately,  a computer network implemented in the software of silicon chips – seem to have emergent properties that cannot be rigorously predicated in advance. (On this point see  Samuel Bowman (2024): Eight things to know about large language models: https://read.dukeupress.edu/critical-ai/article/doi/10.1215/2834703X-11556011/400182/Eight-Things-to-Know-about-Large-Language-Models. Thus, human behavior, which is often predictable, is also often unpredictable. So human communities have instituted ethical standards of which law enforcement and organized religions are examples. Our standards for chatbots and similar platforms are still emerging. 

Thus, the prognosis is mixed. Is automating empathy a silver bullet – or even a good enough lead bullet – to expand empathy for the individual and community and to so at scale, for example, for Henry David Thoreau’s “modern mass of men [persons] leading lives of quiet desperation”? Or our cyber age equivalent of a blow-up sex doll for the socially awkward person playing small and resistant to getting out of the person’s comfort zone? At the risk of ending on a cynical note, given the sorry state of human relations as demonstrated in the news of the day, maybe, just maybe, any form of expanded empathy, whether fake or authentic, if properly managed to mitigate harm, is a contribution. 

In any case, the key differentiators between automated empathy and humanly (biologically) based empathy are the human body (or lack thereof), the exclusivity of the empathic rapport, and the ethical implications, including the locus of responsibility when things go right (and wrong). We humans will predictably fake it till we make it; and automating empathy does not produce empathy – it produces fake empathy. 

References 

(in alphabetical order by first name)

Alisha Gaines. (2017). Black for a Day: White Fantasies of Race and Empathy. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Carl Rogers. (1961). On Becoming a Person, intro. Peter Kramer. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1995.

Daniel P. Brown & Erika Fromm. Hypnotherapy and hypnoanalysis. Hillsdale, N.J.: L. Erlbaum Associates, 1986. 

Donald W. Winnicott. (1953 [1951]). Transitional objects and transitional phenomena. A study of the first not-me possession. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 34, 89-97.

Dylan Freedman. (2025/0819). The day ChatGPT went cold. The New York Times:https://www.nytimes.com/2025/08/19/business/chatgpt-gpt-5-backlash-openai.html

Henri Ellenberger. (1971). The Discovery of the Unconscious

Heinz Kohut. (1959). Introspection, empathy, and psychoanalysis. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 7: 459–483.

Heinz Kohut. (1971). The Analysis of the Self. New York: IUP Press.

Heinz Kohut. (1977). Restoration of the Self. New York: IUP Press.

Joseph Weizenbaum. (1966). ELIZA –  A computer program for the study of natural language communication between men and machines,” Communications of the ACM, 9: 36–45. (See also ELIZA below under Wikipedia.)

Kenneth Craik. (1943). The Nature of Explanation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967.

Lisa Bonos (2025/10/23): “Meet the people who dare to say no to artificial intelligence”: https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2025/10/23/opt-out-ai-workers-school/

Lou Agosta. (2025). Chapter Three: Empathy and its discontents. In Radical Empathy in the Context of Literature. New York: Palgrave Macmillan: 55 – 82. (https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-75064-9_3 )

Lou Agosta. (2019). Review of The Empathy Effect by Helen Reiss: https://empathylessons.com/2019/01/27/review-the-empathy-effect-by-helen-riess/

Lou Agosta. (2015). A rumor of empathy at Affectiva: Reading faces and facial coding schemes using computer systems: https://empathylessons.com/2015/02/10/a-a-rumor-of-empathy-at-affectiva-reading-faces-and-facial-coding-schemes-using-computer-systems/

Paul Ekman. (2003). Emotions Revealed. New York: Owl Books (Henry Holt).

Philip K. Dick. (1968). Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep. New York: Ballentine Books.

Samuel Bowman (2024): Eight things to know about large language models: https://read.dukeupress.edu/critical-ai/article/doi/10.1215/2834703X-11556011/400182/Eight-Things-to-Know-about-Large-Language-Models.

Shabna Ummer-Hashim. (Oct 27, 2025). AI chatbot lawsuits and teen mental health: https://www.americanbar.org/groups/health_law/news/2025/ai-chatbot-lawsuits-teen-mental-health/

Spike Jonze. (2013). Her. Major motion picture. 

Stephen Stills. (1970). Love one you’re with. Lyrics: https://www.google.com/search?client=safari&rls=en&q=words%3A+love+the+one+you%27re+with&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8 [checked on 2025/10/31]

Wikipedia: “ELIZA: An early natural language processing computer program”: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ELIZA

Zara Abrahams. (2025/03/12): “Using generic AI chatbots for mental health support: A dangerous trend”: https://www.apaservices.org/practice/business/technology/artificial-intelligence-chatbots-therapists

Update (Nov 5, 2025). This article just noted: They fell in love with AI Chatbots: By Coralie Kraft : https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2025/11/05/magazine/ai-chatbot-marriage-love-romance-sex.html [The comments note that people being self-expressed is generally a good thing, including self-expressed to and with Chatbots; and the individuals may usefully continue to try to find an actual human being with whom to talk and relate. Less charitably, other commentators have said things like “I hope the person gets the help they need.”]

IMAGE Credit: (c) Adler University – “Empathy Can’t Be Automated” republished with kind permission

(c) Lou Agosta, PhD and the Chicago Empathy Project

Empathy and Greek Tragedy – Connecting the Dots

I can hear the laughter at the back of the auditorium – and indeed in the first row – a new definition of tragedy? You have got to be kidding!? Okay, maybe George Steiner (1963) or Christoph Menke (2009) already covered it – so send me the reference – in which case I modify my assertion to “an aspect of tragedy that may usefully be highlighted, foregrounded, and made the subject of further inquiry.” 


If one thinks about the characters in tragic dramas such as Oedipus, Creon, Agamemnon, Antigone, Jocasta, Orestes, and Electra, they do not seem to be particularly cowardly or slavish. The representation in theatre of the latter qualities of cowardice, etc. caused Plato to ban (“censor”) theatre from his ideal city-state in The Republic; but maybe something was lost in translation and cowardice is really hamartia (the fatal flaw(s) of the tragic hero). 

What does represent a common thread is that the protagonists (“heroes”) are survivors who become perpetrators (or vice versa) and they are brought low not only by the usual theatrical information asymmetries, boundary violations, and fatal acts of revenge, but by moral trauma. Moral trauma is someone who seems to have no other choice than to commit an integrity or boundary violation. 

What has been overlooked is the role of moral trauma.  Moral trauma is defined as the distressing emotional, behavioral, social, and sometimes spiritual aftermath of exposure to (including participation in) events in which a person’s moral boundaries are violated and in which individuals or groups are gravely injured, killed, or credible threat thereof is enacted (i.e., individuals are physically traumatized) (Litz et al 2009; Shay 2014).) The agent, is put in a double-bind, in which, whatever the action, innocent people are going to suffer and die. 

The double bind is created in diverse was. The double bind is created by information asymmetries (Oedipus does not know his biological parents, etc.); by conflicting laws of the family versus political authority in which Antigone is caught; by a curse in the form of sexual desire on the part of Phaedra for her step son, which, when revealed, even as a fantasy, represents a proposed boundary violation so immoral that the suggestion as thought itself requires punishment; by the commitment to a life of crime in support of Jason on the part of Medea that, once unleashed, is unstoppable (“might be hung for stealing a sheep as well as a lamb”); whether the best way to right a wrong inflicted on someone (Philoctetes), whose good will has now turned out to be indispensable, is to tell the aggrieved party the truth and risk rejection or try to trick the party into cooperating thereby performing a further perpetration; not knowing the future, an escaped slave about to be returned to slavey kills her baby to prevent her from being raised in slavey and is thwarted from then killing herself (Morrison’s Beloved). More pedestrianly, one decided on a last-minute change of plans and did not get on the airplane—or trolley car—that crashed–or, due to a last-minute change of plans, one did. The irreparability and irreversibility of catastrophe is a feature of a world infused with contingency. In literature this has a name. It is called “tragedy.” In such a world, radical empathy is an indispensable constituent in the project of finding one’s way forward through the fog of suffering to reconciliation and transfiguration of empathic distress into community and the possibility of fulfillment and satisfaction.

On further background for those who may need a review of the narrative, Oedipus is a survivor who is abandoned as a baby to die by his biological father but is rescued by a kindly shepherd, who foster him. Survivor. Learning of the Oracle that he will kill his father, Oedipus leaves home and unwittingly meets the biological father on his path of exile. An altercation occurs and Oedipus unwittingly kills the biological father, thus fulfilling the Oracle; but more significantly, the survivor now becomes a perpetrator. In the case of Antigone, the “double bind” is that she must either violate the laws of the family that require one bury one’s next-of-kin or violate the laws of the city that require one be a team player and defend the home-team against it’s enemies (who also happen to be next of kin). In moral trauma one is caught between a rock and a hard place – the devil and the deep blue sea. 

Clytemnestra and her boyfriend, Aegisthus. may be more problematic cases—and they initially show up like villains in their adultery and homicide and treachery. Yet Clytemnestra is a survivor. Agamemnon killed Clytemnestra’s first husband Tantalus and then married her, the distinction “consent” apparently not being readily available at the time. Tough crowd. Agamemnon had adulterous adventures while he was away at war, but his wife, Clytemnestra, firmly oppressed in the patriarchy, should not? This leads naturally, by way of free association, to the equally tough case of Medea. Medea is a kind of monster, though, I assert contra Plato, not a particularly cowardly one. One wonders what tragic spectacles Plato was attending. Even if these spectacles were the same ones with which the tradition makes one familiar, the argument can be made that denial is not the only and perhaps not even the optimal method of educational. Even if one swallows all the anachronistic refinements of a society built on slavery prohibiting the representation of slavery as subversive (of course it is, but for different reasons), there have still got to be better educational methods than denial. 

The confrontation with errancy (hamartia) on the part of individuals with whom one can imagine identifying—perhaps in one’s wildest dreams—and taking their place, leads to being grabbed by the throat and having one ‘s heart ripped out in pity and fear. The “fatal flaw” is usually not thought of as being both a survivor and a perpetrator, but it turns out to mean that too. That is the educational moment—that is the training—that is the therapy, if one may say so. It is rather like a spa treatment where one takes the healing waters and then drinks a double dose of a powerful purgative. One has to hold one’s nose as one’s bowels are loosened. Catharsis is different than preparation for a colonoscopy, but perhaps not by much. It is not a rational process—it is an educational and therapeutic one. The monstrous has an unexpected healing power (The Birth of Tragedy quoted in Schmidt (2001: 218))—if one survives the literary encounter with it in the literary artwork without succumbing to empathic distress.
 
This points immediately to Nietzsche’s answer to Plato’s banning of tragic poetry from the just city (the Republic), namely, that humans cannot bear so much truth (1883: §39): 
 
Indeed, it might be a basic characteristic of existence, that those who would know it completely would perish, in which case the strength of a person’s spirit would then be measured by how much ‘truth’ he could barely still endure, or to put it more clearly, to what degree one would require it to be thinned down, shrouded, sweetened, blunted, falsified.
 
And again, with admirable conciseness, Nietzsche (1888/1901: Aphorism 822): “We have art, lest we perish of the truth.” Here “truth” is not a semantic definition such as Davidson’s (1973, 1974) use of Tarksi (loosely a correspondence between language and world), but the truth that life is filled with struggle and effort—not fair—that not only are people who arrive early and work hard all day in the vineyard paid a full day’s wages, but so are people who arrive late and barely work also get paid a full day’s wages; that, according to the Buddha, pain is an illusion, but when one is sitting in the dentist chair, the pain is a very compelling illusion; not only old people get sick and die, but so do children. While the universe may indeed by a well-ordered cosmos, according to the available empirical evidence, the planet Earth seems to be in a local whorl in its galaxy where chaos predominates; power corrupts and might makes right; good guys do not always finish last, but they rarely finish first, based alone on goodness.  
 
So much for Nietzsche’s response. The answer of the tragic poets (e.g., Aeschylus, Agamemnon 173–181) provided even before the question is posed by Plato, is “learning through suffering” (pathei mathos). Note well this is consistent with Plato’s guidance not to celebrate examples (whether in Epic or in Tragedy) of cowardly, slavish, or devaluing actions (which Socrates famously denounces (Republic: 395a–396b)). But we humans seem to learn the hard way—in the college of hard knocks. The suffering takes on a life of its own. Literary fiction is the phantom-limb-pain of life. 

The learner is a survivor, who is in pain, but no corresponding reality of the missing limb exists, which limb, in being amputated, has become fictional. If the suffering is fictional, so perhaps is the therapy—write a poem, a tragedy, or tell a story. Life mutilates the individual, and, even if one gets through life relatively unscathed, one dies and the “celebrants” throw dirt in one’s face. Creon says “Alas. I have learned, unhappy as I am” (Antigone 1271–1272); but at that point Antigone is dead and Creon’s life is a ruin. The lesson is not for Creon, but for the audience (or reader). 
 
Yet this is not informational learning. The tragic protagonists (e.g., Antigone) cannot learn from her error, since she is crushed by it—yet the audience can. A hard lesson indeed. The double bind—disrespect the state or disrespect one’s ancestors—is to be caught between the proverbial rock and the hard place. That so many antidotes and answers to the pain and suffering are proposed, is itself evidence that the latter can readily slip loose from one’s mastery and control, which are predictably tentative and temporary, and ruin one’s day, if not life. For the audience knows the outcome, or at least sees it coming ahead of the protagonist. Yet the audience cannot use the knowledge to produce a different factual result—hence the need for alternative fictional methods. It is not like some specific error occurs that could be corrected through better intelligence or information—check the brakes on the Trolley so that they do not fail inopportunely—it is rather that no matter how much one knows, how carefully one assesses the risks of one’s action, the outcome is still uncertain and may even be disastrous. 

What kind of knowledge is that? The one certain piece of knowledge—death awaits. Yet it could be that from the audience’s perspective—the lesson is to dance in the chaos—dance in the uncertainty (so to speak)—between now and the ultimate un-over-comeable end of possibility. One double-checks the brakes, knowing full well there no guarantee exists, but that the checking is an expansion of control over uncertainty. With 20-20 hindsight, contingency starts to look like fate—that which, by definition, cannot be avoided; and yet daily counter-examples abound. A man named “John Silber” (1926–2012) is born with a birth defect—a mis-formed right arm that ended in an appendage like a thumb. Fate or rather contingency? Silber goes on to become a celebrated educator, University President, Kant scholar (which is how I got to know him), profiled on the front page of The Wall Street Journal (in the days of print journalism), and candidate for governor of Massachusetts. This was not a predictable result. Fate starts to look less constraining. The power to begin something new— “natality” as Hannah Arendt called it—new possibilities show a way forward.
 
The double bind is the source of tragedy, but is not alone sufficient to generate tragedy. For if one remains with the double bind, one gets “ruin and wreck,” not tragedy. For if one stays with the double bind, one gets “empathic distress.” One gets a form of insanity, not tragedy. One becomes a Philoctetes abandoned in pain and suffering, alone on an island for ten years before the return of Odysseus, Neoptolemus, and Hercules. The double bind presents a conflict but then requires that one not question the contingent framework of the conflict. Thus, the double bind is often kept in place, spinning in a tight unproductive circle, by a lack of imagination. Antigone does not think to act to claim sanctuary in the Temple of Hestia, virgin goddess of the family (which, of course, would be a different drama). The lesson? Write a poem—tell a story—use one’s imagination to brainstorm alternative possibilities—decline the constraining “set up” —embrace radical hope: “To hope till Hope creates from its own wreck the thing it contemplates” (Shelley 1820: 153; see also Lear 2008). 

In moral trauma one is no longer an agent in the full sense, which is one of the key hidden variable in classic tragedy—loss of agency. One’s agency is compromised by information asymmetries. Oedipus does not know who are his biological parents and he does not know that he does not know! One’s agency is compromised by inconsistent standards of behavior between the family and the political community, in which “cross fire” Antigone (and her family) are brought low. Now act! One is required to choose in the face of moral trauma—a choice one cannot make, that one ought not to have to make, but that, in any case, one is required to make. 
 
Our empathy for the agent starts out requiring a decision that no one should have to make. In classic tragedy, the individual is forced to make a decision that neither the agent nor anyone else is authorized to make. But that agent has to make it anyway. Doing nothing is also a decision, and people are going to die. This is the definition of a double bind—damned if one does, and damned if one doesn’t.  

Empathy is always empathy and radical empathy applies the same four aspects of relatedness—receptivity, understanding, interpretation, and responsiveness. Radical empathy emerges from standard empathy, when standard empathy breaks down, misfires, and/or fails in the face of empathic distress (including “burn out” or “compassion fatigue”). Empathic distress is itself a function of physical trauma, moral trauma, double binds, soul murder, and tragic circumstances that act to destroy possibilities of human flourishing, strength, aliveness, energy, and/or vitality. As a matter of definition, “soul murder” is defined by Henrik Ibsen’s John Gabriel Borkman (1896), as destroying (through emotional or physical abuse) the possibility of love, but is generalized here to include destroying the possibility of generating new possibilities (Shengold 1989). 

Radical empathy is attained when standard empathy honors the commitment to empathize in the face of empathic distress – the reaction on the part of audiences to circumstances in which tragic protagonists become entangled.This is empathy the “hard way,” and it is rare. However, no other way exists of attaining radical empathy than through empathy pure-and-simple—“standard empathy”—and much of the work accomplished here engages with the break downs of standard empathy as emotional contagion, projection, pressure to conform, and communications getting “lost in translation.” The repairs of these misfirings—and, it must be acknowledged, failures—of standard empathy lead the way to radical empathy. The transfiguration of moral trauma, double binds, and so on, by classic tragedies, work to overcome empathic distress, and, is on the critical path to performing and attaining radical empathy. 
 
Without standard empathy, the audience does not experience the pain and suffering of the struggling humanity in the story of the runaway trolley. Even if the experiences are vicarious ones, there is no pity and fear without empathy in witnessing the unavoidable conflict that tears apart the protagonists. However, if the viewer (reader) is able to sustain one’s commitment to empathy in the face of the breakdown of standard empathy into empathic distress, then the possibility of radical empathy opens up. Radical empathy has much to contribute here. 

A short description is that radical empathy relates empathically to that which causes empathic distress. Radical empathy relates to those decisions that no human being has the right to make, can make, or should have to make, but then ends up making anyway. Radical empathy reveals that one can be both a perpetrator and a survivor. Hence, the definition: the theatrical representation of moral trauma, double binds, and compromised agency, occasioning empathic distress, that calls forth the overcoming or amelioration of empathic distress by means of radical empathy for the survivor/perpetrator. Empathizing with such individuals and circumstances is why tragedy was invented.
 

References

Donald Davidson. (1973). Radical interpretation. In Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 2001: 125–139.

___________________. (1974). On the very idea of a conceptual scheme. In Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 2001: 183–198.

Henrik Ibsen. (1896). John Gabriel Borkman, tr W. Archer. New York: Project Gutenburg e-Book, 2006.

Jonathan Lear. (2008). Radical Hope. Cambridge, MA: 2008.

B. T. Litz, Stein N, Delaney E, Lebowitz L, Nash WP, Silva C, Maguen S. Moral injury and moral repair in war veterans: a preliminary model and intervention strategy. Clin Psychol Rev. 2009 Dec;29(8):695-706. doi: 10.1016/j.cpr.2009.07.003. Epub 2009 Jul 29. PMID: 19683376.

Christoph Menke,, (2009). Tragic Play., tr James Phillips. New York: Columbia University Press. 

Friedrich Nietzsche. (1883). Thus Spoke Zarathustra, R. J. Hollingdale (tr.). Baltimore: Penguin Press, 1961.

________________. (1888/1901). The Will to Power, R. J. Hollingdale (tr.). New York: Vintage, 1968.

Dennis Schmidt. (2001). On Germans and Other Greeks. Bloomington: Indian UP.

J. Shay, (2014). Moral injury. Psychoanalytic Psychology, 31(2), 182-191. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0036090

Leonard Shengold. (1989). Soul Murder Revisited: Thoughts About Therapy, Hate, Love, and Memory. Hartford: Yale UP. 

Percy Bysshe Shelley. (1820). Prometheus Unbound in Selected Poetry: Percy Bysshe Shelley, Harold Bloom (ed.). New York: Houghton-Mifflin (Signet Classic Poetry), 1968: 120–212. 

George Stein. (1963). The Death of Tragedy. New York: Alfred Knopf. 

IMAGE Credit: Wikimedia: Painting from an ancient Corinthian vase. Ajax falls on his sword in the presence of his colleagues, Odysseus and Diomedes. The short stature of Odysseus is a well-known Homeric feature. These vases are black-figured; the heroes are painted in silhouette on the red ground of the vases. Their names are appended in archaic Greek letters. Artist from ancient Corinth; public domain; between circa 800 and circa 480 B.C.; drawing published 1911.

(c) Lou Agosta, PhD and the Chicago Empathy Project

Suicidal empathy is now a podcast

One can always make a splash by throwing a rotten tomato, and those who throw one at empathy get a chance to gather Internet clicks by saying something shocking, even if it is of questionable accuracy. However, what about seriously engaging this thought literally as a debating point – is empathy a defect of western civilization dooming us to suicide and/or suicidal species extinction? As an exercise in thinking, consider the pros and cons.

Listen to this blogpost as a podcast on A Rumor of Empathy with Lou Agosta –

You know how modern agriculture can grow enough food to feed everyone on the planet thanks to the “Green Revolution” and high yield seeds, but people are still starving, because of the use of food by politicians and politics in the pejorative sense to perpetrate hostility, aggression, and bad actions? Likewise with empathy: Enough empathy is available to go around; but it is badly distributed. People are living and working in empathy deserts. Organizational politics, stress and burnout, attempts to control and dominate, egocentrism and narcissism, out-and-out aggression and greed, all result in empathy getting hoarded locally, creating “empathy deserts” even amid an adequate supply. Therefore, this approach does not call for “more” empathy, but rather for “expanded” empathy. The difference is subtle.

Indeed the one minute empathy training consists in driving out hostility, aggression, bullying, bad language, prejudice, politics in the pejorative sense, a long list of negative behaviors, and empathy naturally and spontaneously comes forth. The majority of people want to be empathic, and, given half a chance, will behave empathically. Does this mean would-be empaths and empathically motivated people have become suicidal?  

The short version of suicidal empathy is as follows. We are in a lifeboat which is filled to the maximum after our ship sank. In the water, treading water, surrounding the lifeboat are additional survivors and other leaky lifeboats about to sink, leaving the survivors treading water. If the survivors in the lifeboat are empathic and take in the other survivors, then the lifeboat stil afloat will be swamped and we will all drown. The conclusion is that in such extreme situations, which are more common than one might imagine, then empathy needs to be turned off – or at least dialed down significantly – lest we all perish. 

This thought experiment of the lifeboat and its extreme situation has received renewed attention as Elon Musk has notoriously said that empathy is a weakness of western civilization. 

[On background, for Musk’s sound bite about empathy being a weakness, see: https://youtube.com/shorts/LWvOvgjNEds?si=GByQLE0yoFDyWtTr ). To be fair, Musk does not invoke the lifeboat scenario in the quoted statements; however, Musk and his would-be supporters have expounded at greater length on behavior in extremis as reported in the following CNN article, in which a simplified version of evolutionary psychology (not necessarily Musk’s) as the survival of the fittest, plays a leading role https://www.cnn.com/2025/03/05/politics/elon-musk-rogan-interview-empathy-doge/index.html  By the way, regarding Musk’s comment, empathy advocates are telling me, there is no such thing as bad press coverage, and you can’t get publicity like this at any price. It is almost as good as having your books banned by the Catholic Church!]

Like most thought experiments, the lifeboat scenario is an intuition pump designed to stimulate debate about a difficult and controversial subject, in this case, empathy in circumstances of scarcity, trauma, compromised agency, and extreme situations. 

On background, the original formulation of the lifeboat situation is due to ecologist Garrett Hardin (1974) whose idea of “spaceship earth” envisions the rich and poor nations as being in a life-or-death struggle against one another for limited resources. That Hardin was an anti-immigration Nativist in a nation of immigrants is problematic (and he is called out by the Southern Poverty Law Project as giving support to white supremacist hate groups[1]); but his many personal limitations do not necessarily mean his thought-experiment of lifeboat ethics is without merit. We engage it as a thought-experiment on its own merits. 

The key idea of Hardin’s thought experiment is that each nation is a lifeboat. Nations such as the USA are solid, water tight, and well off. Others such as the South Sudan, Burundi, Central African Republic and Bangladesh are sinking (in the case of Bangladesh, literally so) or at least leaking badly. In the water surrounding the lifeboat(s), there already are a lot of people treading water (think: refugees fleeing hunger and murderous gangs in South America) – and this number is growing. Therefore, Hardin’s argument goes, it behooves the well-off nations to establish strong borders that keep would-be refugees from the leaky boats from overwhelming the still water tight boats in order to prevent swamping us all. According to this scenario of “lifeboat ethics,” empathy is a luxury we cannot afford. Similar statements would be made about compassion, kindness, generosity, and, presumably, most of the teachings regarding neighborliness of Jesus of Nazareth, Confucius, and Buddha – not affordable in our extreme situation. 

Now to engage with the strongest version of lifeboat ethics requires a scenario in which there really is a situation of extreme scarcity. For the sake of argument, though scarcity is not inevitable, let us suppose that it is indeed inevitable. Let us accept the flawed presupposition that spaceship earth has resources which are so limited that extreme measures and hard-heartedness are required. 

Accepting the assumption of scarcity, the argument in favor of lifeboat ethics rejects the possibility that human beings have managed to survive on the planet by using their cognitive capabilities, innovating out of predicaments, by thinking about the consequences of their actions, optimizing those consequences, and finding ways of doing more with less. Here the limitations of the lifeboat dilemma as a thought experiment come into view. The ecological authorities who propose the thought experiment rule out every initiative and innovation to lessen the pain and suffering of the participants in the lifeboat scenario, whether in the boat or the water, thereby eliminating (or greatly reducing) the agency of those who would act empathically or who are willing to limit their own narrow self-interest. 

For example, if it is proposed that the people in the lifeboat throw the swimmers their own life vests or life preservers (think: foreign aid), thereby increasing the chances of survival, the authorities rule there are not enough life vests.

If it is proposed that the people in the boats pull on the oars to circle the boats, tie the boats together to build a sort of pier, and use canvas to create a platform to support other survivors (think: the United Nations), there are no oars or canvas or rope or the seas are too rough.

If it is proposed that some good Samaritans in the lifeboat volunteer to treat the lifeboat as a “time share” into and out of which individuals rotate out of the water for a while and then back in, the better to survive (think: foreign guest worker program), the authorities rule the water is so cold as to make such sharing unworkable.

If it is proposed that the occupants in the lifeboat, pass the survivors in the water a thermos of hot medicinal tea (think: Doctors Without Borders), thereby delaying hypothermia, the authorities rule there is no such thermos.

If it proposed to implement a flotation device by tying the ends of one’s trousers together, capturing the air, and wrapping it around one’s shoulders (think: the peace corps), then the authorities rule that the fabric is too thin or torn.

If, after the people in the water have died of hypothermia or been killed by sharks, the people in the lifeboat can live for hundreds of days on sea turtles, raw fish, and rain water (think: micro lending), but only if they have a fishing line and a piece of canvas to catch the rain. The sea is a vast source of protein and can sustain many lifeboats, given a fishing line and a piece of putty to plug the leaks. The authorizes rule all that out, too. In short, the agency required to imagine and implement an empathic act or even a useful, life sustaining one, is cancelled by the steady drum-beat (and counter argument) of “not enough,” “not enough,” and more “not enough”. 

This is why tragedy – the art form – was invented. Life presents contingent circumstance that constrain one’s agency, limit one’s choices, and make one both a survivor and a perpetrator (if one survives). As thinkers of the lifeboat dilemma, we are put into a double-bind. If one acts inclusively, thoughtlessly pulling people into the already overcrowded lifeboat, then everyone ends up in the water (and eventually under water). If one acts to repel any attempt to get into the lifeboat, then one enacts violence against those trying, perhaps legitimately to self-rescue, and one behaves hard-heartedly. One becomes a perpetrator, causing others to die. One is caught between the rock and hard place; literally, in this case, between the devil and the deep blue sea. That is the definition of moral trauma. Now empathize with that!

The people trying to climb into the lifeboat, who get pushed down, experience physical trauma as they drown. The people already in the boat who push down the otherwise innocent would-be survivors for whom there is no room in the boat, experience moral trauma. Whatever happens, their souls are damaged. The result is empathic distress, including forms of compassion fatigue, guilt, loss of self-respect, and burnout, one and all professional risks of the helping professions. Whether one gives into despair (or a hard-hearted “realism”) and becomes a survivalist, stock-piling canned goods, ammo, and guns, is a further point of debate. In addition to empathic distress, standard empathy confronts obstacles of emotional contagion, projection, conformity, and communications lost in translation. 

Yet even in the face of lifeboat ethics, empathy remains indispensable. How so? If one is in a lifeboat one is by definition a survivor. Your ship sank! That is a necessary part of the definition of a lifeboat. You were cast into the vast, seemingly boundless sea. Never underestimate the importance of empathy for those in extremis, but even more than empathy, the occupants of the lifeboat need rescue. To be in a lifeboat and not need rescue is a contradiction in terms, blowing up the whole scenario and sending it back to the drawing board. This exposes the entire lifeboat scenario as a manipulation and mechanism for constraining, compromising, and denying agency to the participants in the dilemma. However, let us take the scenario at face value – help is not coming!

Meanwhile, awaiting rescue, one is at risk of becoming a perpetrator, albeit unwittingly, if one defends the lifeboat against those trying to climb into it by pushing them back down into the water. People are going to drown. In most tragic literature, the protagonist is both a survivor and a perpetrator.

For example, the Greek hero Oedipus was exposed as an infant to die, abandoned by his biological parents, who feared the prophecy of his murdering his father. He is rescued by a shepherd and goes on unwittingly to kill his biological father in a dispute as he (Oedipus) tries to avoid the fated prophecy, and, leaves the home of his foster parents (not realizing they have fostered him). Likewise, the people in the lifeboat are both survivors and perpetrators, the latter as they have to take violent action to defend their boat against the desperate swimmers who would occupy it.

Two wrong do not make a right, and there is no excuse for bad behavior. However, the people in the lifeboat are asked to make choices – life and death decisions – that no one is entitled to make, that no one should have to make, indeed that no one can make with integrity, yet that they make anyway and in any case, since doing nothing is also a choice. The point is not to marshal excuses – since there are none adequate to life and death – but to note that standard empathy is challenged in the face of moral trauma to become radical – to become radical empathy.

Empathy itself requires innovation. The proposal is that the lifeboat dilemma calls for and calls forth radical empathy. Radical empathy leverages the imagination to find a way forward in the face of tragic circumstances. Radical empathy is committed to empathizing in the face of empathic distress to solve the given dilemma through imagination variations when and where it is possible to do so; to comfort the survivors when there are any; and when there are no survivors by bearing witness to the tragic struggle where the outcome is a tragic one. 

Empathy, whether standard or radical, has a direct answer to lifeboat ethics and those about to be cast into a lifeboat. The answer is: “Women and children first.” If that happens to be your own spouse and children, then so much the better. However, save someone; and while I cannot say what I action I would take in such an extreme situation, presumably one should be ready to surrender one’s place in the boat. That is the empathic moment and the answer to hard-hearted proposals to throw the weak overboard. Children are the future and, unless they survive, species extinction is the outcome, and species extinction is a completely different thought experiment, not relevant here. This is the empathic answer. 

In the face of a thought-experiment such as lifeboat ethics, designed to take away one’s power and agency in the face of contingencies, the problem – how to allocate resources empathically in the face of extreme scarcity – cannot be directly solved. Rather the problem must be refuted. The setup of the experiment contains a flawed presupposition. Fundamentally flawed! The experiment makes it sound like scarcity is unavoidable. This is factually, scientifically, and indeed historically inaccurate. 

Scarcity (let us consider the example of starvation) is occurring on our planet, in war zones, and even in the inner-city community in which I live, but not because of lack of food. Starvation is occurring because food is being used as a weapon of domination, including prejudice, aggression and war. There is enough food to go around (as will be easily demonstrated in the next paragraph) but hostile and oligarchical powers (governments) are withholding it from those who have been designated as “the enemy,” including civilian populations. A noncontroversial if no less gut-wrenching example was the Nigerian-Biafran Civil War (1967 – 1970), with examples of children near death with swollen belies due to malnourishment. This was due to armed military blockade not crop failures. Such withholding would, of course, be the contrary of empathic (or even decent!) behavior. 

On background, spaceship earth (to use Hardin’s incisive term) has vastly more resources than a life boat and, therefore, vastly expanded opportunities for imaginative innovation. To stay with the example of feeding people, the development of Cyrus McCormick’s combine-wheat-reaper, and the follow-on agribusiness technology, allow some 2% of the population to grow enough food to feed the entire planet; and this in spite of the fact that human choices made under aggression continue to use food as a weapon of starvation. Prior to the Green Revolution, the other 98% of the population had to work twelve to sixteen hours a day to grow enough food to avoid  a slow, agonizing death by starvation. Arguably, these people were historically in the lifeboat dilemma; and their behavior often showed it (which, of course, is not excuse for bad behavior as two wrongs do not make a right). 

On further background, Norman Borloug’s (1914–2009) innovations in seeds and plants improved agricultural yields by integral factors, leading food experts to estimate his innovations saved over a billion people from starvation, earning Borloug the Nobel Peace Prize and the US Presidential Medal of Freedom. Lots of wars have been fought over land – land also used to grow food. Garrett Hardin lived long enough to know about this (“Green Revolution”), but his commitment to anti-immigration politics apparently created a blind spot, preventing him from engaging.

Therefore, the approach of lifeboat ethics is based on a fallacy that the situation of scarcity is an unavoidable one – an inevitable continency. On the contrary, scarcity is being manufactured by bad actors, bad politics, and out-and-out human aggression. As such, the scarcity can and should be undone by actors with better (including empathic) motives in order to restore the community to a benchmark standard human functioning. This is consistent with natural disasters creating local calamities that cause scarcity. It is also consistent with disagreements about what constitutes an emergency. However, the point is to send in emergency services and the national guard to deliver or air drop palettes of drinkable water, canvas for tents, and provisions, not to shoot the survivors as a burden to the community (the latter following the logic of the lifeboat to its absurd conclusion). 

Returning to the basic metaphor, empathy is no more to blame for overloading the lifeboat than carpentry is to blame for the fact that Roman soldiers used hammer and nails to execute condemned criminal and political enemies by crucifying them. Without practice, empathy can go astray as emotional contagion, projection, conformity, and communications lost in translation. Being generous to a fault or suicide have never been a requirement for empathy. Never. With practice, a rigorous and critical empathy sets boundaries, establishes limits, and creates a whole that is more than the sum of its parts.

A rigorous and critical empathy belongs to a short list of things such as dignity, respect, compassion, neighborliness, and forms of spiritual love, and are not quantifiable as zero-sum phenomena. For example, if I give you a slice of my chocolate cake, I have less cake. However, if I give you empathy, by giving you a good listening, we both have expanded empathy. Empathy is non additive – and so non subtractive. humanizing encounter in which my own humanity is enriched in contributing to another person. A rigorous and critical empathy is not quantifiable like chocolate cake. Granted that our topic is difficult and significant, we can enjoy lighter moment – there is enough food to go around, but definitely not enough chocolate cake! Like food, there is enough empathy to go around, but it does not seem that way, because we have not been effective in driving out the obstacles to empathy such as aggression, hostility, bullying, and politics in the pejorative sense. 

As Lord Acton famously said, “Power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely.” Granted, that corrupt leaders lacking integrity engage in abuses of power, is not new news. That super rich individuals and corporations form corrupt alliances with powerful politicians lacking integrity is called a lot of things – “oligarchy” is defined as the rule of the rich for the benefit of the rich; and “fascism” is defined as the rule of a military industrial complex pulling the strings of politicians at the expense of individuals and their well-being as citizens and their liberties. A new trail of tears comes forth based on fear and intimidation. 

The political authorities argue, the current situation is an emergency, an invasion, a crisis that requires setting aside the rule of law. An early version of capitalism that rejects win-win participation and business innovation is privileged over creating a clearing for a rising tide, which raises all boats (to continue to riff on the lifeboat theme with a slogan from Ronald Regean). It is hard not to get cynical. Setting aside the rule of law – what? – so that the President can accept $400 million gifts from a foreign power in direct violation of the US Constitution. Granted this is a single example, it speaks volumes. A strange emergency indeed!

In the face of this, empathy proposes to speak truth to power. Changing the metaphor: while bureaucracy may need to be trimmed back from time to time, like forest management that burns the underbrush with a controlled burn, less it spawns an even bigger forest fire that burns down the nearby city, we are now seeing an uncontrolled burn. Entire departments serving the citizens are summarily laid waste jeopardizing emergency responses to tornadoes, national security, scientific innovation, foreign aid to allies and would-be friends, basic education, and business entrepreneurship. Key term: uncontrolled burn (credit to Garret Smith for calling my attention to this). It has happened that a controlled burn of the forest under brush got out of hand and resulted in a major forest fire. This is a description of the so-called Department of Government Efficiency’s (Doge’s) approach to cost cutting. Uncontrolled burn. My take – who else’s would it be? – is that the cost cutting “wizards” are undertaking an uncontrolled burn. Think: slash and burn.

What Musk (hereafter “M”), Stephen Miller (Deputy White House Chief of Staff) and John Vought do not point out is that empathy does not work with bullies or abusers, who will take whatever vulnerability you may exhibit and use it against you. This is also the case with anti-social personality disorder – individuals with a defective conscience who struggle to tell right from wrong, though without interviewing M, one has no way of knowing M’s or any individual’s mental status. One possibility is that the individual is projecting his own unreliable, defective empathy onto the community as an empathic defect. Many of those who lack empathy are hungry for it. If ever there was a disqualifying statement by a would-be administrator or leader, M’s soundbite is it. However, a further agenda lurks nearby.

Presumably a statement that “empathy is a weakness” would be a justification of the unempathic “slash and burn” bullying methods of the unelected puppet masters at Doge [pronounce: “dog”], the so-called US Department of Government of Efficiency, showing up at the IRS and Social Security offices and so on and demanding to see confidential citizen data and/or seemingly randomly sending employees home (“firing” them).

In the face of bullying, a critical and rigorous empathy sets limits, establishes boundaries, pushes back against attempts to control, dominate, and manipulate, and speaks truth to power. One must not overlook the power of top down, cognitive empathy in thinking like one’s opponent in order to overcome him. “Top down,” cognitive empathy is detailed in Mikah Zeno’s Red Team! (Basic Books 2015) according to which taking a walk in the other’s shoes (the folk definition of empathy) provides advantages in relationships, business, politics, and building communities that are thrive on cooperation, communication, coordination, and inclusiveness. If one were looking for a short disqualifying reason to sideline unelected puppet masters such as M and fellow traveller Stephen Miller (see more on him on the South Poverty Law Project’s report on racism and anti-immigration hate groups), this is it. I leave it to the reader to figure out who is the puppet.

When the imagination is constrained to rule out every option except the narrowest, strictest self-interest, then the result is a scenario in which pain and suffering are going to be widespread and people are going to get hurt. Even those who do not suffer physical trauma will face confrontation with moral trauma. People are starting to wonder if, given the lifeboat scenario, they might indeed be better off in having gone down with the ship. However, this is not caused by (or the fault of) empathy – it is due to lack of imagination. If we human beings were not empathic (and compassionate, generous, kind), then we would not experience conflict, distress, trauma, in short, the breakdown of standard empathy in the face of empathic distress and the requirement for radical empathy. Now we will never know for sure whether Garrett Hardin was overcome by empathic distress or suffered from a clinical depression or both; however, it is a generally accepted fact that Hardin ended his own life by suicide. The first documented case of suicidal empathy?

We conclude with a positive proposal, on which I have repeatedly written and published: Teach critical thinking. This is the empathic educational moment. Absent a rigorous and critical practice of empathy, I am cautious about engaging current political clichés in a highly polarized political world and “rhetoric” in the negative sense. 

Critical thinking includes putting oneself in the place of one’s opponent—not necessarily to agree with the other individual—but to consider what advantages and disadvantages are included in the opponent’s position. Taking a walk in the Other’s shoes after having taken off one’s own (to avoid the risk of projection) shows one where the shoe pinches. This “pinching” —to stay with the metaphor—is not mere knowledge but a basic inquiry into what the Other considers possible based on how the Other’s world is disclosed experientially. That is what we have attempted to do here by engaging with the most rigorous version of the lifeboat dilemma, instead of a strawman. Critical thinking is a possibility pump designed to get people to start again listening to one another, allowing the empathic receptivity (listening) to come forth. 

In our day and age of fake news, deep fake identity theft, not to mention common political propaganda, one arguably needs a course in critical thinking (e.g., Mill 1859; Haber 2020) to distinguish fact and fiction. Nevertheless, I boldly assert that most people, not suffering from delusional disorder or political pathologies of being The True Believer (Hoffer 1953)), are generally able to make this distinction. 

A rigorous and critical empathy creates a safe zone of acceptance and tolerance within which people can inquire into what is possible—debate and listen to a wide spectrum of ideas, positions, feelings, and expressions out of which new possibilities can come forth. For example, empathy and critical thinking support maintaining firm boundaries and limits against actors who would misuse social media to amplify and distort communications. Much of what Jürgen Habermas (1984) says about the communicative distortions in mass media, television, and film applies with a multiplicative effect to the problematic, if not toxic, politics occurring on the Internet and social networking. 

The extension to issues of politics, climate change, and community struggles follows immediately. Insofar as individuals skeptical of empathy are trying to force a decision between critical thinking and empathy, the choice must be declined. Both empathy and critical thinking are needed; hence, a rigorous and critical empathy is included in the definition of enlarged, critical thinking (and vice versa). (Note that “critical thinking” can mean a lot of things. Here key references include John Stuart Mill 1859; Haber 2020; “enlarged thinking” in Kant 1791/93 (AA 159); Arendt 1968: 9; Habermas 1984; Agosta 2024, 2025.) 

In conclusion, a positive alternative to abandoning facts and skipping critical thinking is suggested by Bob Dylan’s song about empathy. One has to push off the shore of certainty and venture forth into the unknown. We give Dylan the last word (1965: 185): “I wish that for just one time / You could stand inside my shoes / And just for that one moment / I could be you” [.] 

References

Lou Agosta. (2024). Empathy Lessons. 2nd Edition. Chicago: Two Pears Press. 

__________. (2025). Radical Empathy in the Context of Literature. Palgrave Macmillan. 

Hannah Arendt. (1952/1958). The Origins of Totalitarianism, 2nd Edition. Cleveland and New York: Meridian (World) Publishing, 1958. 

________________. (1968). Men in Dark Times. New York: Harvest Book (Harcourt Brace). 

Lisa Blankenship. (2019). Changing the Subject: A Theory of Rhetorical Empathy. Logan UT: 

Bob Dylan. (1965). Bob Dylan: The Lyrics: 1961–2012. New York: Simon and Schuster. 

Garrett Hardin. (1974). Commentary: Living on a Lifeboat. BioScience, Volume 24, Issue 10, October 1974, Pages 561–568, https://doi.org/10.2307/1296629

Jonathan Haber. (2020). Critical Thinking. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 

Jürgen Habermas. (1984). The Theory of Communicative Action,Vol 1, Thomas McCarthy (tr.). Boston: Beacon Press. 

Eric Hoffer. (1953). The True Believe: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements. New York: Harper Perennial. 

Immanuel Kant. (1791/93). Critique of the Power of Judgment, Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews (trs.). Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2013. edition. 

Elon Musk. (2025). Sound byte on empathy: see: https://youtube.com/shorts/LWvOvgjNEds?si=GByQLE0yoFDyWtTr 

Elon Musk. (2025). About the interview with Joe Rogan on empathy: https://www.cnn.com/2025/03/05/politics/elon-musk-rogan-interview-empathy-doge/index.html

Southern Poverty Law Project. (2025). Garett Hardin: https://www.splcenter.org/resources/extremist-files/garrett-hardin/

Southern Poverty Law Project. (2025). Stephen Miller: https://www.splcenter.org/resources/extremist-files/stephen-miller/

Wikipedia: lifeboat ethics / ecologist Garret Hardin: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lifeboat_ethics

Wikipedia: Norman Borlaug : https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Norman_Borlaug

Acknowledgement: I appreciate William Ickes calling my attention to suicidal empathy, lifeboat ethics, and the issues around it, including current political debates. Bill is a deep thinker in all matters relating to empathy, social science, and contemporary community struggles. I am grateful for his feedback and friendship. The views expressed here are my own, albeit inspired by Professor Ickes.

Image credit: A photo of a lifeboat from the RMS Titanic: Wikimedia commons. 

Note: The content of this blog post is slightly different than the spoken word podcast due to the differences between writing and speaking.

(c) Lou Agosta and the Chicago Empathy Project


Radical empathy is now a podcast!

Listen to the podcasts on Spotify: 

Radical empathy is empathy defined as the practice of empathy that remains committed to empathizing in the face of empathic distress. Once again, it must be emphasized—and empathized—that one does not necessarily know one’s limits in dealing with trauma until they are tested in experience. Here are the three key distinctions between standard and radical empathy. 1. Radical empathy processes empathic distress whereas standard empathy is stopped by it. 2. Empathic distress is reliably occasioned and caused by physical trauma, moral trauma, soul murder, double binds, Trolley-car-like dilemmas (to be defined further)), and diverse tragic circumstances that are hard, if not impossible, to capture in standard uses of words and language. 3. Radical empathy is required when one or both of the would-be empathic partners is both a survivor and a perpetrator (which itself points to empathic distress). Given these three invariables, both standard and radical empathy share empathic receptivity, empathic understanding, empathic interpretation, and empathic responsiveness. I repeat: standard and radical empathy share receptivity, understanding, interpretation, and responsiveness. The differentiator is what happens with empathic distress. When one or more of these aspects of standard empathy breaks down or misfires, the repair or overcoming of the breakdown reliably presents the possibility of transforming standard into radical empathy. Radical empathy is not for the faint of heart, and instead of an image of puppies, the above painting, by Caravaggio, is a portrait of Medusa, whose hair was transformed into snakes, turning to stone (paralyzing) all those who met her and looked at her in person. If you are confronting trauma, be sure to bring your radical empathy.

Read / Listen to (subscribe to) this blog and A Rumor of Empathy on Spotify for further updates on radical empathy. 

Short summary of episode one: This episode on Radical Empathy – what it is and why it is important – is the first in a series inquiring into radical empathy, what it is or whether it is just a rumor; how radical empathy differs from standard empathy; how radical empathy and everyday, standard empathy overlap and the dynamics of their interactions; how radical empathy makes a difference in situations when standard empathy breaks down and fails; and how the listener can expand his or her empathic skills, getting power over empathy and apply empathy in one’s lie, relationships, career, family, in the individual and in community.

The occasion for this podcast series on radical empathy is the publication of my new book Radical Empathy in the Context of Literature (April 2025 from Palgrave Macmillan). The suggestion is to have your local community or university or institute library order a copy. They have budget for these things and one can save a couple of dollars. This work on Radical Empathy contains many examples of empathy, both standard and radical, that are eye opening and engaging in their lessons for empathy and life.

Order books on empathy by Lou Agosta on empathy by searching for “Lou Agosta” and “empathy lessons” on your favorite online book source or click on this shortened URL: https://shorturl.at/gsGal

Image art credits: QWERTY, oil paint on board by Alex Zonis (AlexZonisart.com); The Shadow of Empathy (Doll Heads) by Alex Zonis (AlexZonisart.com; Head of Medusa by Caravaggio (Gallery of the Uffizi (Florence, Italy)) from Wikimedia Commons.

Empathy alone is not going to fix this thing, and it might help you get into action: empathic defects, unelected puppet masters, and the uncontrolled burn

That little voice inside that is quietly telling you “You do not make a difference” is not your friend. High probability that voice is a hostile introject based on whatever it is that you had to survive – unreliable empathy, bullying teachers, problematic parenting, or out-and-out boundary violations and trauma. It must be the first target of transformation – that is, a conversation for possibility with a trusted other, including, but not limited to, a therapist. However, it (the voice) could also just be a bad habit. Don’t believe everything you think!

The recommendations in a world of tips and techniques for dealing with dis-regulated emotions and feelings of anxiety after looking at the news, include:

  • Give up: “My actions do not make a difference.” This a copout and got us into this mess in the first place. Here is the ultimate criteria: what would it take, if the political situation really deteriorates and the USA becomes a third world dictatorship (unlikely but possible) for you to be able to say that you at least had done something against the flood tide of troubles? What would it take? 
  • Dial down the guilt, and yet: You had not even written your Congressman or donated ten dollars to your preferred political party or representative. You had not even voted (?), and if you’d don’t vote, then you don’t get to complain about the result. Of course, that does not stop the complaining! Make a resolution to do better – and follow through. Put a reminder in your scheduler!
  • Step back from the news temporarily – that is why the off button was invented – check the headlines at most twice a day and not after (say) 8 pm if one goes to bed at 10 pm – if the world ends we are gonna hear about it – the news one needs finds you.
  • Take some action – attend a town hall, express your concern in a civil way over coffee about community (including political) developments to your friends and frenemies of varying views – write congress – write every senator (as I did) using the web form (https://www.senate.gov/senators/senators-contact.htm) – or at least call or write the Senators and Representatives from your home state – donate to a worthy cause of interest – whether on the left or right. Whether your action makes a difference or not, one result is you will feel better [high probability].
  • Put your stress and struggle into your day job – hopefully you still have one! Put your suffering into your work – expand your productivity. 
  • Other stress reduction activities – spa treatments (cost money) such as massage, time in a sensory deprivation tank, swimming, yoga, tai chi, martial arts. Notice that what many of these things have in common is that they are activities that get one out of one’s head, have a calming effect on the body, and  leave person feeling good, enhancing mood and spirit. Note that empathy is also on the short list of stress reducers, including getting a good listening form a committed listener who is able to provide a gracious and attentive ear.
  • You may say that the previous two bullets do not make a difference to the community’s predicament. However, they do. One cannot be effective if one is too anxious to take action. Whether or not your action is a silver bullet and produces a breakthrough in the community, as noted above, one result of your action is that you will feel better and that you have done something to make a difference (high probability). 
  • With practice, one gets good at rhetorical empathy: speaking truth to power. The best short example of this I can find is Malcom-X’s statement to the mostly African American audience around Thanksgiving: “You did not land on Plymouth Rock; Plymouth Rock landed on you!” Malcolm’s zinger got a lot a Amens and knowing laughter, for it concisely expressed and gave back to the listeners the experience of struggle and accomplishment of the community. 
  • A longer example of rhetorical empathy (Blankenship 2019) is Bob Dylan’s early comments on climate change: “Come gather ‘round people / Wherever you roam / And admit that the waters / Around you have grown / And accept it that soon / You’ll be drenched to the bone / If your time to you is worth savin’ / Then you better start swimmin’ or you’ll sink like a stone / For the times they are a-changin’”(1965: 81)

Defective empathy: A certain multi-billionaire advisor to the White House (hereafter known as “M”:) says empathy is a defect of western civilization. Key term: defect. Presumably we should cancel it to avoid becoming uncivilized? (For the sound byte see: https://youtube.com/shorts/LWvOvgjNEds?si=GByQLE0yoFDyWtTr ). Of course, lack of empathy is a short definition of “uncivilized,” and more on that shortly. This is a sound byte; however, M has expounded at greater length as reported in the following CNN article:

https://www.cnn.com/2025/03/05/politics/elon-musk-rogan-interview-empathy-doge/index.html

What M did not point out is that empathy does not work with bullies or abusers, who will take whatever vulnerability you may exhibit and use it against you. This is also the case with anti-social personality disorder – individuals with a defective conscience who struggle to tell right from wrong, though without interviewing M, one has no way of knowing M’s or any individual’s mental status. One possibility is that the individual is projecting his own defective, unreliable empathy onto the community as an empathic defect. If ever there was a disqualifying statement by a would-be administration, M’s soundbite is it.

Presumably a statement that “empathy is a defect” would be a justification of the unempathic “slash and burn” bullying methods of the unelected puppet masters at Doge [pronounce: “dog”], showing up at the IRS and Social Security offices and so on and demanding to see confidential citizen data and/or seemingly randomly sending employees home (“firing” them).

In addition, one must not overlook the power of top down, cognitive empathy in thinking like one’s opponent in order to overcome him. “Top down,” cognitive empathy is detailed in Mikah Zeno’s Red Team! (Basic Books 2015) according to which taking a walk in the other’s shoes (the folk definition of empathy) provides advantages in relationships, business, politics, and building communities that are thrive on inclusiveness. Notwithstanding M’s assertions of support for humanity, empathy is usually interpersonal, one-on-one, and, according to the report on CNN and Joe Rogan interview, we are unlikely to get any empathy from this guy. If one were looking for a short disqualifying reason to sideline unelected puppet masters such as M and fellow traveller Stephen Miller (see more on him below), this is it. I leave it to the reader to figure out who is the puppet. 

To say that empathy is defective is like saying that carpentry is defective because Roman soldiers used hammers and nails to execute criminals and political prisoners by crucifying them. Like every human knowledge and capacity, empathy can breakdown, go astray, and go off the rails as projection, emotional contagion, conformity. communications getting lost in translation. You wouldn’t be any good at mental arithmetic if you didn’t practice it. Though vastly different than arithmetic, empathy requires practice and improvements based on learning from one’s mistakes. 

Unelected puppet masters: As regards Stephen Miller, a common name, the reference is to the Deputy White House Chief of Staff. According to the Southern Poverty Law Project, which tracks hate groups: “Stephen Miller is credited with shaping the racist and draconian immigration policies of President Trump, which include the zero-tolerance policy, also known as family separation, the Muslim ban and ending the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program. Miller has also “purged” government agencies of civil servants who are not entirely loyal to his extremist agenda, according to a report in Vanity Fair” [. . . .] In response to seeing photos of children being separated from their parents at the U.S. border with Mexico as a result of the zero-tolerance policy, an external White House adviser, in a Vanity Fair report, said, “Stephen actually enjoys seeing those pictures at the border” (see: https://www.splcenter.org/resources/extremist-files/stephen-miller/). On further background, in case you haven’t heard of the Southern Poverty Law Project, these are the guys (attorneys) who were wearing bullet proof vests while going to the trial(s) that bankrupted the KKK (granted hatred is a many-headed monster and some version was reborn).

The uncontrolled burn: What are you talking about? This is a description an approach to cost cutting. As in forestry, the forest rangers sometimes undertake a “controlled burn” to clear away the underbrush that accumulates and might result in a truly catastrophic forest fire – for example, an uncontrolled forest fire that burns down a whole town or suburb. It has rarely happened that a controlled burn got out of hand and resulted in a major forest fire. This is a description of the so-called Department of Government Efficiency’s (Doge’s) approach to cost cutting. Uncontrolled burn. My take – who else’s would it be? – is that the cost cutting “wizards” are undertaking an uncontrolled burn. Think: slash and burn. 

It will be purely accidental if major damage does not occur before a combination of judicial, legislative, and law enforcement actions puts the brakes on this run away trolley car (which seems to have lost its brakes). In other words, what we are seeing in the daily drumbeat of extralegal, illegal, and provocative executive orders is an uncontrolled burn. Unfortunately, unless the citizens step up and communicate with their legislators at a volume and degrees we have not yet seen, we will know the burn is uncontrolled when social security checks to get deposited/mailed; a major terrorist attack (God forbid!) on the scale of Sept 11 occurs because law enforcement is chasing undocumented workers with families who have lived here for decades; another pandemic due to gutting the CDC and FDA. Another negative scenario (please do not shoot the messenger) is that worldwide tariffs contribute significantly to triggering another Great Depression as occurred with the Smoot-Hawley tariffs of 1930. I am cynical enough to think that is what some misguided individuals in the current administration in Washington, DC, are trying to accomplish for their own misguided reasons. [The trade fight worsens: https://www.wsj.com/economy/trade/trade-war-explodes-across-world-at-pace-not-seen-in-decades-0b6d6513?mod=hp_lead_pos3 ]

Regarding Social Security Administration (SSA), it is widely know (but perhaps not widely enough) that social security is a self-funded retirement plan operated by the US Government. People pay money into the trust fund in the form of social security taxes on their earnings; and the same people are entitled to get money out at retirement age. So no one is giving anyone charity or welfare here. It is a further challenge that the fund has become something of a political football through creative accounting, which has used it to subsidize the overall budget. Though I hope a breakdown of the SSA does not occur, if it does, and payments are missed, the howls across this nation will be loud enough to hear in the deepest bunker in government. We seem to be heading in that direction: https://tinyurl.com/2v85hwdr [SSA under stress – a lot of stress]

The challenge with social networking (e.g., Facebook (FB)) is that an inaccurate statement gets multiplied a hundred times, a thousand times, a hundred thousand times and a million times. Back in the days (1776-ish) of Sam Adams Committees of Correspondence, it took five days for a letter to to get from New York to Philadelphia. One had time to think about the consequences of one’s proposed actions.If one said “The British are combining!” and they were not coming, then one had time to correct one’s errors and minimize the damage. 

With social networking, there is something about the anonymity, fake neutrality, and misleading disinterestedness that stand in strong contrast to previous media channels. Radio and television as used by FDR (President Franklin D Roosevelt) and Hitler (master-minded the killing of millions of people; the good guy and the bad guy!), but, when a falsehood was stated, one could eventually figure out who uttered it. With the proliferating fake identities of social media, the entire context becomes fake. As Mark Zuckerberg is reported to have said of FB: “We are no longer fact checking.” I take that to mean: A new sign over the Facebook portal: “Abandon facts all ye who enter here”? Like the inscription over the entrance to Dante’s version of hell.

Critical thinking going forward: Let us conclude with a positive proposal: Teach critical thinking. This is the empathic educational moment. Absent a rigorous and critical practice of empathy, I am cautious about engaging current political clichés in a highly polarized political world and “rhetoric” in the negative sense. 

Critical thinking includes putting oneself in the place of one’s opponent—not necessarily to agree with the other individual—but to consider what advantages and disadvantages are included in the opponent’s position. Taking a walk in the Other’s shoes after having taken off one’s own (to avoid the risk of projection) shows one where the shoe pinches. This “pinching” —to stay with the metaphor—is not mere knowledge but a basic inquiry into what the Other considers possible based on how the Other’s world is disclosed experientially. Critical thinking is a possibility pump designed to get people to start again listening to one another, allowing the empathic receptivity (listening) to come forth. 

In our day and age of fake news, deep fake identity theft, not to mention common political propaganda, one arguably needs a course in critical thinking (e.g., Mill 1859; Haber 2020) to distinguish fact and fiction. Nevertheless, I boldly assert that most people, not suffering from delusional disorder or political pathologies of being The True Believer (Hoffer 1953)), are generally able to make this distinction. 

A rigorous and critical empathy creates a safe zone of acceptance and tolerance within which people can inquire into what is possible—debate and listen to a wide spectrum of ideas, positions, feelings, and expressions out of which new possibilities can come forth. For example, empathy and critical thinking support maintaining firm boundaries and limits against actors who would misuse social media to amplify and distort communications. Much of what Jürgen Habermas (1984) says about the communicative distortions in mass media, television, and film applies with a multiplicative effect to the problematic, if not toxic, politics occurring on the Internet and social networking. 

The extension to issues of politics, climate change, and community struggles follows immediately. Insofar as individuals skeptical of empathy are trying to force a decision between critical thinking and empathy, the choice must be declined. Both empathy and critical thinking are needed; hence, a rigorous and critical empathy is included in the definition of enlarged, critical thinking (and vice versa). (Note that “critical thinking” can mean a lot of things. Here key references include John Stuart Mill 1859; Haber 2020; “enlarged thinking” in Kant 1791/93 (AA 159); Arendt 1968: 9; Habermas 1984; Agosta 2024.) 

In conclusion, a positive alternative to abandoning facts and skipping critical thinking is suggested by Bob Dylan’s song about empathy. One has to push off the shore of certainty and venture forth into the unknown. We give Dylan the last word (1965: 185) : “I wish that for just one time / You could stand inside my shoes / And just for that one moment / I could be you” [.] 

References

Lou Agosta. (2024). Empathy Lessons. 2nd Edition. Chicago: Two Pears Press. 

Hannah Arendt. (1952/1958). The Origins of Totalitarianism, 2nd Edition. Cleveland and New York: Meridian (World) Publishing, 1958. 

________________. (1968). Men in Dark Times. New York: Harvest Book (Harcourt Brace). 

Lisa Blankenship. (2019). Changing the Subject: A Theory of Rhetorical Empathy. Logan UT: 

Bob Dylan. (1965). Bob Dylan: The Lyrics: 1961–2012. New York: Simon and Schuster. 

Jonathan Haber. (2020). Critical Thinking. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 

Jürgen Habermas. (1984). The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol 1, Thomas McCarthy (tr.). Boston: Beacon Press. 

Eric Hoffer. (1953). The True Believe: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements. New York: Harper Perennial. 

Immanuel Kant. (1791/93). Critique of the Power of Judgment, Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews (trs.). Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2013. edition. 

(c) Lou Agosta and the Chicago Empathy Project

Image Credit: Wikimedia: Peter Trimming: ‘The Scream’ – geograph.org.uk – 3200603.jpg / Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 2.0

Unreliable Parental Empathy in Henry James’ “What Maisie Knew”

Henry James provides a dramatic picture of unreliable and defective parental empathy. What Maisie Knew(1897) begins as a contentious divorce between Beale and Ida Farange is granted by the court. And, lacking the wisdom of Solomon (admittedly a rare quality), so is the custody of the child. The narrative is an inquiry into how the child is cut in half emotionally, and the consequences who she becomes as a person. Maisie is about six years old, and is to spend six months with each parent. As the story begins, each parent wants to take Solomon’s sword and use it on the other partner. Lacking a sword, they use Maisie. Or, expressed slightly differently, the parents are playing “hard ball” and Maisie is the ball. 

James’ incomparable empathy with Maisie and his penetrating and astute comprehension of human relations writ large applies empathy in the extended sense as who people are as possibilities, walking in the other’s shoes (after, of course, first taking off one’s own to avoid projection), translating communications between adults and children (and adults and adults) as well as affect-matching and mis-matching (empathy in the narrow sense). James’ work aligns with the concise classic statement “On adult empathy with children” by Christine Olden (1953). When encountering a child, according to Olden, the adult is present to her or his own fate as a child of similar age. The encounter brings up the adult’s issues even if the child does not have such an issue and has other, unrelated issues. The adults expand their empathy by getting in touch with these issues and taking care that they not get in the way of their openness and responsiveness to the child. That, of course, is far from the case with the adults presented in James’ narrative. For example, in encountering Maisie, Mrs Wix (one of the governesses) is present not only to her own fate as a child, but to the fate of her (Mrs Wix’s) child, who was killed in a tragic traffic accident when she was about Maisie’s age. Mrs Wix reaction to her loses, including her own genteel poverty, is to embrace a scrupulous conventional morality that mainly constrains her (Mrs Wix), but which will also eventually impact Maisie. The parents, Beale and Ida, are nursing their grievances and elaborating their hostility to one another, as noted above, using Maisie. The prospective step-parents, Sir Claude and Miss Overmore (Mrs Beale), who eventually emerge, are a definite improvement in empathic responsiveness to Maisie. However, the bar is now set so low that is not saying a lot and the process of de-parenting and re-parenting does not succeed as the narrative ends due to Sir Claude’s unresolved marital status and Maisie’s own painfully acquired knowledge of how to play “hard ball” with the grown-ups. 

As James’ novel begins, Maisie’s parents have already spent whatever financial resources they had as the divorce court enjoins Beale (the father) to return the 2500 pounds sterling to his former wife, which money, as noted, seems already to have been spent; Ida (the mother) is living off her looks, by the middle of the story, consorting with exceedingly unattractive rich men (Mr Perrin); Mr Faranago is doing the same with an American “Countess” of Color, who is described as having a mustache and it otherwise painted in terms of an appalling racist stereotype (definitely not James’ best moment). They are doing this for money. As Jems’ novels end, the one person of integrity – and it is narrowly scrupulous morality at that (people who are married should not move in with people to whom they are not married, even if the marriage is emotionally over (though not legally over)) – is Mrs Wix, whose inheritance (we learn towards the end) was stolen by a relative and, as the story of Maisie ends, has some slight hope of getting it back with the guidance of Sir Claude, who has heretofore not been particularly effective at anything except wooing an attractive, supposedly rich lady (Masie’s mother) who turned out not to be so rich and not so attractive if her personality is taken into the account.  That noted, let us take a step back.

Children of tender age will repeat what is told them by way of a performance as if reciting a nursery rhyme, not appreciating the ramifications of the statements in the adult world. The reader is given a sample of misbehavior on the part of both parents. At this point, Maisie is six years old (p. 9). Her mother asks her:

‘And did your beastly, papa, my precious angel, send any message to your own loving mamma?’ Then it was that she found the words spoken by her beastly papa to be after all, in her little bewildered ears, from which, at her mother’s appeal, they passed, in her clear, shrill voice, straight to her little innocent lips, ‘He said I was to tell you, from him, she faithfully reported, ‘that your’re a nasty, horrid pig!’ (p. 11)

The way the parents use and, strictly speaking, misuse Maisie to send one another insulting, arguably abusive, messages marks both as loathsome individuals. These parents are easy to hate. The parents are verbally abusive towards one another, and abusive towards Masie in enrolling her in delivering invalidating messages on their behalf to one another. The text is packed with instances of inadequate, substandard parenting. The text is thick with examples of defective empathy, unreliable empathy, and even fiendish empathy. Breakdowns of empathy such as emotional contagion, projection, conformity, and communications lost in translation, are so pervasive as to make the text a veritable compendium of what parents ought not to do. 

Maisie is reduced to a tool, and indeed even in Henry James’ skillful literary hands is something of a guinea pig in the jungle of parental incompetence and ethical conformity. The saving grace of James’ fictional study is that such scenarios, bordering on and perpetrating emotional abuse, are all too common – in his time and ours. The advantages of a fictional account is that it enables imaginative variations and thought experiments; and one is not going to get sued for slander, which is a risk even if the alleged “slander” is accurate and based on factual evidence.

The examples of Maisie’s parents are why 21st Century divorce judges begin proceedings by issuing a binding court order that the parents are not to speak ill of one another in front of the child nor have the child deliver messages to one another. I do not know the judicial practices in 1897. What I do know is that in 1897 divorce was less common and more scandalous in contrast with today when divorce is common and the scandals are single parent families, fatherless children, and domestic violence against women and children. We also know that the patriarchy was much more severe in times past (nor does that excuse today’s problems). Consider the cases of Anna Karenina (Leo Tolstoy, 1878) and Effi Briest (Theodor Fontane, 1895), who were prevented from seeing their children by spouses who were aggrieved, wielding ethical cudgels to separate mother and child. Yet even in our own time such legal injunctions are hard to enforce in cases where the parent is bound and determined to create mischief. Anecdotal reports from the trenches indicate that divorce judges are swamped with cases of physical abuse and inevitably give lower priority to bad verbal behavior, which can still be quite destructive to young, still maturing personalities.

Taking care of this child of tender age requires time and effort (all of which cost money) and each parent is eager to send Maisie to the other to inflict this cost on the despised former spouse. The child becomes an extension of the parent, like the narcissistic extension his or her own hand, the very definition of defective empathy, which leaves the child vulnerable to emotional disequilibrium, a kind of empty depression, and breakdowns in the child’s own empathy. The violation of the moral imperative to treat other people as ends in themselves and not mere means aligns with the parents’ retributive attitude, manipulative behavior, and (it must be said) pathological narcissism. Maisie becomes a mere means of the parents to inflict abuse on one other. While lonely and neglected, Maisie makes use of “auxiliary parents” such as an interested and engaged governesses and step parents (all of whom have their own conflicts of interest to maintain a measure of hope and perky positivity in the face of recurring disappointments delivered by the supposed adults in her world. Now in the context of the narrative, the governess, Miss Overbeck, is romantically interested in (and eventually marries) Maisie’s father; but Miss Overbeck also takes a sincere interest in Maisie. If Miss Overbeck is faking her interest in Maisie, it is an academy award winning performance. As in most areas of life, conflicting and overlapping interests are what make James’ narratives so powerful and thought provoking.

The matter almost immediately goes beyond James’ penetrating and engaging narrative. And that is relevance of James for us today. In our own time of fragmented and blended families, who does not know of an example where former spouses are at risk of speaking ill about one another? (It happens to married couples too!) The question is what happens when the affection or hostility are not expressed but nevertheless powerfully present, so to speak, percolating up from beneath the surface. That the emotions are not expressed means that they remain “unthought” as far as thinking using words is concerned. When Maisie’s father tells her, “Your mother hates you,” what does Maisie know about her mother and/or her father? The former spouses routinely refer abusively to their ex-partner in the presence of the child (as James calls her) in devaluing terms (p. 141) – “pig,” “nasty” person, “ass,” and so on. 

When another person tells one something, then one has to decide whether to believe it or not. A whole course in critical thinking may be unfolded and inserted here. In particular, the child is  motivated to believe the parents, because most decent parents tell the child the truth in age appropriate language, establishing a track record. Still, life events such as divorce, the birth of a sibling, major illness, or death of a family member, introduce incentives and emotional conflicts that distort communications and create parental integrity outages. Even in such examples, and this is the really interesting case, the child is incented to “go along with the program” – that is, what is represented as the truth about the life and family circumstances – because the parent provides meals, clothing, transportation, education, and entertainment, all of which are essential to the child’s well-being and immediate happiness. Still, while the child is constrained to “go along with the program” that does not mean the child always believes the outlandish assertions of the dominating parental authorities. Just because the child goes along with the parent’s fibs does not mean that the child always believes what she is told. You can’t fool all the people all of the time. 

For example, at about the same time as James was writing his work, there was a precocious five-year-old – articulate, funny, witty, cute – living in Vienna to whom was born a baby sister. When he asked his parents from where the sister came (he was not quite sure a sister was such a good idea), the parents told him the stork brought it. At that point the boy’s behavior deteriorated, hough the connection and timing was overlooked by the parents, because of their own blind spots. The well-behaved boy threw temper tantrums, developed a phobia which made it difficult to take him out of the house, and regressed to baby-like behavior and talk. His father had a conversation with someone who was innovating in human development (Freud 1909). The coaching was – stop lying to the kid and tell him about from where babies come – tell him about the birds and bees. Recovery was prompt – though there were other challenges in the relationship between his parents. 

The point? Children often know that they do not have all the facts and being dependent on their parents for their well-being the children decide it is best to conform. (Key term: conform.) They accept what they are told, subject to their own observations. The boy in question, anonymously known as “Little Hans,” had access to the lake where the storks were living and he saw the storks, but there was a noticeable absence of human babies (Freud 1909). Young scientist! Astutely observant, Hans concluded that his parents account was a fabrication. In short, they were lying to him about from where babies came. Unable to express himself in adult (scientific) language with the counter-example produced by his own observations down by the lake, Hans acted out. His behavior deteriorated. His behavior expressed his disagreement and his suffering, In short, he “knew” his folks were lying to him, rather in the sense that Maisie “knew” matters were not well with the representations offered by the adults in her environment. 

Thus, the one parent says, “Your father is loathsome.” The other parent says, “Your mother is loathsome.” Unlike the story about the stork, both of Maisie’s parents are speaking the truth! Yet even in uttering what is a factually accurate statement, there is a larger integrity outage confounding circumstances for the child. It is the job of the parents to take care of the whole child, and they seem not even to have the idea what is the “whole child” and how to do their job. Yes, of course, the child’s material needs, but also the child’s emotional development, education, and sense of being an effective agent, even if only in age appropriate, childish matters. That is profoundly missing here. In such a context, the factually accurate words are a lie. 

In the case of Maisie, what might be called intrusive interruptions – and the pediatrician psychoanalyst D. W. Winnicott calls “impingements” – in her childhood tasks of precisely being allowed to be a child of tender age, learning her school lessons, playing with children of a similar age, and holding tea parties with her dolls and stuffed animals – occur as the grown ups treat Maisie like a grown up. Her nursery attendant tells her: “Your papa wishes you never to forget, you know, that he has been dreadfully put about” (p. 10). This is the paradigm of defective empathy, for it attempts to induce in the child what papa was experiencing, yet does so in way that blames the child – points an accusing finger at her – for the “dreadful” inconvenience papa is suffering because of shared child custody. The child’s job is to learn her school lessons, play with her dolls, have bed time story time and lunch time and bath time, and visit with her peers (of which Maisie seems to have none), not to understand legal custody proceedings.

In general, when confronted with incompetent parenting, the child will (1) try to “fix the parent” so the parent can do her/his job (of taking care of the child), (2) conform, or (3)act out (see Little Hans, above). For example, the child will try to cheer up the depressed mother by putting on a happy smiley face, being perky, winsome, in the face of the mother’s self-invovled funk and indifference. The middle school or pubertal child will quote positive things said by friends about the parent. The child will try to placate the neglectful, abandoning, or angry father by being apologetic, giving agreement, being submissive, promising “I’ll be good!” The child may have no idea what is bothering the grown up – financial challenges, health issues, sexual frustration, or relationship breakdowns that a child of tender age cannot possibly comprehend. The child may act out – if an adolescent, defy social conventions – if a child of tender age, regress and lose toilet skills and wet the bed. The child will experience difficulties – experience sleep and eating disorders or throw temper tantrums. The child has limited skill in expressing her or his feelings verbally and/or understanding parental issues, so the child will invent meaning. “If only I were better at academics, sports, socializing, doing chores, then my mother and/or father would be happy (and be able to take care of me in such a way that I can be happy too).” “If only I had done my chores, my folks would not be getting divorced” – and this after both parents have repeatedly assured the child that she or had nothing to do with the family breakup. 

In the narrative, mamma enacts a similar impingement and calls forth a “try to fix her” response in Maisie. Papa has already used the same words: 

You’ll never know what I’ve been through about you – never, never, never. I spare you everything, as I always have [….] If you don’t do justice to my forbearing, out of delicacy, to mention, just as a last word, about your stepfather, a little fact or two of a kind that really I should only have to mention to shine myself in comparison and after every calumny like pure gold: if you don’t do me that justice you’ll never do me justice at all.

Maisie’s desire to show what justice she did her had by this time become so intense as to have brought with it an inspiration (p, 161)

In response, Maisie tries to cheer up her mother – tries to “fix” things by acknowledging her mother with the complimentary description of Ida (mamma) provided by The Captain, a prospective romantic interest of mamma with whom Maisie had a conversation. The Captain had paid her (mamma) many credible compliments, saying beautiful, kind things about her, which helped Maisie feel genuine affection for this difficult individual, Maisie’s mamma. Maisie tries to acknowledge her mamma using the Captain’s kind words. It does not work. “Her [Maisie’s] mother gave her one of the looks that slammed the door in her face; never in a career of unsuccessful experiments had Maisie had to take such a stare” (p. 164). James compares the impact on Maisie to a science experiment that goes horribly wrong, producing something disgusting instead of the expected elegant result. The mother then has a temper tantrum. Maisie (who is now estimated to be the age of a middle school student) survives this scene of “madness and desolation,” “ruin and darkness,” and, after mamma’s departure, goes off and smokes cigarettes with Sir Claude. 

As noted, Winnicott describes this scene of fear and defective empathy, “…[T]he faulty adaptation to the child, resulting in impingement of the environment so that the individual [the child] must become a reactor to this impingement. The sense of self is lost in this situation and is only regained by a return to isolation” (Winnicott, 1952: 222; italics added). Maisie is definitely isolated, and she suffers greatly because of it. The parent takes the child as his or her confidant as if the child were an adult, “Let me tell you what your father said.” “Let me tell you what your mother did.” Even when the content of the statement is relatively benign, the tone with which it is uttered – and that is the moment of defective empathy – causes the listener to imagine a kind of outrage, boundary violation, or integrity outage. This other must be the very devil!

In the case of What Maisie Knew, both parents are explicitly hostile towards one another and, if not hostile towards Maisie (though that too emerges), at least neglectful and manipulative. Arguably, in making Masie the means of their abuse of one another, the parents are also abusing her. However, what about the case, perhaps more common in our own supposedly psychologically advanced time, where the parent is hostile, but following the court order, the parent does not express it. What happens then? That of course goes beyond James’ narrative, but points to its relevance for our own challenges and struggles. 

On a positive note, if the abusive language is not performed, then it is not in the space. In so far as children are designed to conform to the guidance of their parents – even when they do not fully believe or trust them – so much negativity is removed from the space. Well and good – at least there is nothing to present in court when going before the judge. You will never hear me say that it is better to use the abusive language for then one knows where one stands with the other person. There are many other, better, ways of figuring out where one stands with the other such as comparing words and deeds, confronting one’s own introspective empathy, or simply asking the other person or other significant actors in the environment. It is just that the child’s ability to do these things is still developing and may be inadequate to the task (a problem that less skilled adults (and there are many) may also face). The hostility does not appear on the surface, which gives the appearance of a calm and placid body of water; yet a rip tide may lurk beneath the surface, capable of pulling one down.

At this point, it is useful to take a step back and consider how our consciousness is populated with many voices and many actors. An example of an “internal object” (actually more of an agent) would be a conscience that “tells” the person about the rightness of a prospective or accomplished behavior or speech act. The first internal object, the conscience (“superego”) is formed, thanks to the mechanism of identification with the aggression (about which more shortly). The conscience can become a hostile introject along other internal objects such as images of the parents, mentors, and positive complexes such as generosity, compassion, and empathy. The proposal is that the difference between parents who are explicitly assaultive in their speech acts and those who bottle up the hostility, which then leaks out in indirect forms, shows up in the quality of the internal introject. In the first case, the introject is more hostile, harsher but easier to distinguish from the authentic self; in the second case, the introject is more benign, but not necessarily harmless, and yet harder to distinguish from the authentic self. 

If one could truly cancel all the hostility – not just try to keep it down – but truly extirpate it, then it would become an idle wheel and not move any part of the behavior or thinking of the agents in question. But would the hostility then exist anymore? It would be unexpressed, because it really and truly were sublimated into a poem or work of art. That is the issue – is there ever such a thing as unexpressed hostility? This is not a problem that Maisie’s parents have – their problem is that they are embracing the hostility, elaborating it, making it their project. The damage (including to the parents) is substantial. In contract, when the hostility is unexpressed, but still lurking beneath the surface, it may not be unexpressed forever. Betrayal oozes at every pore. empathy is active here too, in a kind of regressive mode, and gives off hostile vibes, aggressive vibes, even if one’s words as sweet as honey. “Would you like another piece of cake?” Is spoken with such a tone of venom that one suspects the cake might contain arsenic. The tone is the moment of empathy (or, more precisely, the unempathic moment) in which one gives off a kind of negative affect, a hostile vibe, in spite of one’s sweet or benigh words. In addition, it is just as common for hostility which is not verbally expressed to be displaced or expressed indirectly in behavior and deed. With advance apologies to pet lovers, the boss bullies the employee and the employee goes home and kicks the dog. The hostility is present but displaced. 

As Maisie’s papa gets ready to leave for American to attend to the business affairs of his new, rich consort, the princess, further unreliable empathy. He makes an invitation to Maisie to accompany him to America. This is “out of the blue,” without context or assurances as to how Maisie will be taken care of, and the offer is fake. Why fake? Because he really does not want her along, nor does she really want to go, even though she says with enthusiasm and e=repeatedly “I will follow you anywhere.” It is clear the adventure is not going to happen:

She [Maisie] began to be nervous again; it rolled over her that this was their parting, their parting forever, and that he [papa] had brough her there for so many caresses only because it was important such an occasion should look better for him than any other [….]It was exactly as if he had broken out to her: ‘I say, you little donkey, help me to be irreproachable, to be noble, and yet to have none of the beastly bore of it. There’s only impropriety enough for one of us; so you must take it all (p 138). 

Naturally, the child has to go along with what the parent tells her or him. The parent has the power to provide meals, transportation, shelter and entertainment, though, in this case, none are offered.

The cost and the impact of the lack of integrity and empathy (and adaptation in general) of the parents to the child is the creation of a false self. Maisie pretends to be dumb. The trouble is that faking being dumb risks actually being dumb in a “fake it till you make it” moment. Her formal education is already neglected and in tatters. Now in the context of James’ narrative, Maisie never loses her cognitive acumen, though she gets called invalidating names such as “idiot” and “donkey” by her elders, which must have a damaging impact on her self-esteem.

Here James is the master psychologist ahead of his time, giving the reader an inside case history on the production of what, as noted, D. W. Winnicott came to describe as “the false self.” On background, Winnicott is the pediatrician who became a celebrated psychoanalyst, surviving an analysis with James Strachey, Melanie Klein, who was himself fortified intellectually by one his most famous (indeed infamous) students and colleagues, Masud Kahn. Without going into psychoanalytic politics, let’s just say that Winnicott’s ideas of the transitional object, virtual play space of creativity, and the false self are among the most enduring and time-tested contributions of child analysis. 

At risk of over-simplification, the false self is constructed in order to protect the true self, the source of spontaneity, satisfaction, fulfillment, beginning something new (as Hannah Arendt would say), and creativity. The false self is designed to help the individual survive the impingements of caretakers whose empathy is faulty. Here “empathy” is understood in the extensive sense of the parent’s willingness and ability to adapt to the requirements of the maturing child. The child is an end in her- or himself and not an extension of the parent’s narcissism, which narcissism reduces the child to the role of fulfilling the parents’ unmet needs in their own lives. Unhappy the child who must compensate for what is missing in the parents’ own lives. Most children will try to do so, making reparation for another’s incompletenesses, conforming to the felt requirements of the parent. How do you think that is going to work for the child?

Maisie’s authentic self takes shelter, hides, behind the false one and preserves the hope of someday being able to be expressed and have a satisfying life of her own, but in the meantime Maisie is able to get the secondary gain of frustrating her parents is using her to hurt one another. Maisie acquires the “know how” required to survive by manipulating the manipulators. The cost is enormous, but it protects one from the impingements of the powerful, malevolent forces in the unempathic environment:

The theory of her stupidity, eventually embraced by her parents, corresponded with a great date in her small, still life [….] She [Maisie] had a new feeling, the feeling of danger; on which a new remedy rose to meet it, the idea of an inner self, or, in other word, of concealment. She puzzled out with imperfect signs, but with a prodigious spirit, that she had been a centre of hatred and a messenger of insult, and that everything was because she had been employed to make it so. Her parted lips locked themselves with the determination to be employed no longer. She would forget everything, she would repeat nothing, and when, as a tribute to the successful application of her system, she began to be called a little idiot, she tasted a pleasure altogether new. When therefore, as she grew older, her parents in turn, in her presence, announced that she had grown shockingly dull, it was not from any real contraction of her little stream of life. She spoiled their fun, but she practically added to her own (p. 13; see also p. 54 on “the effect of harmless vacancy”; see also p. 117 on deep “imbecility”).

The child lives into – and unwittingly lives up to – the devaluing description and expectations made of her. Maisie makes the best of a bad situation and has fun spoiling the fun of other (which “fun” seems to be the mutual insults of and gossip about the parents). But the cost is substantial. James’ calls out a masochistic moment here in which, as the proverb goes, one cuts off one’s nose to spite one’s face. Caught in the cross fire, in an attempt to find a way between the rock and the hard place, Maisie consults a potential ally. Miss Overmore (the governess initially employed by her mother, but who eventually marries her father) has conflicts of interest of her own but in this moment functions as an honest broker. Maisie’s mother tells her to tell her father that he is a liar and Maisie, who is maturing, asks her governess if she should do so:

‘Am I to tell him?’ the child [Maisie] went on. It was then that her companion [Miss Overmore] addressed her in the unmistakable language of a pair of eyes deep dark-grey. ‘I can’t say No,’ they replied as distinctly as possible; ‘I can’t say No, because I’m afraid of your mamma, don’t you see? Yet how can I say Yes after your papa has been so kind to me, talking to me so long the other day, smiling and flashing his beautiful teeth at me the tie we met him in the Park, the time when, rejoicing at the sight of us [….]The wonder now lived again, lived in the recollection of what papa had said to Miss Overmore: ‘I’ve only to look at you see that your’re a person to whom I can appeal to help me save my daughter.’ Maisie’s ignorance of what she was to be saved from didn’t diminish the pleasure of the thought that Miss Overmore was saving her. It seemed to make them cling together (p. 15). 

What Maisie does is she keeps quiet. She isolates – plays dumb. All the worse, the mother initially prevents Miss Overmore from accompanying Maisie when the rotation to the father’s turn to take care of her occurs. The child is afraid of being abandoned – not taken care of – not provided for. Miss Overmore is taking caring of Maisie educationally and emotionally. Miss Overmore is banished (at least at this point). The child is “invisible”: “Maisie had a greater sense than ever in her life before of not being personally noticed (p. 107).

As the novel progresses, mamma is stricken with a dreaded but unspecified disease and her life is limited by illness even as she consorts with men who have money. As noted, Papa is bound for America. Sir Claude (who has not been properly introduced here but is a kind person who marries Maisie’s mother and genuinely likes Maisie) ping pongs between England and Paris as Sir Clause learns of a letter in which Papa (Mr Beale) deserts Mrs Beale (Miss Overmore, now Sir Claude’s lover). “You do what you want – and so will I” type of arrangement. Sir Claude is still married to mama (Ida Farange), and in the gilded age that is the scandal. Sir Claude cannot live with a woman married to someone else (according to the standard conventions of the time). There is something indecent about Sir Claude taking up with Miss Overmore while still technically married to Ida. Key term: indecent. 

The novel itself has an unthought, regarding the conventions circa 1897 about adult sex outside of marriage and within marriage with other partners. Sir Claude’s is a person who does not  speak unkindly of anyone. He is kind, albeit a chain smoker, which is perhaps a way of binding his underlying anxiety. He is  happy to have been given permission to do what he wants by his wife (Ida, Masie’s mother) provided she gets similar permission to consort with whoever she wishes. Without a formal divorce, this leaves Sir Claude compromised in terms of conventional moral standards (which were much stronger in such matters in 1897 than in 2024). 

We fast forward though Maisie’s lessons in cynicism, playing “hard ball,” the integrity outages of her parents and step parents, and instruction from another of her governesses, Miss Wix, in a rigorous sense of conventional morals. As the story ends (spoiler alert!), Maisie practices a kind of hardball. “I will give up Mrs Wix if you will give up Miss Overmore – and we will go off together to Paris,” Maisie proposes to Sir Claude. Both governesses are to be thrown “under the bus,” which does have a certain narrative symmetry and symbolizes Maisie’s gorwing up. 

Thus, Maisie tries to seduce Sir Claude, who, as noted, is the handsome if ineffective 2nd husband of her mamma. “Everyone loves Sir Claude,” everyone except his wife (Maisie’s mama). After marrying mamma, Sir Claude falls in love with Miss Overmore (who has since married Papa). Maisie proposes that she will give up Miss Wix if Sir Claude gives up Miss Overmore. That is the “seduction.” There is a certain amount of back-and-forth negotiation, but it is clear this is never seriously considered by Sir Claude. He would be willing to be in Maisie’s life, but is committed to living near Miss Overmore (Mrs Beale) in France (who are notoriously loose regarding marriage boundaries) so Sir Claude and Miss Overmore can continue their romance. Maisie (as directed by the author, James) takes the moral high road, and returns to England with her strict governess Miss Wix to a life of genteel poverty and “moral sense,” which means conformity to conventional moral behavior. 

The empathic moment for Maisie is, who is she as a possibility? This is an aspect of empathy that is sometimes overlooked in the conversations about affect matching, projection, and communications lost in translations – who is the person as a possibility. For example, I meet someone is who struggling with alcohol abuse or, in this case, with quasi-abusive, neglectful parents. That is not who the person is authentically as a possibility. The abuser of alcohol is the possibility of overcoming that she is drinking because of unresolved trauma, low self-esteem, or other specific issue, which when surfaced and worked through allow the person to write the great American novel, join Doctors without Borders, or start a family. 

So, once again, who is Maisie as a possibility? First of all, she is a survivor of being “caught in the cross fire” of a nasty divorce and being raised in its shadow. Anyone proposing to give Maisie a good listening might find themselves responding to her empathically saying, “You may usefully know yourself as a survivor.” By the end of the narrative, as Maisie goes off with her governess, Miss Wix, it far from clear that is the case. So while Maise learns a lot about cynicism, hardball, interpersonal invalidation, perpetrations, and emotional intrigue, she does not yet know herself as a survivor. 

Using James’ other female figures as a foil for who is Maisie as a possibility, maybe she becomes a kind of Kate Croy (as in James’ Wings of a Dove) scheming to get married to get someone else’s fortune upon their passing away. Maybe Maisie becomes Maggie (as in The Golden Bowl), sacrificing herself to the happiness of others and simultaneously validating the appearances of conventional morality. Or perhaps she becomes a Miss Overmore, a governess educating other people’s children in French grammar and romantic intrigues with the master of the house. Alternatively, Maisie becomes a governess such as Mrs Wix, not mourning the loss of a daughter, but the loss of her own possibility of satisfaction by means of a scrupulous morality, a reaction formation to the loose standards of her own parents and step parents. As the narrative concludes, the latter is the probable almost certain future. A sad ending indeed. 

There are many moments of affect matching (and mismatching) in James. There are many moments of communications lost in translation. These are empathy lessons in the sense that if one “cleans up” the miscommunication (restore understanding, then empathy emerges between the communicants. There are many examples of projection in – the parents especially are projecting their hostility onto one another and indeed everyone in the environment. Withdraw the project and authentically be with the other person and empathy comes forth. This does not happen to the parents, but the step parents (with whom Maisie is prospectively “re-parented”) move in that direction. Does Maisie become Kate Croy, Maggie (albeit without all the money), or even a version of her own mamma, seeking her fortune (literally) in association with a series of men of varying degrees of unattractiveness The opportunities for women are appallingly limited. Maisie’s education has been neglected as she has been shunted back and forth between parents. Even when she is de-parented from her biological ones, and Sir Claude and Miss Overmore (Mrs Beale) come together and propose to take care of her, the promise of educational lectures is short-circuited by lack of a revenue model. They can afford some lectures targeting working class folks at the equivalent of the public library, but university level preparation (which, at that time, requires Greek and Latin) seems a high bar. The disappointing, even demoralizing (in the sense of inspiring a righteous indignation), results are a reduction to absurdity of the constraints of standard morality. There is no need for James explicitly to have intended such a message, but it is not hard to find it in him, consistent with an agenda that treats women as full human beings, social actors, and agents with full political and financial rights (which was definitely not the case in James’ Gilded Age). 

James’ novels often end on a conventional note, even if his embrace of convention is a reduction to absurdity of convention. When Maisie sees her parents nasty divorce, relatively rare in 1896 as compared with our own time, and the musical chairs of changing partners with Sir Claude and Miss Overbeck (Mrs Beale), is it any wonder that Maisie embraces conventional morality and partners with Mrs Wix, a standard governess who has lost a daughter that would be about Maisie’s age? As noted above, when Mrs Wix is in the presence of Maisie, she (Mres Wix) is in the presence of her lost daughter, which presents an obstacle to her being with – that is, empathizing with – Maisie. Instead Mrs Wix goes to morality (not inconsistent with empathy, just different than it) and her advocacy with “moral sense.” At this point, James’ incomparable empathy gives way to crafting a writerly conclusion, which engages and reduces conventional morality to absurdity.

Much ink has been spilt on whether James’ endings are endorsed by him. Happy endings are rare in the real world, and if one considers death to be unhappy, then they never occur. Never. However, endings where the protagonists act conventionally are realistic in the sense that people often conform to conventional moral standards – which is why it is called “convention.” 

A deeper level of integrity coincides with doing what is conventional in James’ Wings of a Dove. Maggie returns to her unfaithful husband, Prince Amerigo, doing what is superficially conventionally requires. The arguably “deeper” integrity of Maggie’s self-sacrifice for the happiness of the poor couple (the husband and his original love interest) is hard to understand  under the draconian laws of the patriarchy, by which the unfaithful husband has control of Maggie’s financial fortune. Maggie decides to “fund” his unfaithfulness to her in a magnanimous gesture of self-sacrifice (but does she really have a choice?) based on the romantic notion that his love for his prospective bride from their days of mutual impoverishment was the “real thing.” There is no way that life has to look, and it will turn out the way that it turns out. 

In a different context and narrative, Lambert Strether (The Ambassadors) honors his word in the most superficial sense, returning to America presumably to acknowledge that, though Chad returns to Woollett, he (Strether) tried to convince him not to do so, requiring the engagement of other ambassadors, and forgoing his (Strether’s) own possibility of happiness with Marie, which would have required him explicitly to break his word and not return. Thus, doing the conventionally “right thing” is the wrong thing from the perspective of a personally satisfying outcome. 

In the background is the pervasive issue of what is the revenue model? Who has the money? Kate Croy and Merton Denscher are engaging in a confidence scheme to get Milly Theale’s fortune (she has a fatal disease). Denscher is belatedly overcome with integrity (and Kate’s refusal to have sex with him to confirm the shady deal), not conventional conformity, but actual remorse. It cancels his affection for Kate, who poverty previously prevented him from marrying. Unless one thinks Milly’s bequest is a “guilt trip” designed to punish Denscher (which it might be, but probably not), and not a genuine gift to someone Milly loved, a case can be made that the non-conforming thing to do would be to “take the money and run (to the bank).” Here the layers of ambiguity and uncertainty really do send the participants (and readers) spinning (Pippin 2000: 66), and no reason exists to believe an unambiguous “right answer” is available. In the Golden Bowl, Maggie has the money, until she doesn’t, and that makes all the difference. 

That Maisie turns out with standard level neuroses, acting out an Oedipus complex, even if cynical and seductive in a way conventionally appropriate for women of the Gilded Age, and not psychotic, is a tribute to the secure attachment she experienced from her early nurse, Moddle, all of which must have occurred prior to the beginning of the narrative.

Bibliography

S. Freud. Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-Year-Old Boy. The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud 10:1-150

Henry James. (1897). What Maisie Knew. New York, Penguin Classics, 2007.

Christine Olden. (1952). On adult empathy with children. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child 8: 111–126. 

Robert Pippin. (2000). Henry James and Modern Moral Live. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.

Winnicott, D. W. (1952). Psychoses and child care. In D. W. Winnicott (1958).

Collected Papers. London: Tavistock Publications.

Juneteenth: Beloved in the Context of Radical Empathy

For those who may require background on this new federal holiday, June 19th – Juneteenth – it was the date in 1865 that US Major General Gordon Granger proclaimed freedom for enslaved people in Texas some two and a half years after Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation. Later, the Thirteenth Amendment to the US Constitution definitively established this enshrining of freedom as the law of the land and, in addition, the 14th Amendment extended human rights to all people, especially formerly enslaved ones. This blog post is not so much a book review of Beloved as a further inquiry into the themes of survival, transformation, liberty, trauma – and empathy. (By is a slightly updated version of an article that was published on June 27, 2023.)

“Beloved” is the name of a person. Toni Morrison builds on the true story of Margaret Garner, an enslaved person, who escaped with her two children even while pregnant with a third, succeeding in reaching freedom across the Ohio River in 1854. However, shortly thereafter, slave catchers (“bounty hunters”) arrived with the local sheriff under the so-called fugitive slave act to return Margaret and her children to slavery. Rather than submit to re-enslavement, Margaret tried to kill the children, also planning then to kill herself. She succeeded in killing one, before being overpowered. The historical Margaret received support from the abolitionist movement, even becoming a cause celebre. The historical Margaret is named Sethe in the novel. The story grabs the reader by the throat – at first relatively gently but with steadily increasing compression – and then rips the reader’s guts out. The story is complex, powerful, and not for the faint of heart. 

The risks to the reader’s emotional equilibrium of engaging with such a text should not be underestimated. G. H. Hartman is not intentionally describing the challenge encountered by the reader of Beloved in his widely-noted “Traumatic Knowledge and Literary Studies,” but he might have been:

“The more we try to animate books, the more they reveal their resemblance to the dead who are made to address us in epitaphs or whom we address in thought or dream. Every time we read we are in danger of waking the dead, whose return can be ghoulish as well as comforting. It is, in any case, always the reader who is alive and the book that is dead, and must be resurrected by the reader” (Hartman 1995: 548).

Waking the dead indeed! Though technically Morrison’s work has a gothic aspect – it is a ghost story – yet it is neither ghoulish nor sensational, and treats supernatural events rather the way Gabriel Garcia Marquez does – as a magical or miraculous realism. Credible deniability or redescription of the returned ghost as a slave who escaped from years-long sexual incarceration is maintained for a hundred pages (though ultimately just allowed to fade away). Morrison takes Margaret/Sethe’s narrative in a different direction than the historical facts, though the infanticide remains a central issue along with how to recover the self after searing trauma and supernatural events beyond trauma. The murdered infant had the single word “Beloved” chiseled on her tombstone, and even then the mother had to compensate the stone mason with non-consensual sex. An explanation will be both too much and too little; but the minimal empathic response is to try to say something that will advance the conversation in the direction of closure, the integration of unclaimed experience (to use Cathy Carruth’s incisive phrase), and recovery from trauma. Let us take a step back.

Morrison is a master of conversational implicature. What is that? “Conversational implicature” is an indirect speech act that suggests an idea or thought, even though the thought is not literally expressed. Conversational implicature lets the empathy in – and out – to be expressed. Such implicature expands the power and provocation of communication precisely by not saying something explicitly but hinting at what happened. The information is incomplete and the reader is challenged to feel her/his way forward using the available micro-expressions, clues, and hints. Instead of saying “she was raped and the house was haunted by a ghost,” one must gather the implications. One reads: “Not only did she have to live out her years in a house palsied by the baby’s fury at having its throat cut, but those ten minutes she spent pressed up against dawn-colored stone studded with star chips, her knees wide open as the grave, were longer than life, more alive, more pulsating than the baby blood that soaked her fingers like oil” (Morrison 1987: 5–6). Note the advice above about “not for the faint of heart.” 

The reader does a double-take. What just happened? Then a causal conversation resumes in the story about getting a different house as the reader tries to integrate what just happened into a semi-coherent narrative. Yet why should a narrative of incomprehensibly inhumane events make more sense than the events themselves? No good reason – except that humans inevitably try to make sense of the incomprehensible.“Not a house in the country ain’t packed to its rafters with some dead Negro’s grief” (1987: 6). One of the effects is to get the reader to think about the network of implications in which are expressed the puzzles and provocations of what really matters at a fundamental level. (For more on conversational implicature see Levinson 1983: 9 –165.) 

In a bold statement of the obvious, this reviewer agrees with the Nobel Committee, who awarded Morrison the Novel Prize in 1988 for this work. This review accepts the high literary qualities of the work and proposes to look at three things. These include: (1) how the traumatic violence, pain, suffering, inhumanity, drama, heroics, and compassion of the of the events depicted (consider this all one set), interact with trauma and are transformed into moral trauma; (2) how the text itself exemplifies empathy between the characters, bringing empathy forth and making it present for the reader’s apprehension; (3) the encounter of the reader with the trauma of the text transform and/or limit the practice of empathizing itself from standard empathy to radical empathy.

So far as I know, no one has brought Morrison’s work into connection with the action of the Jewish Zealots at Masada (73 CE). The latter, it may be recalled, committed what was in effect mass suicide rather than be sold into slavery after being militarily defeated and about-to-be-taken-prisoner by the Roman army. The 960 Zealots drew lots to kill one another and their wives and children, since suicide technically was against the Jewish religion. 

On further background, after the fall of Jerusalem as the Emperor Titus put down the Jewish rebellion against Rome in 73 CE, a group of Jewish Zealots escaped to a nearly impregnable fortress at Masada on the top of a steep mountain. (Note Masada was a television miniseries starring Peter O’Toole (Sagal 1981).) Nevertheless, Roman engineers built a ramp and siege tower and eventually succeeding in breaching the walls. The next day the Roman soldiers entered the citadel and found the defenders and their wives and children all dead at their own hands. Josephus, the Jewish historian, reported that he received a detailed account of the siege from two Jewish women who survived by hiding in the vast drain/cistern – in effect, tunnels – that served as the fortress’ source of water.

The example of the Jewish resistance at Masada provides a template for those facing enslavement, but it does not solve the dilemma that killing one’s family and then committing suicide is a leap into the abyss at the bottom of which may lie oblivion or the molten center of the earth’s core, a version of Dante’s Inferno. So all the necessary disclaimers apply. This reviewer does not claim to second guess the tough, indeed impossible, decisions that those in extreme situations have to make. One is up against all the debates and the arguments about suicide. 

Here is the casuistical consideration – when life is reduced from being a human being to being a slave who is treated as a beast of burden and whose orifices are routinely penetrated for the homo- and heteroerotic pleasure of the master, then one is faced with tough choices. No one is saying what the Zealots did was right – and two wrongs do not make a right – but it is also not obvious that what they did was wrong in the way killing an innocent person is wrong, who might otherwise have a life going about their business gardening, baking bread, or fishing. This is the rock and the hard place, the devil and deep blue sea, the frying pan or the fire, the Trolley Car dilemma (see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trolley_problem). This is Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, the Desert Fox, who after the unsuccessful attempt in June 1944 to assassinate Hitler (of which Rommel apparently had knowledge but took no action), was allowed by the Nazi authorities to take the cyanide pill. This is Colonel George Armstrong Custer with one bullet left surrounded by angry Dakota warriors who would like to slow cook him over hot coals. Nor as far as I know is the bloody case of Margaret Garner ever in the vast body of criticism brought into connection with the suicides of Cicero and Seneca (and other Roman Stoics) in the face of mad perpetrations of the psychopathic Emperor Nero. This is a decision that no one should have to make; a decision that no one can make; and yet a decision that the individual in the dilemma has to make, for doing nothing is also a decision. In short, this is moral trauma.

A short Ted Talk on trauma theory is appropriate. Beloved is so dense with trauma that a sharp critical knife is needed to cut through it. In addition to standard trauma and complex trauma, Beloved points to a special kind of trauma, namely, moral trauma or as it sometimes also called moral injury, that has not been much recognized (though it is receiving increasing attention in the context of war veterans (e.g. Shay 2014)). “Moral trauma (injury)” is not in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM), any edition, of the American Psychiatric Association, nor is it even clear that it belongs there, since the DSM is not a moral treatise. Without pretending to do justice to the vast details and research, “trauma” is variously conceived as an event that threatens the person’s life and limb, making the individual feel he or she is going to die or be gravely injured (which would include rape). The blue roadside signs here in the USA that guide the ambulance to the “Trauma Center” (emergency department that has staff on call at all times), suggest an urgent emergency, in this case usually but not always, a physical injury. 

Cathy Caruth (1996) concisely defines trauma in terms of an experience that is registered but not experienced, a truth or reality that is not available to the survivor as a standard experience, “unclaimed experience.”The person (for example) was factually, objectively present when the head on collision occurred, but, even if the person has memories, and would acknowledge the event, paradoxically, the person does not experience it as something the person experienced. The survivor experiences dissociated, repetitive nightmares, flashbacks, and depersonalization. At the risk of oversimplification, Caruth’s work aligns with that of Bessel van der Kolk (2014). Van der Kolk emphasizes an account that redescribes in neuro-cognitive terms a traumatic event that gets registered in the body – burned into the neurons, so to speak, but remains sequestered – split off or quarantined – from the person’s everyday going on being and ordinary sense of self. For both Caruth and van der Kolk, the survivor is suffering from an unintegrated experience of self-annihilating magnitude for which the treatment – whether working through, witnessing, or (note well) artistic expression – consists in reintegrating that which was split off because it was simply too much to bear. 

For Dominick LaCapra (1999), the historian, “trauma” means the Holocaust or Apartheid (add: enslavement to the list). LaCapra engages with how to express in writing such confronting events that the words of historical writing and literature become inadequate. The words breakdown, fail, seem fake no matter how authentic. And yet the necessity of engaging with the events, inadequately described as “traumatic,” is compelling and unavoidable. Thus, LaCapra (1999: 700) notes: “Something of the past always remains, if only as a haunting presence or revenant.” Without intending to do so, this describes Beloved, where the infant of the infanticide is literally reincarnated, reborn, in the person named “Beloved.” For LaCapra, working through such traumatic events is necessary for the survivors (and the entire community) in order to get their power back over their lives and open up the possibility of a future of flourishing. This “working through” is key for it excludes denial, repression, suppression, and, in contrast, advocates for positive inquiry into the possibility of transformation in the service of life. Yet the attempt at working through of the experiences, memories, nightmares, and consequences of such traumatic events often result in repetition, acting out, and “empathic unsettlement.” Key term: empathic unsettlement. From a place of safety and security, the survivor has to do precisely that which she or he is least inclined to do – engage with the trauma, talk about it, try to integrate and overcome it. Such unsettlement is also a challenge and an obstacle for the witness, therapist, or friend providing a gracious and generous listening. 

LaCapra points to a challenging result. The empathic unsettlement points to the possibility that the vicarious experience of the trauma on the part of the witness leaves the witness unwilling to complete the working through, lest it “betray” the survivor, invalidate the survivor’s suffering or accomplishment in surviving. “Those traumatized by extreme events as well as those empathizing with them, may resist working through because of what might almost be termed a fidelity to trauma, a feeling that one must somehow keep faith with it” (DeCapra 2001: 22). This “unsettlement” is a way that empathy may breakdown, misfire, go off the rails. It points to the need for standard empathy to become radical empathy in the face of extreme situations of trauma, granted what that all means requires further clarification. 

For Ruth Leys (2000) the distinction “trauma” itself is inherently unstable oscillating between historical trauma – what really happened, which, however, is hard if not impossible to access accurately – and, paradoxically, historical and literary language bearing witness by a failure of witnessing. The trauma events are “performed” in being written up as history or made the subject of an literary artwork. But the words, however authentic, true, or artistic, often seem inadequate, even fake. The “trauma” as brought forth as a distinction in language is ultimately inadequate to the pain and suffering that the survivor has endured, which “pain and suffering” (as Kant might say) are honored with the title of “the real.” Yet the literary or historical work is a performance that may give the survivor access to their experience. 

The traumatic experience is transformed – even “transfigured” – without necessarily being made intelligible or sensible by reenacting the experience in words that are historical writing or drawing a picture (visual art) or dancing or writing a poem or bringing forth a literary masterpiece such as Beloved. The representational gesture – whether a history or a true story or fiction – starts the process of working through the trauma, enabling the survivor to reintegrate the trauma into life, getting power back over it, at least to the extent that s/he can go on being and becoming. In successful instances of working through, the reintegrated trauma becomes a resource to the survivor rather than a burden or (one might dare say) a cross to bear. To stay with the metaphor, the cross becomes an ornament hanging from a light chain of silver metal on one’s neck rather than the site of one’s ongoing torture and execution. Much work and working through is required to arrive at such an outcome.

Though Beloved has generated a vast amount of critical discussion, it has been little noted that the events in Belovedrapidly put the reader in the presence of moral trauma (also called “moral injury”). Though allusion was made above to the DSM, the devil is in the details. Two levels of trauma (and the resulting post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)) are concisely distinguished (for example by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual(5th edition) of the American Psychiatric Association (2013). There is standard trauma – one survives a life changing railroad or auto accident and has nightmares and flashbacks (and a checklist of other symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)). There is repeated trauma, trauma embedded in trauma, double-bind embedded in double bind. One is abused – and it happens multiple times over a course of months or years and, especially, it may happen before one has an abiding structure for cognition such as a stable acquisition of language (say to a two-year-old) or happens in such a way or such a degree that words are not available as the victim is blamed while being abused – resulting in complex trauma and the corresponding complex PTSD.

But this distinction, standard versus complex trauma (and the correlated PTSD), is inadequate in the case of moral trauma, where the person is both a survivor and a perpetrator. 

Thus, an escaped slave makes it to freedom. One Margaret Garner is pursued and about to be apprehended under the Fugitive Slave Act. She tries to kill herself and her children rather than be returned to slavey. She succeeds in killing one of the girls. Now this soldier’s choice is completely different than the choice faced by Margaret/Sethe, and rather like the inverse of it, dependent on not enough information rather than a first-hand, all-too-knowledgeable acquaintance with the evils of enslavement from having survived it (so far). Yet the structural similarities are striking. Morrison says of Sethe/Margarent might also said of the soldier, “[…][S]he could do and survive things they believed she should neither do nor survive […]” (Morrison 1987: 67). Yet one significant difference between the soldier and Sethe (and the Jewish Zealots) is their answer to the question when human life ceases to be human. A casuistical clarification is in order. If human life is an unconditional good, then, when confronted with an irreversible loss of the humanness, life itself may not be an unconditional good. Life versus human life. The distinction dear to Stoic philosophy, that worse things exist than death, gets traction – worse things such as slavery, cowardice in the face of death, betraying one’s core integrity. The solder is no stoic; Sethe is. Yet both are suffering humanity.  

However, one may object, even if one’s own human life may be put into play, it is a flat-out contradiction to improve the humanity of one’s children by ending their humanity. The events are so beyond making sense, yet one cannot stop oneself from trying to make sense of them. So far, we are engaged with the initial triggering event, the infanticide. No doubt a traumatic event; and arguably calling forth moral trauma. But what about trauma that is so traumatic, so pervasive, that it is the very form defining the person’s experiences. Trauma that it is not merely “unclaimed, split off” experience (as Caruth says). For example, the person who grows up in slavery – as did Sethe – has never known any other form of experience – this is just the way things are – things have always been that way – and one cannot imagine anything else (though some inevitably will and do). This is soul murder. So we have moral trauma in a context of soul murder. Soul murder is defined by Shengold (1989) as loss of the ability to love, though the individuals in Beloved retain that ability, however fragmented and imperfect it may be. Rather the proposal here is to expand the definition of soul murder to include the loss of the power spontaneously to begin something new – the loss of the possibility of possibility of the self, leaving the self without boundaries and without aliveness, vitality, an emotional and practical Zombie. In addition, as a medical professional, Shengold (1989) makes an important note: “Soul murder is a crime, not a diagnosis.” Though Morrison does not say so, and though she might or might not agree, enslavement is soul murder. 

Beloved contains actual murders. Once again this is not for the fainto of heart. For example, Sethe’s friend and slave Sixo from the time of their mutual enslavement is about to be burned alive by the local vigilantes, and he gets the perpetrators to shoot him (and kill him) by singing in a loud, happy, annoying voice. He fakes “not givin’ a damn,” taking away the perpetrators’ enjoyment of his misery. It works well enough in the moment. His last. Nor is it like one murder is better (or worse) than another. However, in a pervasive context of soul murder, Sethe’s infanticide is an action taken by a person whose ability to choose -sometime called “agency” – is compromised by extreme powerlessness. Yet in that moment of decision her power is uncompromised by all the compromising circumstances and momentarily retored – whether for the better is that about which we are debating, bodly assuming the matter is debateable. One continues to try and justify and/or make sense out of what cannot have any sense. Sethe is presented with a choice (read it again – and again) that no one should have to make – that no one can make (even though the person makes the choice because doing nothing is also a choice). This is the same situation that the characters in classic Greek tragedy face, though a combination of information asymmetries, personal failings, and double-binds. Above all – double-binds. This is why tragedy was invented (which deserves further exploration, not engaged here).

Now bring empathy to moral trauma in the context of soul murder. Anyone out there in the reading audience experiencing “empathic unsettlement” (as LaCapra incisively put it)? Anyone experiencing empathic distress? If the reader is not, then that itself is concerning. “Empathic unsettlement” is made present in the reader’s experience by the powerful artistry deployed by Beloved. Yet this may be an instance in which empathy is best described, not as an on-off switch, but as a dial that one can dial up or down in the face of one’s own limitations and humanness. This is tough stuff, which deserves to be read and discussed. If one is starting to break out in a sweat, if one’s mouth is getting dry, if the pump in one’s chest is starting to accelerate its pumping, and one is thinking about putting the book down, rather than become hard-hearted, the coaching is temporarily to dial down one’s practice of empathy. While one is going to experience suffering and pain in reading about the suffering and pain of another, it will inevitably and by definition be a vicarious experience – a sample – a representation – a trace affect – not the overwhelming annihilation that would make one a survivor. Dial the empathy down in so far as a person can do that; don’t turn it off. Admittedly, this is easier said than done, but with practice, the practitioner gets expanded power over the practice of empathizing.

As noted, Morrison is a master of conversational implicature. Conversational implicature allows the empathy to get in – become present in the text and become present for the reader engaging with the text. The conversational implicature expresses and brings to presence the infanticide without describing the act itself by which the baby is killed. Less is more, though the matter is handled graphically enough. The results of the bloody deed are described – “a “woman holding a blood soaked child to her chest with one hand” (Morrison 1987: 124) – but not the bloody action of inflicting the fatal wound itself. “Writing the wound” sometimes dances artistically around expressing the wound, sometimes, not. 

Returning to the story itself, Morrison describes the moment at which the authorities arrive to attempt to enforce the fugitive slave act: “When the four horsemen came – schoolteacher, one nephew, one slave catcher and a sheriff – the house on Bluestone Road was so quiet they thought they were too late” (Morrison 1987: 124). Conversational implicature meets intertextuality in the Book of Revelation of the New Testament. The four horsemen of the apocalypse herald the end of the world as we know it and the end of the world is what comes down on Sethe at this point. Perhaps not unlike the Zealots at Masada, she makes a fatal decision. Literally. As Hannah Arendt (1970) pointed out in a different political context, power and force (violence) stand in an inverse relation: when power is reduced to zero, then force – violence – comes forth. The slaves power is zero, if not a negative number. Though Sethe tries to kill all the children, she succeeds only in one instance. In the fictional account, the boys recover from their injuries and, in the case of Denver (Sethe’s daughter named after Amy Denver, the white girl who helped Sethe), Sethe’s hand is stayed at the last moment. 

Beloved is a text rich in empathy. This includes exemplifications of empathy in the text, which in turn call forth empathy in the reader. The following discussion now joins the standard four aspects of standard empathy – empathic receptivity, empathic understanding, empathic interpretation, and empathic responsiveness. The challenge to the practice of empathy is that with a text and topic such as this one, does the practice of standard empathy need to be expanded, modified, or transformed from standard to radical empathy? What would that even mean? Empathy is empathy. A short definition of radical empathy is proposed: Empathy is committed to empathizing in the face of empathic distress, even if the latter is incurred, and empathy, even in breakdown, acknowledges the commitment to expanding empathy in the individual and the community. 

We start with a straightforward example of empathic receptivity – affect matching. No radical empathy is required here. An example of standard empathic receptivity is provided in the text, and the dance between Denver and Beloved is performed (1987: 87 – 88):

“Beloved took Denver’s hand and place another on Denver’s shoulder. They danced then. Round and round the tiny room and it may have been dizziness, or feeling light and icy at once, that made Denver laugh so hard. A catching laugh that Beloved caught. The two of them, merry as kittens, swung to and fro, to and fro, until exhausted they sat on the floor. “

The contagious laughter is entry level empathic receptivity. Empathy degree zero, so to speak. This opening between the two leads to further intimate engagement with empathic possibility. But the possibility is blocked of further empathizing in the  moment is blocked by a surprising discovery. At this point, Denver “gets it” – that Beloved is from the other side – she has died and come back – and Denver asks her, “What’s it like over there, where you were before?” But since she was killed as a baby, the answer is not very informative: “I’m small in that place. I’m like this here.” (1987: 88) Beloved, the person who returns to haunt the family, is the age she would have been had she lived. 

The narrative skips in no particular order from empathic receptivity to empathic understanding. “Understanding” is used in the extended sense of understanding of possibilities for being in the world (e.g., Heidegger 1927: 188 (H148); 192 (H151)): “In the projecting of the understanding, beings [such as human beings] are disclosed in their possibility.” Empathic understanding is the understanding of possibility. What does the reader’s empathy make present as possible for the person in her or his life and circumstance? What is possible in slavery is being a beast of burden, pain, suffering, and early death – the possibility of no possibility of human flourishing. In contrast, when Paul D (a former slave who knew Sethe in enslavement) makes his way to the house of Sethe and Denver (and, unknown to him, the ghost of the baby), the possibility of family comes forth. In the story, there’s a carnival in town and Paul D, who knew Sethe before both managed to escape from the plantation (“Sweet Home”), takes her and Denver to the carnival. “Having a life” means many things. One of them is family. The possibility of family is made present in the text and the reader. That is the moment of empathic understanding of possibility: 

“They were not holding hands, but their shadows were. Sethe looked to her left and all three of them were gliding over the dust hold hands. Maybe he [Paul D] was right. A life. Watching their hand-holding shadows [. . . ] because she could do and survive things they believed she should neither do nor survive [. . . .] [A]ll the time the three shadows that shot out of their feet to the left held hands. Nobody noticed but Sethe and she stopped looking after she decided that it was a good sign. A life. Could be.” (Morrison 1987: 67)

Within the story, Sethe has her own justification for her bloody deed. She is rendering her children safe and sending them on ahead to “the other side” where she will soon join them. “I took and put my babies where they’d be safe” (Morrison 1987: 193). The only problem with this argument, if there is a problem with it, is that it makes sense out of what she did. Most readers are likely to align with Paul D (a key character in the story and a “romantic” interest of Sethe’s), who at first does not know about the infanticide. Paul D learns the details of Sethe’s act from Stamp Paid, the person who is the former underground rail road coordinator, who knows just about everything that goes on, because he was a hub for the exchange of all-manner of information in helping run-away and would-be run-away slaves to survive. 

Stamp feels that Paul D ought to know, though he later regrets his decision. Stamp tells Paul D about the infanticide – showing him the newspaper clipping as evidence and explaining the words that Paul D (who is illiterate) cannot read. Paul D is overwhelmed. He cannot handle it. He denies that the sketch (or photo) is Sethe, saying it does not look like her – the mouth does not match. Stamp tries to convince Paul D: “She ain’t crazy. She love those children. She was trying to out hurt the hurter” (1987: 276). Paul D asks Sethe about the infanticide reported in the news clipping, and she provides her justification (see above). Paul D is finally convinced that she did what she did, yet unconvinced it was the thing to do and a thunderhead of judgment issues the verdict: “You got two feet, Sethe, not four […] and right then a forest sprung up between them trackless and quiet” (1987: 194).[1] Paul D experiences something he cannot handle. 

Standard empathy misfires as empathic distress. Standard empathy chokes on moral judgment. Paul D moves out of the house where he is living with Sethe, Denver, and Beloved. Standard empathy does not stretch into radical empathy. In a breakdown of empathic receptivity, Paul D takes on Sethe’s shame, and instead of a decision to talk about the matter with her, perhaps agreeing to exit the relationship for cause, Paul D runs away from both Sethe and his own emotional and moral conflicts, making an escape. Stamp blames himself for driving Paul D away by disclosing the infanticide to him (of which he had been unaware), and tries to go to explain it to Sethe. Seeking the honey of self-knowledge results in the stings of enraged distortion and disguise. Paul D finds the door is closed and locked against him. Relationships are in breakdown. 

At this point the isolation of the women – Sethe, Denver, Beloved – inspires a kind of “mad scene” – or at least a carnival of emotion. Empathic interpretation occurs as dynamic and shifting points of view. The rapid-fire changing of perspectives occurs in the three sections beginning, “Beloved, she my daughter”; “Beloved is my sister”; “I am Beloved and she is mine” (Morrison 1987: 236; 242; 248). These express the hunger for relatedness, healing, and family that each of the women experience. For this reader, encountering the voices has the rhythmic effect of Virginia Woolf’s The Waves. The voices are disembodied, though they address one another rather than the reader (as was also the case in Woolf). The first-person reflections slip and slide into a free verse poem of call and response. The rapid-fire, dynamic changing of perspectives results in the merger of the selves, which, strictly speaking, is a breakdown of empathic boundaries. There is no punctuation in the text of Beloved’s contribution to the back-and-forth, because Beloved is a phantom, albeit an embodied one, without the standard limits of boundaries in space/time such as are provided by standard punctuation.

This analysis has provided examples of empathic receptivity, understanding, and interpretation. One aspect of the process of empathy remains. In a flashback of empathic responsiveness: Sethe is on the run, having escaped enslavement at Sweet Home Plantation. She is far along in her pregnancy, alone, on foot, barefoot, and is nearly incapacitated by labor pains. A white girl comes along and they challenge one another. The white girl is named Amy Denver, though the reader does not learn that at first, and she is going to Boston (which becomes a running joke). What is not a joke is that Sethe and Amy Denver are two lost souls on the road of life if there ever were any. Amy is barely more safe or secure than Amy, though she has the distinct advantage that men with guns and dogs are not in hot pursuit of her. Sethe dissembles about her own name, telling Amy it is “Lu.” It is as if the Good Samaritan – in this case, Amy – had also been waylaid by robbers, only not beaten as badly as the man going up to Jerusalem, who is rescored by the Samaritan. Amy is good with sick people, as she notes, and practices her arts on Sethe/Lu. Sethe/Lu is flat on her back and in attempt to help her stand up, Amy massages her feet. But Sethe/Lu’s back hurts. In a moment of empathic responsiveness, Amy describes to Sethe/Lu the state of her (Sethe’s) back, which has endured a whipping with a raw hide whip shortly before the plan to escape was executed. Amy tells her:

“It’s a tree, Lu. A chokecherry tree. See, here’s the trunk – it’s red and spit wide open, full of sap, and this here’s the parting for the branches. You got a mighty lot of branches. Leaves, too, look like, and dern if these ain’t blossoms. Tiny little cherry blossoms, just as white. Your back got a whole tree on it. In bloom. What god have in mind I wonder, I had me some whippings, but I don’t remember nothing like this” (1987: 93).

This satisfies the definition of empathic responsiveness – in Amy’s description to Lu of what Amy sees on Lu’s back, Amy gives to Lu her (Amy’s) experience of the state of Lu’s back. Amy’s response to her (Lu) allows / causes Lu to “get” that Amy has experienced what her (Lu’s) experience is. Lu (Sethe) of course cannot see her own back and the result of the rawhide whipping which is being described to her. On background, early in the story, Sethe tells Paul D: “Them boys found out I told on em. Schoolteacher [actually a teacher, but mostly a Simon Legree type slave owner, and the brother of Mrs Garner’s late husband] made one open up my back, and when it closed it made a tree. It grows there still” (1987:20). The reader wonders, What is she talking about? “Made a tree”? The conversational implicature – clear to the participants in the story, but less so to the reader – lets the suspense – and the empathy – come out. The “tree” finally becomes clear in the above-cited passage. One has to address whether this attempt succeeds artistically to transform the trauma of the whipping into an artistic integration and transfiguration of pain and suffering. Nothing is lacking from Morrison’s artistry, yet the description gave this reader a vicarious experience of nausea, empathic receptivity, especially with the white puss. Once again, not for the faint of heart. This a “transfiguring” of the traumatic.

A further reflection on “transfiguring” is required. If one takes the term literally – transforming the figure into another form without making it more or less meaningful, sensible, or significant, then one has a chance of escaping the aporias and paradoxes into a state of masterful and resonant ambiguity. For example, in another context, when the painter Caravaggio (1571–1610) makes two rondos of Medusa, the Gorgon with snakes for hair, whose sight turns the viewer to stone, was he not transfiguring something horrid and ugly into a work or art? The debate is joined. The inaccessible trauma – what happened cannot be accurately remembered, though it keeps appearing in nightmares and flashback – is the inaccessible real, like Kant’s thing in itself. The performing of the trauma, the work of art – Caravaggio’s self-portrait as the Medusa[2] or the encounter of Amy and Sethe/Lu or Morrison’s Beloved in its entirety – renders the trauma accessible, expressible, and so able to be worked through, integrated, and transformed into a resource that at least allows one to keep going on being and possibly succeed in recovery and flourishing. Once again, the intention is a transfiguring of the traumatic. However, the myth of the Medusa itself suggests a solution, albeit a figurative one. In the face of soul murder embedded within moral trauma, the challenge to standard empathy is to expand, unfold, develop, into radical empathy. That does not add another feature to empathy in addition to receptivity, understanding, interpretation, and responsiveness, but it raises the bar (so to speak) on the practice of all of these. Radical empathy is committed to the practice of empathizing in the face of empathic distress. What does empathic distress look like? It looks like the reaction to the traumatic vision of the snake-haired Gorgon that turns to stone the people who encounter it. It looks like the tree on Sethe/Lu’s back, the decision that Sethe/Margarent should not have to make, but that she nevertheless makes, staring into her image of the Medusa, who show up as the four horsemen. This is to chase the trauma upstream in the opposite direction from the would-be artistic transfiguration. A

This points immediately to Nietzsche’s answer to Plato’s banning of tragic poetry from the just city (the Republic), namely, that humans cannot bear so much truth (1883: §39): 

Indeed, it might be a basic characteristic of existence, that those who would know it completely would perish, in which case the strength of a person’s spirit would then be measured by how much ‘truth’ he could barely still endure, or to put it more clearly, to what degree one would require it to be thinned down, shrouded, sweetened, blunted, falsified.

And again, with admirable conciseness, Nietzsche (1888/1901: Aphorism 822): “We have art, lest we perish of the truth.” Here “truth” is not a semantic definition such as Davidson’s (1973, 1974) use of Tarksi (loosely a correspondence between language and world), but the truth that life is filled with struggle and effort—not fair—that not only are people who arrive early and work hard all day in the vineyard paid a full day’s wages, but so are people who arrive late and barely work also get paid a full day’s wages; that, according to the Buddha, pain is an illusion, but when one is sitting in the dentist chair, the pain is a very compelling illusion; not only old people get sick and die, but so do children. While the universe may indeed be a well-ordered cosmos, according to the available empirical evidence, the planet Earth seems to be in a local whorl in its galaxy where chaos predominates; power corrupts and might makes right; good guys do not always finish last, but they rarely finish first, based alone on goodness.  

On background, the reader may recall that the hero Perseus succeeded in defeating this Medusa without looking at her. Anyone who sees the Medusa straight on is turned to stone. Perseus would have been traumatized by the traumatic image and rendered an emotional zombie – lacking in aliveness, energy, strength, or vitality – turned to stone. Beyond empathic unsettlement and empathic distress, moral trauma (moral injury) and soul murder stop one dead – not necessarily literally but emotionally, cognitively and practically. That is the challenge of the paradox and seeming contradiction: how to continue empathizing in the face of empathic distress. Is there a method of continuing to practice empathizing in the face of such distressing unsettlement? At least initially, the solution is a narrative proposal. Recall that Perseus used a shield, which was also a magic reflective mirror, indirectly to see the Medusa as a reflection without being turned to stone and, thus seeing her, being able to fight and defeat her. The shield acted as a defense against the trauma represented by the Medusa, enabling Perseus to get up close and personal without succumbing to the toxic affects and effects. There is no other way to put it – the artistic treatment of trauma is the shield of Perseus. It both provides access to the trauma and defends against the most negative consequences of engaging with it. The shield does not necessarily render the trauma sensible or meaningful in a way of words, yet the shield takes away the power of the Gorgon/trauma, rending it unable to turn one to stone. In the real-world practice of trauma therapy, this means rendering the trauma less powerful. The real world does not have the niceness of the narrative, where the Gorgon is decapitated – one and done! One gradually – by repeated working through – gets one’s power back as the trauma shrinks, gets smaller, without, however, completely disappearing. The trauma no longer controls the survivor’s life.

The question for this inquiry into Beloved is what happens when one brings literary language, refined language, artistic language, beautiful language, to painful events, appalling events, ugly events, dehumanizing events, traumatic events? The literary language has to dance around the traumatic event, which is made precisely present with expanded power by avoiding being named, leaving an absence. The traumatic events that happened were such that the language of witnessing includes the breakdown of the language of witnessing. As Hartman notes in his widely quoted study:

It is interesting that in neoclassical aesthetic theory what Aristotle called the scene of pathos (a potentially traumatizing scene showing extreme suffering) was not allowed to be represented on stage. It could be introduced only through narration (as in the famous recits [narrative] of Racinian tragedy) (Hartman 1995: 560 ftnt 30).

The messenger arrives and narrates the awful event, which today in a streaming series would be depicted in graphic detail using special effects and enhanced color pallet. One might say that Sophocles lacked special effects, but it is that he really “got it” – less is more. The absence of the most violent defining moment increases its impact. Note this does not mean – avoid talking about it (the trauma). It means the engagement is not going to be a head on encounter and attack, but a flanking movement. In the context of narrative, this does not prevent the reader from engaging with the infanticide. On the contrary, it creates a suspense that hooks the reader like a fish with the rest of the narrative reeling in the reader. The absence makes the engagement a challenge, mobilizing the reader’s imagination to fill in the blank in such a way that it recreates the event as a palpable vicarious event. It is necessary to raise the ghost prior to exorcising it, and the absentee implication does just that. 

If this artistic engagement with trauma is not “writing trauma” in LaCapra’s sense, then I would not know it:

 “Trauma indicates a shattering break or caesura in experience which has belated effects. Writing trauma would be one of those telling after-effects in what I termed traumatic and post-traumatic writing (or signifying practice in general). It involves processes of acting out, working over, and to some extent working through in analyzing and ‘giving voice’ to [it] [. . . ]  – processes of coming to terms with traumatic ‘experiences,’ limit events, and their symptomatic effects that achieve articulation in different combinations and hybridized forms. Writing trauma is often seen in terms of enacting it, which may at times be equated with acting (or playing) it out in performative discourse or artistic practice” (LaCapra 2001: 186–187).

If the writing (and reading) of the traumatic events is a part of working through the pain and suffering of the survivors (and acknowledging the memory of the victims), then the result for the individual and the community is expanded well-being, expanded possibilities for aliveness, vitality, relatedness, and living a life of satisfaction and fulfillment. Instead of being ruled by intrusive flashbacks and nightmares, the survivor expands her/his power over the events that were survived. This especially includes the readers engaging with the text who are survivors of other related traumatic events, dealing with their own personal issues, which may be indistinguishable from those of fellow-travelers in trauma. That is the situation at the end of Beloved when Paul D returns to Sethe and Denver (Sethe’s daughter) after the community has exorcised the ghost of Beloved. It takes a village – a community – to bring up a child; it also takes a village to exorcise the ghost of one.

References

Anonymous. (2012). Trolley problem (The trolley dilemma). Wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trolley_problem [checked on 2023-06-25]

Hannah Arendt. (1970). On Violence. New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich.

Caty Caruth. (1996). Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative, and History. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.

Donald Davidson. (1974). On the very idea of a conceptual scheme. In Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 2001: 183–198.

Geoffrey H Hartman. (1995). On Traumatic Knowledge and Literary Studies New Literary History , Summer, 1995, Vol. 26, No. 3, Higher Education (Summer, 1995): 537 – 563 .

Martin Heidegger. (1927). Being and Time, John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (trs.). New York: Harper and Row, 1963.s

Albert R. Jonsen and Stephen Toulmin. (1988). The Abuse of Casuistry. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Dominick LaCapra. (1999). Trauma, absence, loss. Critical Inquiry, Summer, 1999, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Summer, 1999): 696–727 

Dominick LaCapra. (2001). Writing History, Writing Trauma. Baltimore, John Hopkins Unviersity Press. 

Stephen Levinson. (1983). Pragmatics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Toni Morrison. (1987). Beloved. New York: Vintage Int.

Friedrich Nietzsche. (1883). Thus Spoke Zarathustra, R. J. Hollingdale (tr.). Baltimore: Penguin Press, 1961.

________________. (1888/1901). The Will to Power, R. J. Hollingdale (tr.). New York: Vintage, 1968.

Ruth Leys. (2000). Trauma: A Genealogy. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Boris Sagal, Director. (1981). Masadehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Masada_(miniseries) [checked on 2023-06-25).

J. Shay, (2014). Moral injury. Psychoanalytic Psychology, 31(2), 182-191. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0036090

Leonard Shengold. (1989). Soul Murder Revisited: Thoughts About Therapy, Hate, Love, and Memory. Hartford: Yale University Press. 

Bessel van der Kolk. (2014). The Body Keeps the Score. New York: Penguin. 


[1] For those readers wondering how Sethe regained her freedom after being arrested for murder (infanticide), Beloved provides no information as to the sequence. During the historical trial an argument was made that as a free woman, Margaret Garner should be tried and convicted of murder, so that the Abolitionist governor of Ohio could then pardon her, returning here to freedom. Something like that needs to be understood in the story, though it is a fiction. It is a fiction, since in real life, Garner and her children were indeed returned to slavery under the Fugitive Slave Act. Moral trauma within soul murder indeed. 

[2] Caravaggio was a good looking fellow, and he uses himself as a model for the face of the Medusa. This does not decide anything. Arguably, Caravaggio was arguably memorializing – transfiguring – his own life traumas, which were many and often self-inflicted as befits a notorious manic-depressive. 

© Lou Agosta, PhD and the Chicago Empathy Project

Empathy Lessons, 2nd Edition, is now available as an ebook…

The release of the ebook version of Empathy: Lessons ,2nd Edition, coincided with a major astronomical event – the total solar eclipse that traversed North America on Monday April 8, 2024. The gods are watching and winking at us humans to encourage expanding our empathic humanism! 

Empathy is oxygen for the soul (see Chapter 6: Evidence-based empathy training). So, if you are short of breath due to life stress, get the expanded empathy delivered in this book. Just as the body needs oxygen to live physically, the soul needs empathy to live emotionally. Most people are naturally empathic, but the cynicism and denial needed to survive everyday life drives empathy away. Remove the obstacles to empathy and empathy naturally develops and grows. That is the empathy lesson in a nutshell without all the guidance and practice needed to succeed. Find out how to take your empathy to the next level.


In addition to all the features of the First Edition—a readiness assessment for empathy, tips on overcoming resistance to empathy, evidence-based empathy training, empathic techniques of stress reduction, applications to dealing with bullying, healthy well-being, and capitalism—the enlarged Second Edition includes new chapters on rhetorical empathy in politics, the limitations of empathy (and what to do about them), and an expanded chapter on empathy as a lens on love and romance. Not to be missed!

The empathy lessons include how—
To perform a readiness assessment; establish a set up for success in cleaning up inauthenticities that block empathy so that empathy can expand and flourish;

Empathy is not an “on–off” switch but a tuner (a dial) that expands or contracts in accessing the vicarious experience of the other person;

Empathy works as a method of data gathering about the other person, providing a vicarious experience of the other person without being flooded by the experience;

Introspection, vicarious experience, listening to one’s own “voice over” and radical acceptance are the royal road to empathic receptivity;

Empathic receptivity overcomes emotional contagion, creating a set up for clear communication of feelings and experiences;

Empathic understanding overcomes conformity and enables shifting out of stuckness into contribution, transformation, and leadership, including satisfying and flourishing relationships;

Empathic interpretation overcomes projection and is the folk definition of empathy, walking in another’s shoes, adding “top down” empathy to “bottom up,” empathic receptivity;

Empathic responsiveness drives out anger and rage, acting as a soothing balm to suffering and emotional upset, deescalating conflict and aggression;

Scientific, peer-reviewed, evidence-based research confirms that empathy reduces inflammation and stress;

Relationships get “weaponized” in bullying and, coming from empathy, how to overcome bullying, reestablishing boundaries: recommendations to students, teachers, administrators on how to stop bullying (including cyber-bullying) and promote empathy;

“Corporate empathy” is not a contradiction in terms, “CEO” now means “chief empathy officer,” and empathy is now the ultimate “capitalist tool”;

In rhetorical empathy, the speaker’s words address the listening of the audience in such a way as to leave the audience with the experience of having been heard. The speaker articulates the experience the audience is hiding harboring in their hearts yet have been unable to express.

To expand empathy, start with and stick with integrity and authenticity – start with creating a safe space of acceptance and toleration. Fake in; fake out. Empathy is based on integrity and being straight with the other person to and with whom one is trying to relate.

Decline the choice between empathy and compassion, between expanding empathy and fighting and reducing the empire of prejudice, imperialism, the pathologies of capitalism, and violence. 

Some have tried to force a choice between compassion and empathy. The world needs both more compassion and expanded empathy.

My colleagues and friends are telling me, “Louis, you are sooo 20th Century – no one is reading hard copy books anymore! Electronic publishing is the way to go.” Following my own guidance about empathy, I have heard you, dear reader. The electronic versions of all three books, Empathy Lessons, 2nd Edition, Empathy: A Lazy Person’s Guide, and A Critical Review of a Philosophy of Empathy – drum roll please – are now available. 

Feeling like you are thrown “under the bus” again and it’s getting crowded under there? Get the empathy you need to fight back and flourish in this book. Get expanded empathy here!

Order from author’s page: Empathy Lessons, 2nd Edition: https://tinyurl.com/29rd53nt

Order from author’s page: Empathy: A Lazy Person’s Guidehttps://tinyurl.com/29rd53nt

Order from author’s page: A Critical Review of Philosophy of Empathyhttps://tinyurl.com/29rd53nt

Read a review of the 1st edition of Empathy Lessons – note the list of the Top 30 Empathy Lessons is now (2024) expanded to the Top 40 Empathy Lessons: https://tinyurl.com/yvtwy2w6

Read a review of A Critical Review of a Philosophy of Empathyhttps://tinyurl.com/49p6du8p

Empathy Lessons, 2nd Edition, Cover art by Alex Zonis (Memory Bocks: Shimon")

Above: Cover art: Empathy Lessons, 2nd Edition, illustration by Alex Zonis, original oil paint on board, entitled “Memory blocks: Shimon”

Empathy: A Lazy Person's Guide Cover Art by Alex Zonis, illustrator/artist
Empathy: A Lazy Person’s Guide Cover Art by Alex Zonis, illustrator/artist

Order from author’s page: A Critical Review of a Philosophy of Empathyhttps://tinyurl.com/mfb4xf4f

Cover art by Alex Zonis

Above: Cover art: A Critical Review of a Philosophy of Empathy, illustration by Alex Zonis

In conclusion, let me again say a word on behalf of hard copy books – they too live and are handy to take to the beach where they can be read without the risk of sand getting into the hardware, screen glare, and your notes in the margin are easy to access. Is this a great country or what – your choice of pixels or paper!?!

(c) Lou Agosta, PhD and the Chicago Empathy Project

Top Ten Empathy Trends 2024

This is going to be a tough year—heck, some of these trends were formulated before January 1st, 2024, and it was already a tough year, not having even started! I am sick at heart for the atrocities and killing. I begin the year in grief for all the dead. I am regularly donating blood at the local blood bank, so I bleed in solidarity with the victims and survivors of boundary violations, atrocities, and killings. Based on empathy, I am confident that you, dear reader, will do whatever you can. As Lenin said, “You ask me for a contribution—we’re all doin’ what we can.” Just so there is no misunderstanding—that would be John Lennon. We need a lighter moment, too, amid all the bad news. Meanwhile—I am going with Paul Simon: 

“Who says, “Hard times?” / I’m used to them / The speeding planet burns / I’m used to that / My life’s so common it disappears / And sometimes even empathy / Cannot substitute for tears”  (1990, “The Cool, Cool River”) 

—okay, I substituted the word “empathy” for “music”—but the point is similar. 

(10) The first casualty of war is truth—the second is empathy. Empathy has to call for backup. The backup is in the form of radical empathy. In time of war, the power of empathy consists in putting oneself in the shoes of the opponent, thinking like the opponent, and thereby anticipating and thwarting the opponent’s surprise attack. Putting oneself in the opponent’s shoes requires taking off one’s own shoes first. Empathy should never be under-estimated, but empathy requires a safe space of acceptance and tolerance.

Yet, empathic engagement in such predicaments must be limited to cognitive empathy—use critical thinking to try to figure out what the Other is thinking and feeling in order to intervene in a way that is useful according the standards of a humane community. When confronting an aggressor, the empathic approach is to set limits, set boundaries, establish a safe space of one’s own that can be grown to include those willing to join.

The world was on fire last year at this time. The conflagration is spreading. Empathy is one of the few proven methods of deescalating anger and rage—but only if the parties are willing to do so. Empathy is based on creating a safe space of acceptance and tolerance within which the opposing parties can engage with the possibilities for expanding community. Killing everyone in sight and/or signing up for a suicide mission is indeed a solution—but all the evidence is that it is a bad solution. Once someone throws the first stone, or the first bomb, then self-defense, limit setting, drawing boundaries is appropriate. Empathy does not work with psychopaths, certain kinds of autism, most bullies, suicide bombers, totalitarian bureaucrats, and lynch mobs. It is not joke, but especially in the latter cases, call for backup. Many of these individuals will take your affective, emotional empathy and use it against you. 

The FBI hostage negotiating team understands that empathy reduces rage and upset; and they use empathy in context for that purpose, though, as far as I know, they do not use the word “empathy” as such. Yet once the bullets start flying, the time for empathy has passed. Send in the swat team. For an illuminating article on the margins of empathy see Elizabeth Bernstein on “Advice From a [FBI] Hostage Negotiator” (WSJ.com 06/14/2020) [https://on.wsj.com/3ajoYon]. Never underestimate the power of empathy. Never. 

Though not a new book, Micha Zenko’s Red Team considers the dynamics of thinking like one’s opponent, and it is as timely as it was five years ago.

(9) Radical empathy lands hard, and a grim empathy lesson hits home: If one wants to end a cycle of revenge killings and get peace, one is going to have to negotiate with the people who have killed one’s children and parents. As an analogous case, this grim empathy lesson was expressed by Fionnuala D. Ní Aoláin (Oct 13, 2023) during Q&A in her talk, “The Triumph of Counter-Terrorism and the Despair of Human Rights” at the University of Chicago Law School. Professor Aoláin draws on the example of the sectarian violence in Northern Ireland, The Troubles, between 1960 and 1998’s Good Friday Agreement. This had all the characteristics of intractable hatred, perpetrations and human rights violations, the British government making every possible mistake, the Jan 30, 1972 shooting of 26 unarmed civilians by elite British army troopers, internment without trail, members of the Royal Family (Louis Mountbatten, the Last Viceroy of India, and his teenage grandson (27 Aug 1979)) blown up by an IRA bomb, the IRA (Irish Republican Army) launching a mortar at 10 Downing Street (no politicians were hurt, only innocent by-standers), and many tit-for-tat acts of revenge killing of innocent civilians. It is impossible to generalize as every intractable conflict is its own version of hell—no one listens to the suffering humanity—but what was called The Peace Process got traction as all sides in the conflict became exhausted by the killing and committed to moving forward with negotiations in spite of interruptions of the pauses in fighting in order to attain a sustainable cease fire. The relevance to ongoing events in the Middle East will be obvious. An organization widely designated in the West as “terrorist” changes the course of history in the Middle East. Hearts are hardened by the boundary violations, atrocities, and killings. The response requires radical empathy: to empathize in the face of empathic distress, exhausted by all the killing. Though neither the didactic trial in Jerusalem (1961) of Holocaust architect Adolph Eichmann nor the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (1995) lived up to their full potentials, they formed parts of processes that presented alternatives to violence and extra judicial revenge killings. In this frame, the survivor is willing to judge if the perpetrator is speaking the truth and expressing what, if any, forgiveness is possible. The radical empathy that empathizes in the face of empathic distress acknowledges that moral trauma includes survivors who are also perpetrators (and vice versa). (See Tutu 1997 in the References for further details.) In a masterpiece of studied ambiguity, radical empathy teaches that two wrongs never make a right; they make at least twice the wrong; and one who sews the wind reaps the whirlwind.

(8) In the USA, librarians are the point of the spear in expanding empathy. Reading teaches one to walk in someone else’s shoes. Reading takes one to worlds that don’t exist, like the world of Harry Potter. One can feel what it was like for Rosa Parks to refuse to sit in the back of that segregated bus in 1955. This trend calls out the convergence of reading and empathy—both open up new worlds, both provide vicarious experiences of the lives of Others, both point to possibilities that had not previously been imagined. In both reading and empathy, we relate to an Other—in the one case in-person, in the other case, in-fiction or the vicarious presentation of historical narrative. Librarians will receive expanded empathy—just not in Florida or similar cultural swamps—but will continue to struggle with unemployment insurance and lost healthcare benefits—empathy for the reader goes into reverse as more books are banned from library shelves (by volume count) than are added to the library inventory. To be sure, parents are responsible for vetting the reading material that their children encounter. According to a Washington Post article, a majority of book ban complaints were filed by eleven (11) people (Hannah Natanson, “Objection to sexual, LGBTQ content propels spike in book challenges,” Washington Post, May 23, 2023 [see shortened URL: https://shorturl.at/hpEHM%5D; see also Reshma Kirpalani and Hannah Natanson, “The lives upended by Florida’s school book wars,” Washington Post, Dec 21, 2023). Your library’s reading list is being dictated by someone whose fears and inhibitions are inspiring her to legislate morality. Never has the power of the word—or magical thinking—been greater—if one says the word “gay,” that calls it forth and gives it reality. Might be worth a try: “Empathy, empathy, empathy!” “Peace on earth, peace on earth, peace on earth!”

(7) Rhetorical empathy emerges as a new practice and the distinction expands. Empathy is generally understood as a listening skill with responses being limited to short speech acts of recognition and acknowledgment, “I get you, man!” Rhetorical empathy refers to empathic responsiveness—speaking into the listening of the person with whom one is attempting to empathize with a form of words that indicates one understands what the Other has experienced. Not just listening, but also speaking empathically. For example, when Abraham Lincoln called in his 2nd Inaugural address to “bind up the nation’s wounds; to care for him who shall have borne the battle, and for his widow and is orphan,” Lincoln’s rhetorical empathy created a clearing for compassionate action. When Malcolm X said to his African American audience in an example of “out bound,” rhetorical empathy: “You didn’t land on Plymouth Rock; Plymouth rock landed on you,” the audience felt heard and appreciated in its long suffering and struggle for social justice. The “Amens!” and laughter of knowledge that erupted in the audience were evidence of the accuracy of Malcolm’s empathic responsiveness. Arguably the Parables of Jesus of Nazareth—especially that of the Good Samaritan—are examples of rhetorical empathy—getting inside the experiences of the listeners to overcome their blind spots—in the case of the Good Samaritan of the understanding of who is one’s neighbor—the one who is in need right now. (See Blankenship 2019 in the References for more on rhetorical empathy.)

(6) Lies, damn lies, and total nonsense—about empathy. The trend is to confuse fake empathy and mutilated empathy with the practice of a rigorous and critical empathy, to the latter’s detriment. A cottage industry has grown up of demonstrating the biases and limitations of empathy, and, like any powerful skill, empathy has its strengths and weaknesses. A bold statement of the obvious: empathy can breakdown as emotional contagion, projection, conformity, or understanding getting lost in translation. However, these misfirings of empathy call for training and improving one’s practice of the skill, not giving up on it. That empathy can be parochial and favor the “in group” is properly remedied with expanded empathy and the practice of inclusion. The matter is complex. The practice of including the breakdowns of empathy in empathy’s definition is like invalidating the practice of carpentry because Roman soldiers used hammers and nails in crucifying their victims. A case in point is Alisha Gaines’ Black for a Day (see the detailed review: https://shorturl.at/ozNRU), in its own way an engaging narrative, which, however, presents significant problems. The narrative of Black for a Day consists in describing the cases of several non-fiction narratives of individuals, born Caucasian, who “go under cover,” changing the color of their skin cosmetically and chemically from white to black, in order to “pass” as African American while travelling in the American south (or, in one case, Harlem) in the late 1940s and 1950s (note well the dates!). 

According to Black for a Day, these impersonations are supposed to produce empathy between the races and/or in white people for black people, but what they actually produce is “empathic racial impersonation”—that is, fake empathy. This is a subtle and complex point. Black for a Day denounces “empathic racial impersonation,” but what Black for a Day might more usefully be denouncing is fake empathy. Key term: fake empathy (my term, not Gaines’). 

These social psychology experiments, “passing” as black, impersonating a black person, provide engaging adventures and misadventures that demonstrate that when one starts out by faking race, solidarity, integrity, relatedness, and empathy as input, then one gets fake race, fake solidarity, fake integrity, fake relatedness, and fake empathy as output. This is not surprising. Fake in; fake out. If one begins with pretense, deception, and inauthenticity as input, then one gets pretence, deception, inauthenticity—and fake empathy—as output. Black for a Day, as indicated, includes a fascinating account of what amounts to social psychology experiments gone bad. White people putting on the equivalent of black face, pretending to be black, is a bold experiment, which, admittedly engaging as a kind of misguided role playing, does not work as intended. As noted, such a mixed result no more invalidates a rigorous and critical empathy than that Roman soldiers invalidate the practice of carpentry by hammering nails into the limbs of the people they were crucifying. 

A similar consideration applies to Glenda Carpio’s Migrant Aesthetics and the limits of empathy, which tries to force a choice between fighting against the evils of “empire” (racism, imperialism, the pathologies of capitalism, prejudices of all kinds, and so on) and empathy. (See the complete review at https://shorturl.at/absCQ.) But why force a choice between empire and empathy? Isn’t “empire” the systematic negation of empathy? Don’t we need to reduce the evils of empire and expand empathy? Such a choice must be declined and the practice of a rigorous and critical empathy brought to the struggle against global injustice. 

(5) Historical empathy gets new relevance. You, dear reader, really gotta get this—history does repeat itself—a US President was elected to two non-consecutive terms and a popular socialist candidate ran for US President from prison after being convicted of sedition (but was not elected) in 1892 and 1920, respectively. This is an invitation to take an alternative, opposing point of view, regardless of what side you are on in 2024. Grover Cleveland was the only US President (so far!) to be elected twice to two non-consecutive terms (1885/1889, 1893/1897). During his first administration, Cleveland supported the Dawes Act of 1887, which basically legalized the stealing of Native American (Indian) land from the tribes. Shortly after assuming office for the 2nd time, Cleveland called out the US Army as strike breakers to operate the railroad during the Pullman railway strike in 1894 under the pretext of delivering the US Mail. As a historical footnote, the reader may know that the railroad baron, George Pullman, built an ideal “city” on the southside of Chicago for his workers in a utopian moment of flush profits when other capitalists were squeezing workers as hard as they could. This good start came to a violent end in 1894 when railroad revenues plunged in the economic panic of 1893 and workers were laid off—but the Pullmanville rents were not reduced. The President of the Railway Union, Eugene Debs, went on in historical fact to run for President from prison in 1920. Debs was sent to prison under the Sedition Act of 1918 for opposing US participation in World War 1. He garnered nearly a million votes for his socialist party while unable to campaign. Heading an oligarchy of monied interests, Cleveland was a model of personal integrity in what was in-effect a fascist dictatorship in which the US Presidency and Congress were dominated by the robber barons of capitalism. A fictionalized account of this period is narrated in Jack London’s The Iron Heel (1908), which tells of the conflict between the trade union labor movement in the USA and a fictional fascist dictatorship that reads a lot like the Cleveland Presidency. One of Marx’s most relevant observations: “History repeats itself, first as tragedy, second as farce.” In this case, it was indeed Karl, not Groucho, Marx, though, I submit, worthy of Groucho. Still, democracy (in some version somehow) survived. Previous performance is no guarantee of future results. 

(4) Empathy disrupts the patriarchy. The innovations of Simon Baron-Cohen into mind blindness, the ability to take the perspective of the Other (the folk definition of empathy), are well-known, even legendary. In a different context, Baron-Cohen’s research on gender has been influential but controversial. Men and women have different routes to accessing and activating their empathy; they respond to different pressures to conform to (or push back against) what the community defines as conforming to gender-appropriate behavior; and men and women even have different incentives for empathic performance. For example, “…[M]en’s scores on an empathy task equaled women’s when a monetary reward for good performance was offered” (Bluhm 2017: 384). Monetary rewards up; empathy up? Though Bluhm does not say so, the author came away with the distinct impression of a much-needed debunking of the neurohype—what we would now call “alternative facts”—a job well done. Bluhm’s work is especially pertinent in constraining celebrity, executive consultants (once again, my term), running with the neuro-spin, and publishing in the Harvard Business Review, who assert that brain science shows one needs more women executives on corporate boards to expand empathy. I hasten to add that we do indeed need more women executives, but that is not something demonstrated by brain science, at least as of this date (Q4 2023). We need more women executives because it is demonstrated by statistics (just one of many sources of reasons other than brain science) that to devalue their contributions to innovation, service, and productivity of slightly more than half the population is a highly problematic business practice—foolish, inefficient, and wasteful. The challenge is that the practices that make one good at business—beating the competition, engaging technology problems, solving legal disputes—do not necessarily expand one’s empathy, regardless of gender. Empathy under capitalism is an equal opportunity debunker—take a walk in the Other’s shoes in order to sell him or her another pair; treat the workers with respect and dignity in order to sustain commitment to the mission and enhance productivity. 

(3) The banality of empathy gives way to a thoughtful rigorous and critical empathy. Namwali Serpall’s “The Banality of Empathy” (2019) provides the entry point. Nice title. Serpall is invoking Hannah Arendt’s book Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (1971), about which it is hard to say just a little. I shall try. One of Arendt’s recurring themes is that evil is a consequence of thoughtlessness. “Enlarged thinking” interrupts thoughtlessness by “trying on” and integrating many diverse points of view. According to Arendt, Eichmann was a simpleton, a “Hans Wurst” from the folktale, who did not think and just followed orders. The wanted-dead-or-alive poster for Thoughlessness has Eichmann’s photo on it. The result of thoughtlessness was catastrophe. Indeed. Of course, Eichmann had many “fellow travelers” in genocide. 

If one empathizes thoughtlessly, the banality of empathy of Serpall’s title, then one is at risk of empathy misfiring as projection, emotional contagion, conformity, and so on. Just so. A rigorous and critical empathy is required to guard against these risks, and Arendt, no advocate for sloppy anything, much less sloppy empathy, is halfway, but not all-the-way, there with her invocation of Kant’s rigorous and critical method. The above-cited quotation from Arendt and my analysis of terms must count towards a clarification of the nuances of the matter of empathy.

Serpall’s article then raises the question about narrative art “If witnessing suffering firsthand doesn’t spark good deeds, why do we think art about suffering will?” Though this may have been intended as a rhetorical question, the answer requires an empirical, fact-based inquiry. Some witnessing of suffering does indeed spark good deeds. The standard Samaritan becomes the Good Samaritan when he stops to help the survivor of the robbery thereby creating neighborliness and community; whereas the Levite and Priest succumb to empathic distress and cross the road, thereby expanding indifference and alienation. These events get “narrativized” in the Parable of the same name, which, in turn, inspires some to good deeds, though others are left paralyzed by empathic distress. 

(2) In the USA, empathy causes the temperature in politics to cool down. Groups called Braver Angels and the Listening First Coalition are making it a priority to bring the practice empathic listening to hot button political issues and disrupt “false polarization” with empathy—similar to the “empathy circles” (work inspired by Edward Rutsch and thecultureofempathy.com). Such empathy-based conversations are not trying to change participants’ minds about the issues; they are trying to change the participants’ minds about each other. In an account in Aaron Zitner’s WSJ.com article (cited below): “Each party would meet separately at the start and come up with a list of the most common false stereotypes of their group—what they think the other party believes incorrectly about them. Then, they would ask what was true of themselves, instead. Finally, they would ask themselves to acknowledge any kernel of truth to the stereotype. Only then would the two parties meet and discuss how each side sees the other. A central goal was to reduce “false polarization”—the misperception that the people in the other party are more extreme in their views than is true.” If this is not the practice of empathic listening, then I would not know it.  As the Wall Street Journal article points out, substantial donor dollars are in play, so this trend has legs. See the shortened URL for Aaron Zitner’s Dec 25, 2023 Wall Street Journal article, “Meet the Americans Trying to Lower the Temperature in Politics”: https://shorturl.at/bBM23.

(1) Empathy “the hard way” results in radical empathy. Empathy “the hard way” means that there is no way of getting to radical empathy except through empathy. For example, one could take a short cut through mind reading, mindfulness, diverse spiritual or religious practices, or chemical interventions such as micro dosing with psilocybin. No doubt all of these and more will be assayed by one thinker or would-be empath or another, and nothing is wrong with that. However, the approach of this work is that the hard work of practicing a rigorous and critical empathy is the path on which radical empathy goes forward. Empathy, whether radical or standard, is at risk of breaking down into empathic distress, misfiring, or failing into the breakdown, or failure of standard empathy with which a would-be radical empathy has to struggle. The short account is that standard empathy encounters a hard case—complex physical and moral trauma, double-binds, tragedy embedded in tragedy (examples are many and not hard to find)—and standard empathy breaks down into empathic distress. 

When empathy is practiced by an individual or group that is committed to continuing to empathize in the face of empathic distress, then standard empathy is able to emerge from the refiner’s fire of the breakdown of empathy as radical empathy. This is empathy the hard way. In other words, radical empathy is not a predictable result. As an exercise consider what would empathy “the easy way” look like? What is really needed is a kind of Turing Test for empathy. No, not ChatGPT, though that is a possibility for future research. As a first approximation such a test exists—though it does so in a fictional universe. A masterpiece ahead of its time, Philip K. Dick’s (1928–1982) negative fantasy of the future Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep (1968) provides for the Voight-Kampff Empathy test (a fiction within a fiction). Once again, life continues to imitate art. One thinks that nothing like a Philip K. Dick’s Voight-Kampff empathy test ever existed. Think again. Helen Riess, MD, (2018) and her neuroscience colleagues at Massachusetts General Hospital and the Harvard Medical School, have developed a bio-feedback-like set of protocols to train medical doctors and related healthcare professionals in regulating their physiological arousal in contexts relevant to empathy, which context, in medicine, is exactly every encounter with a conscious patient. These protocols and this training are proprietary, intellectual property, and are confidential, so I cannot assess the details. Though I am not sure, it sounds like the trainer puts the little Velcro-cuff on one of the subject’s fingers to measure the galvanic skin response. Galvanic skin response is a blunt instrument and does not distinguish between emotions such as fear, anger, sadness, high spirits, much less subtle states such as envy or indignation, yet it does provide a measure of physiological stimulus and arousal. Useful. Might be worth a try. Never was it truer, if you want to sell something, put the word “neuroscience” on it. That’s empathy “the easy way,” but it’s not empathy. It’s gimmick, but, heck, maybe a gimmick just just what empathy needs in these times of alternative facts and fake everything. However, if one is “suffer[ing] woes which Hope thinks infinte; […] wrongs darker than death or night” and one needs “to defy power, which seems ominipotent,” then empathy “the hard way” is the alternative path – to empathize in the confrontation with empathic distress until empathy creates from its own wreck the empathy it contemplates. 

References 

Simone de Beauvoir. (1949). The Second Sex, H. M. Parshley (tr.). New York: Bantam Books, 1961.

Lisa Blankenship. (2019). Changing the Subject: A Theory of Rhetorical Empathy. Logan UT: Utah State University Press.  

Robyn Blum. (2017). Gender and empathy. In (2017). The Routledge Handbook of the philosophy of Empathy. Heidi Maibom (ed.). London/New York: Routledge (Taylor and Francis).

Brenda Carpio. (2019). Migrant Aesthetics. New York: Columbia University Pres. [See separately published review: at https://shorturl.at/absCQ.]

Simon Baron-Cohen. (1995). Mindblindness: An Essay on Autism and Theory of Mind. Cambridge, MA: Bradford Books (MIT Press), 1997.

______________________. (2003). The Essential Difference: Males, Females, and the Truth about Autism. New York: Basic Books.

______________________. (2014). Zero degrees of empathy. RSA [Renaissance Society of America] Video Presentation: https://youtu.be/Aq_nCTGSfWE [checked on 2023-02-26]

Alisha Gaines. (2018). Black for a Day. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. [See separately published review: at : https://shorturl.at/ozNRU.]

H. Riess. (2018), The Empathy Effect. Boulder, CO: Sounds True; for details see separately published “Review: The Empathy Effect by Helen Riess”: https://shorturl.at/AFZ36 [checked on 2023/09/12].

Namwali Serpall. (2019). The banality of empathy. The New York Reviewhttps://www.nybooks.com/online/2019/03/02/the-banality-of-empathy/?lp_txn_id=1496946  [checked on 10/20/2023].

Desmond Tutu. (1997). No Future Without Forgiveness. New York: Random House.

Micah Zenko. (2015). Red Team: How to Succeed by Thinking Like the Enemy. New York: Basic Books.

© Lou Agosta, PhD, and the Chicago Empathy Project

Review: The varieties of empathy in Richard Wright’s (1940) novel Native Son

Review: The varieties of empathy in Richard Wright’s (1940) novel Native Son(New York: Harper Perennial 504 pp + end matter)

The varieties of empathy and empathic experiences extend from authentic empathic receptivity, empathic understanding, and empathic responsiveness, all the way to fake empathy and mutilated empathy. Wright’s novel, Native Son, provides abundant examples of how empathy breaks down into emotional contagion, conformity, projection, and communications getting lost in translation. Of course, once empathy breaks down and fails, strictly speaking, it is no longer empathy and calls for a response to “clean up” the misunderstanding out of which a rigorous and critical empathy is restored and reestablished. Nevertheless, the varieties of empathically related phenomena that are constellated makes Wright’s classic work a study in empathy in all its diverse forms. 

Native Son is as powerful and timely as it was when Richard Wright first published it in 1940. Though it has aspects of tragedy and traffics in ruin and wreck, in the final analysis, it has as much in common with Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein as it does with ancient Greek tragedy by Aeschylus, Sophocles, or Euripides. 

The novel has not changed since 1940, but the world has – becoming both better and worse. To open up the reader’s historical empathy, a background report will be useful and is provided. This report also provides a chapter in African American history. The engagement with Native Son will be interspersed in this review with historical details that bring to life the power of the story in ways that might not be appreciated without a firm historical grounding. This is not a digression but of the essence, lest we forget how far we have come, and how far we still have to go to expand empathy and attain social justice.

The world has become better in that the US Supreme Court ruled in Brown versus the Board of Education (1954) that separate, segregated education in grammar and high schools is inherently

Canada Lee as Bigger Thomas in the original Broadway production of Native Son (1941), photographed by Carl Van Vechten.

unequal. That is worth repeating: Separate but equal is inherently unequal. The world has become better in that the Civil Rights Act and the Voting Rights Act (1965/1965) were passed by a super majority of Congress. These outlawed segregation by law, also called “Jim Crow”; these enabled county and congressional districts in the South (or anywhere) with majority black populations to register to vote and elect black sheriffs and local officials. Why could they not do so previously? There were discriminatory poll taxes, which the impoverished people could not afford to pay; there were written tests (including trick questions) which people who lacked reading skills or merely had a grammar school education were unable to pass; there were other bureaucratic obstacles including the need to present state issued documents that were hard to obtain, putting the would-be voter in a double bind. One hastens to add that the struggle for social and political justice continues, with the US Supreme Court (2023) requiring Alabama and Georgia to redraw their gerrymandered congressional districts to allow for majority black districts. Under backward steps, the so-called “war on drugs” – espoused by Nancy Reagan and implemented by the Clinton administration, resulted in the incarceration (still ongoing) of a generation of young black men for relatively victimless crimes involving using crack cocaine. 

Meanwhile, schools of all kinds continue to be under stress because of mass casualty gun violence. Teaching is a tough job, especially elementary and middle schools and it has gotten tougher; the bureaucratic requirements to present politically correct curriculum has pushed out fundamental skills of critical thinking along with skills such as the three R-s – reading, writing and (a)rithmetic. These have been replaced by the need for librarians and administrators to act in the role of surveillance state capitalism (see Zuboff 2018), overseeing whether some text refers to “gay,” “trans,” the name of a sex organ, and so on, and that someone – especially a parent – might be made to feel uncomfortable. To be sure, parents and educators need to be sensitive to the stages of child development and present material that fits the stage at which the growing child is maturing.

While Jim Crow is a historical reference and black empowerment is advancing, at times haltingly, the number of unarmed black people who end up dead after encounters with the local police has astonished everyone – everyone except black people who have known all about it all along. Today the number of black CEOs of major corporations is some 5.9 % out of an overall black population of 13.6% (US Census). That is progress since 1940 when Wright’s work was published, at which time the percentage was essentially zero. Johnson Publications, the publisher of Ebony magazine (among others), would not be founded until 1942. Yet a case can be made that, though many of the social and legal details are different, the need for struggle and protest is as powerful today as it was in 1940. We are not living in a post racial society, notwithstanding fact of having had a black president. All this and more may usefully inform our reading of Native Son.

Now to the narrative. The protagonist, Bigger Thomas (henceforth referred to as “BT”), completes the 8thgrade. He is too poor to continue school, nor is he motivated to do so. He experiences segregation and prejudice wherever he turns, as indeed do all black people. BT says, “Hell, it’s a Jim Crow army. All they want a black man for is to dig ditches. And in the navy, all I can do is wash dishes and scrub floors” (1940: 353). BT is not allowed to become a pilot or a tank driver or a professional. “I wanted to be an aviator once. But they wouldn’t let me go to the school where I was suppose’ to learn it. They built a big school and then drew a line around it and said that nobody could go to it but those who lived within the line. That kept all the colored boys out” (1940: 353). It is true there were a few exceptions – some black people go to college and become doctors, lawyers, or engineers, though how they pulled that off is not for the faint of heart. 

However, basically, the form of life under segregation (Jim Crow) does not just lack possibility – the possibility of possibility itself is missing. Possibility is not even defined. What does that mean? For example, as soon as Barak Obama was elected US President, the media went to middle schools and interviewed black ten-year-old children about what they wanted to be when they grew up. They immediately knew they wanted to be President. Now this little different than wanting to be a cowboy or a fireman or a doctor, a child’s fantasy. The point is that prior to Obama’s election the possibility could not even be imagined by black children, excepting perhaps some weird science fiction scenario. That is what is meant by the possibility of possibility. BT lacks the possibility of possibility. 

What happens in the narrative after BT serendipitously gets a “good job” as a chauffeur with a wealthy white family, shows that BT still does not “get” – understand or experience – the possibility of possibility. BT is so constantly in survival mode that, in trying to survive, he does the very thing that causes his tragic undoing. It is a well-known stereotype that whenever a black man is lynched or otherwise “taken down” socially, he is initially accused of assaulting or trying sexually to molest a white woman. 

Who Is BT as a person and as a possibility at the start of the story? He is bully and a petty criminal. Malcolm Little, who became Malcolm X, was eleven years old when Wright began working on Native Son in 1936. Both BT and Malcolm, each in their own way, started out as petty criminals. Malcolm was arrested and went to prison. Malcom was the only person I ever heard of who said that prison made him better – indeed saved his life – because he met a follower of a version of strict Islam that enabled him to turn his life around, channeling his intelligence and leadership skills into black empowerment (though, ultimately, it also eventually led to his undoing in a tragedy of betrayal). 

Meanwhile, in Native Son, Mary Dalton is the young adult daughter of the wealthy Henry Dalton, who has given some $5 million dollars to the NAACP (National Association for the Advancement of Colored People) while continuing to operate inner city slums overcrowded with blacks who are unable to rent or buy in other neighborhoods due to red lining and restrictive covenants (contracts) that prevent selling to black people. Moral ambiguities and flat-out hypocrisy are front and center. Henry’s wife is blind – she cannot see – and walks about the mansion dressed in white like a ghost. Everyone else in the novel – black and white – can see well enough – are visually unimpaired –  but have blind-spots and unconscious biases sufficient to sink the Titanic. They do. Full speed ahead into the field of ice bergs!  

Mary is an undergraduate at the local university near their mansion on Drexel Blvd. As a part of her late adolescent rebellion, she goes for the kind of boyfriends most calculated to shock her parents. She likes those “bad boys.” In this case, that would be the left wing radical and card carrying communist, Jan. On background, Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti – Sacco and Vanzetti – were executed in the electric chair in 1927 for being anarchists, amid anti-Italian and anti-immigrant hysteria, not for the robbery and murder of which they were convicted and did not commit.

Wright was authoring at a time (circa 1936) when the Great Depression was still very much an economic reality. The Mayor was a machine boss, who would respond to crime waves by rounding up Communists and Negros. The Governor would call out the National Guard to put down workers who tried to form a union and go out on strike. The blacklisting of workers, both white and black (but mostly white because the blacks did not have jobs), who attempted to form unions was common, which meant they could not find work. Corporations stockpiled tear gas, vomit gas, ammunition and machine guns for armed strike breakers to use against railroad, steel, and manufacturing workers who dared to go out on strike. The National Labor Relations Board was not even validated by the US Supreme Court until 1937 in NLRB v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corporation, 301 U.S. 1 (1937). The forty-hour work week did not become law until the Fair Labor Standards Act (29 U.S. Code Chapter 8) was first enacted in 1938 under President Roosevelt’s New Deal. 

This was a different world from 2023 and being a “Communist” meant something different than it does today, when, in the wake of the success of the trade union movement, much of what the original movement sought to accomplish (such as the 40 hour work week, sick leave, paid overtime, etc.) is part of standard legal labor law practice, rendering The Party irrelevant. Nevertheless, Mary and her boyfriend, Jan, a committed Communist, saw a common cause between the oppressed workers and the oppressed black people, and in this they were accurate enough, but naïve and idealistic, even utopian, in what it was going to take to make a difference.  

The road to hell is paved with good intentions – and fake empathy. The privileged daughter, Mary, of the wealthy real estate tycoon (Mr Dalton), wants something from her new chauffeur. Remember, BT has just got a new, good paying job as the chauffeur. Mary wants him (BT) to ignore orders from her father, BT’s employer, and drive her around town with her boyfriend instead of to the University. Mary uses him (BT) as she would any extension of her own self-interest. For Mary, BT is an extension of her narcissism. BT later reports on his first encounter with Mary: 

“She acted and talked in a way that made me [BT] hate her [Mary]. She made me feel like a dog. I was so mad I wanted to cry [. . . .] Mr Max, we’re all split up. What you say is kind ain’t kind at all. I didn’t know nothing about that woman. All I knew was that they kill us for women like that. We live apart. And then she comes and acts like that to me” (1940: 35). 

The “acted like that” is the fake empathy – it seems kind enough on the surface in that the language does not have any devaluing words; yet there is a subtext – a soft violence, a quiet aggression, a conversational implicature that wrappers the relationship in BT’s subordination. “Acted like that” may also have a seductive aspect to it in that “being nice” in a situation where “no contact” is the norm may easily be misinterpreted as romantic flirting. The latter is not explicit in the text, but one thing is clear: BT and Mary Dalton really are the moth and the flame. Naivete and innocence are abundant on all sides. The moth has an automatic, hypnotic-like attraction to the flame. Little does the moth know what awaits. Does the flame have empathy for the moth? No, the flame is just the flame, towards which the moth has a luminously-based incentive that is its incineration. On background, the US Supreme Court finally ruled in Loving v Virginia in 1967 that anti-miscegenation laws, prohibiting marriage between whites and blacks (among others), were unconstitutional. 

BT has survived on the street among white people by saying “Yessum; it’s all right with me” (1940: 64) and doing as he is told, and (in effect) justifying it by saying he was following orders. Recall, this is 1938 and that statement will come to have a different meaning in 1963 as Hannah Arendt reports for The New Yorker magazine on the trial of one Adolph Eichmann, who said something similar regarding the Holocaust. “I was just following orders.” There is nothing wrong with a chauffeur following orders, yet, in this case, “following orders” from Mary because she is white is an integrity outage in relation to his employment agreement with Mr Dalton to drive Mary to school. BT’s relationship to his word is as “fast and loose” as a rabbit randomly zig-zagging to try to survive by escaping a predatory fox. 

Mary tells him “After all, I’m on your side” (1940: 64), and BT was not even aware of the possibility that changing side was imaginable – that there was a gate in the wall between rich and poor, educated and uneducated, employed and unemployed – mostly white and black. BT is getting $25 dollars a week and a pound of pork chops costs 5 cents ($.05), so that is a good wage. BT is in touch with his own self-interest, which is to keep his job so he can help himself and his mother and siblings. Yet something is off:

“Now, what did that mean? She was on his side. What side was he on? Did she mean that she liked colored people? Well, he [BT] had heard that about her whole family. Was she really crazy? How much did her folks know of how she acted? But if she were really crazy, why did Mr Dalton let him drive her out? [….]

“She was an odd girl, all right. He [BT] felt something in her over and above the fear she inspired in him. She responded to him as if he were human, as if he lived in the same world as she. And he had never felt that before in a white person. But why? Was this some kind of a game? The guarded feeling of freedom he had while listening to her was tangled with the hard fact that she was white and rich, a part of the world of people who told him what he could and could not do” (1940: 64, 65).

If someone tells you something that is too good to be true, it probably is. The ancient Greeks besieging Troy give up, sail off, and leave behind a giant horse as a gift to the gods. Casandra throws a spear at it, and it makes a hollow sound – thwomp! “Beware of Greeks bearing gifts!” No one believes her. Things do not work out well for the Trojans. “After all, I’m on your side.” The blind Mrs Dalton, walking around the mansion in her ghostly white gown, is the ineffective prophet, representing the blindness of all the players.

“Fake empathy” is defined here as a form of empathic responsiveness in which the person(s) claiming to be empathic towards the Other believe their own BS (bunkum, baloney, balderdash), endorse their own malarky, and, in effect, are sincerely self-deceived about the conflict of interest in which they are engaged. In another context, “fake empathy” could mean being intentionally deceptive as when a used car salesman knows the auto is defective but represents it as being in excellent shape. In most cases, the problematic sales person believes his or her own lies and could pass a lie detector test, which, of course, does not detect lies, but merely physiological arousal due to the stress of trying to deceive. 

Mary wants BT to hide the facts from her father (that she is not gong to night school but out on the town with her “bad boy” community friend Jan). This puts BT at risk of losing his job. Mary acts in such a way as to claim to be on BT’s side, which is accurate enough in that she endorses racial integration and rights for workers, while seemingly remaining uninformed about the monopoly rents collected from black people by her father’s South Side Real Estate Corporation. Yet how could she not know? Another blind spot. More deception and self-deception. 

If a further example is needed, Mary’s fake empathy continues as an expression of naivete and projection:

“You know, Bigger [BT], I’ve long wanted to go into these houses,” she said, pointing to the tall, dark apartment buildings looming to either side of them, “and just see how your people live. You know what I mean? I’ve been to England, France and Mexico, but I don’t know how people live ten blocks from me. We know so little about each other. I just want to see. I want to know these people. Never in my life have I been inside of a Negro house. Yet they must live like we live. They’re human . . . . There are twelve million of them . . . ” (1940: 69–70; italics and ellipsis in the original)

In so far as Mary genuinely cares about her black neighbors, this is a first step, born of good, caring intentions. However, Mary’s privilege, naivete, and arrogance (this list is not complete) are obstacles to her empathy. Her empathy misfires as projection. Mary speaks to BT in the third person about the group of which he himself is a part. The condescension is so thick that BT’s street knife would not cut through it had he even thought to try. Mary says, “Yet they [black people] must live like we live,” and that is definitely not the case. BT lives with his mother and two younger siblings in a single room. The opening scene of the novel involves a battle with a large rat in the small single room. Thus, the building is rat infested. Mary lives in a mansion with multiple servants, including BT. Mary tries to take a walk in BT’s shoes, shifting points of view, but it does not work. She is unable to take off her own shoes, so to speak – she can only imagine a glamorous life of travel – and her empathic imagination is insufficient to have a vicarious experience of the grinding, dehumanizing, poverty of her black neighbors, which poverty lives in her blind spot. 

In contrast to fake empathy, a rigorous and critical empathy examines its own blind spots, projections, and conflicts of interests. It knows that it can be inaccurate or misfire. By cleaning up its conflicts of interests, projections, emotional contagions, and/or messages lost in translation, empathy becomes critical and rigorous. Unfortunately, Mary does not live to have the opportunity to work through her fake empathy to a rigorous and critical one, and BT experiences this dawning realization as he awaits execution for killing her.

The reader may say, I want instant empathy. Like instant coffee, just add water and stir. Wouldn’t it be nice? Nor is anyone saying such a thing as “instant empathy” is impossible. It may work well enough in a pinch; but like instant coffee, the quality may not be on a par with that required by a more demanding or discriminating appreciation and taste. 

Jan’s case is similar to Mary’s though more nuanced. Jan wants something from BT as does Mary, but Jan’s agenda is less individual and, as befits a Communist, guided by an analysis of class. Yet he is equally naïve and utopian. Driving along Chicago’s Lake Shore Drive, which offers a panoramic view of the tall buildings in the central city from the South Side, Jan remarks:

“We’ll own all that some day, Bigger,” Jan said with a wave of his hand. “After the revolution it’ll be ours. But we’ll have to fight for it. What a world to win, Bigger! And when that day comes, things’ll be different. There’ll be no white and no black; there’ll be no rich and no poor” (1940: 68).

Jan’s innocence can be measured in that he is not even a very good Communist – his economic analysis is badly flawed. Jan talks as if the Communist revolution will change ownership from the capitalist to the communists whereas any Communist will tell you that the revolution will bring about the abolition of private property. Yet even if he is not a good Communist, Jan is a good human being. His righteous indignation is functioning. Learning that BT’s father was killed in a riot (read “massacre”) targeting black people in the South, Jan says to BT:

“Listen, Bigger, that’s what we want to stop. That’s what we Communists are fighting. We want to stop people from treating others that way. I’m a member of the Party. Mary sympathizes. Don’t you think if we got together we could stop things like that?” [….] You’ve heard about the Scottsboro boys?” (1940: 75; quotations and italics in the original)

On back ground, in 1931 eight black young adults and one juvenile, The Scottsboro Boys, were falsely accused of raping two women. After examination by a medical doctor, no evidence of rape was found. None. The testimony of the women themselves was coerced in that they were involved in sketchy activities that might have opened them up to criminal charges. The young men were tried by an all-white male jury for rape and sentenced to death for it (except for the juvenile, who was sentenced to life in prison). The NAACP and the Communist Party provided legal assistance to the young men and stopped the State from executing them; but they had to endure long and unjust years in prison. The novel calls out the newspaper headline in bold type in referring to BT:

“AUTHORITIES HINT SEX CRIME. Those words excluded him [BT] utterly from the world. To hint that he had committed a sex crime was to pronounce the death sentence; it meant wiping out of his life even before he was capture; it meant death before death came, for the white men who read those words would at once kill him in their hearts” (1940: 243).

BT’s life unfolds in three phases. Phase 1 lasts until, BT puts a pillow over the face of an intoxicated Mary Dalston, in trying to keep Mary from crying out and giving away that he (a black man) is alone with a white woman, even more “incriminating,” in her bedroom. At best he will lose his job – before being lynched for “rape.” The latter is here defined as the white man’s projected fantasy of the black man’s sexual attraction to and on the part of the white woman, which fantasy must be eliminated by lynching the innocent black man. (See the appendix on the varieties of prejudice below.)

What actually happens when BT is left alone with Mary Dalton, who is completely drunk? Mary is sloppy drunk, and can barely stand. BT tries to help her to her bedroom – by supporting her up the stairs. Practically, he has to carry her. Mary’s blind mother, Mrs Dalton, an insomniac, is wandering about the mansion like a ghost. The reader can see trouble coming – suppose they are discovered together in the dark in or near the bedroom? BT tries to explain to his girlfriend Betsy what happened:

“I didn’t mean to kill her. I just pulled the pillow over her face and she died. Her ma came into the room and the girl was trying to say something and her ma had her hands stretched out, like this, see? [The mother, Mrs Dalton, is blind and could not see BT.] I was scared she was goin’ to touch me. I just sort of pushed the pillow hard over the girl’s face to keep her from yelling. He ma didn’t touch me; I got out of the way. But when she left I went to the bed and the girl … She … She was dead” (1940: 227; italics in the original).

This decisive event happens early on in the story. The reader can see it coming. Mary is drunk. BT is uncertain what to do. Mr Dalton did not clarify to the new chauffeur (who is an extension of the auto) that the “boss” is Mr Dalton, who seems to have a blind spot about his angelic daughter’s rebellious streak. The unconscious fantasy, the unconscious bias, is that a black man alone with a white woman, much less an intoxicated one, is the equivalent of statutory rape. Lies, damn lies, and total nonsense move the action forward. Every action that BT takes to avoid the false accusation advances the action in the direction of an even more tragic outcome. BT ends up smothering Mary in order to avoid being discovered with her and being falsely accused of rape (which, of course, will get one lynched). In BT’s conversation with his attorney, Mr Max, BT muses:

“They would say he had raped her and there would be no way to prove that he had not. That fact had not assumed important in his eyes until now. He stood up, his jaws tightening. Had he raped her? Yes, he had raped her [but, of course, not literally]. Every time he felt as he had felt that night, he raped. But rape was not what one did to women. Rape was what one felt when one’s back was against a well and one had to strike out, whether one wanted to or not, to keep the pack from killing one. He committed rape very time he looked into a white face. He was a long, taut piece of rubber which a thousand white hands had stretched to the snapping point, and when he snapped it was rape. But it was rape when he cried out in hate deep in his heart as he felt the strain of living day by day. That, too was rape.” (1940: 227 – 228)

BT’s lawyer (Mr Max) tells the judge at BT’s trial:

“…[T]hat night a white girl was present in a bed and a Negro was standing over he, fascinated with fear, hating her; a blind woman walked into the room and that Negro  [BT] killed that girl to keep from being discovered in a position which he knew we claimed warrants the death penalty” (1940: 400).

The being present together in the bedroom of the black chauffeur and the drunken white college age daughter is in 1940 already a capital crime for all intents and purposes. Here” rape” becomes a cipher for all the boundary violations perpetrated by survivors of perpetrations of survivors of perpetrations, and so on, in a seemingly endless cycle back to the Atlantic slave trade (which does not come up in the novel). Two wrongs do not make a right, and yet it is BT’s ownership of the crime that gives him agency, even if that agency is mutilated by the crime that calls it forth. 

In Phase 2, BT lives into the devaluing expectations that white people have of him – he becomes a kind of Frankenstein – not just a monster but one created by white society, which monster seeks to strike back for the perceived injustice but goes about it in all the wrong ways that indirectly validate the stereotypes that live in white fantasy. James Baldwin has criticized Wright for writing a protest novel in which black people are depicted as dangerous – sexually and aggressively – in a way that maps to white racist stereotypes. And there is truth to it, yet at every step, Wright’s exaggerated “black badness” calls forth the unexaggerated social and legal injustices of discrimination in the North and Jim Crow in the South. Once again, two wrongs do not make a right. Two wrong make a bad situation worse – and at least twice the wrong. Let he who is without guilt cast the first stone; and, in this case, shame does not stop the stones from flying. Once the stones start flying, no one is spared. Wright makes it clear that BT is caught in the double bind of his own untutored judgment and the incoming pervasive slow violence (and fast aggression) of white society’s segregationist limitations. 

In Phase 2, BT descends into hell in a particular sense. It is a kind of mutilated journey of the hero (think of Joseph Campbell’s mythologizing (1990)) on the way to a rebirth of agency, however, with one key difference. BT had not yet been born as a responsible agent, so, instead of “rebirth,” it would be better to say “birth,” born for the first time ever. The definition of hell includes an abundance of pain and suffering, to be sure, but the real hell is that no one hears it – not even God. This is BT’s description:

“[…[T]here were screams and curses and yells of suffering and nobody hears them, for the walls were thick and darkness was everywhere” (1940: 361). 

This is BT’s experience of hell as he is locked up in Cook County Jail awaiting his fate. There is no evidence that Wright ever read Thomas Mann’s Dr Faustus(or vice versa) or Mephistopheles’ description of hell contained in it. Wright was writing just as World War 2 was starting; Mann, perennially and a few years afterwards as Europe was a smoking ruin that still stank of the crematoriums of the Nazi concentration camps. Note well the above-cited quote is Wright not Mann, and it was written seven years before Mann penned his own description of hell. In a fine literary gesture, in {Mann’s) Mephistopheles’ description of Hell, words are used indirectly to describe the indescribable. In Hell – 

“Every compassion, every grace, every sparing, every last trace of consideration for the incredulous, imploring objection ‘that you verily cannot do so unto a soul’: it is done, it happens, and indeed without being called to any reckoning in words; in soundless cellar, far down beneath God’s listening […]” (Mann 1947: 245).

The key aspect of hell – what makes a hell into Hell – is not the fire and ice – though, to be sure, that is not to be dismissed – but the hellish thing is that no one is listening, not even God, especially not God. BT’s fate indeed, though a spark of what might be called radical hope (Lear 2008) emerges when BT meets Mr Max. Mr Max is a “Clarence Darrow for the defense” type lawyer, who is retained for BT by the Communist Party. They are trying to find a common cause between exploited works and the black victims and survivors of racial prejudice, poverty, and social injustice. 

In phase three, BT discovers his agency in taking ownership of the quasi-accidental killing of Mary. But this is a very qualified (re)birth in that agency is shot through-and-through with moral trauma. BT is asked to make a choice he should not have to make; that, strictly speaking, he cannot make; and that, in any case, he inevitably makes whether he takes action or not, since doing nothing is also an action. BT enters Mary’s room as a survivor of systematic racism and Jim Crow. He tries to survive the encounter with Mary’s blind mother. He takes an action to prevent being discovered alone with a drunken white woman, and in doing so he unwittingly smothers her with a pillow to prevent her from talking drunken nonsense. BT enters the room a survivor, and leaves it as a perpetrator. That is moral trauma (also called moral injury” (Shay 2014)). 

In phase three, BT becomes a kind of Frankenstein and chooses the dark side (in the Star War’s sense – already the language is impossible). Recall that in the original Mary Shelley story, Victor Frankenstein rejects the creature that he assembled out of spare body parts and animated using electricity (electricity being a not-well-understood phenomenon at the time (1808) to which quasi-magical powers were attributed). Dr Frankenstein’s creature is lonely and wants a mate, in effect, a girl friend; but the “mad scientist” cannot countenance creating another such physically hideous creature, thereby, giving birth to an entire race of miscreants. At that point the creature has a kind of Richard III moment – “since I cannot prove a lover / To entertain these fair well-spoken days, / I am determined to prove a villain  / and hate [. . . ]” Though it changes the meaning of the sentence to stop it mid-phrase, “hate” is the active ingredient here. He becomes a monster, exacting his revenges by murdering members of Victor Frankenstein’s family. Likewise with BT.

Though all the details are different, BT’s fate follows a parallel trajectory at this point with hatred simultaneously providing the dehumanizing and humanizing element. Hate is also the principle that animates BT’s emergence into agency, albeit a mutilated one, since it occurs on death row.

Until BT committed the first murder, he was little different than the biblical Cain before he slew Abel. Human history begins at the point at which that murder, born of envy, occurs. The murder creates agency. Likewise with BT:

But, after he murdered, he [BT] accepted the crime. And that’s the important thing. It was the first full act of his life; it was the most meaningful, exciting and stirring thing that had ever happened to him. He accepted it because it made him free, gave him the possibility of choice, of action, the opportunity to act and to feel that his actions carried weight [. . . .] It was an act of creation! (1940: 396, 400)

In the beginning was the word – murder. Murder results in one thing for sure – more murder. “The surest way to make certain that there will be more such murders is to kill this boy [BT]” (1940: 391). 

Now one may well say, there’s gotta be a better way to get one’s agency, and that would be an accurate statement. 

An argument can be made that Mr. Max’s rejection of sympathy in favor of empathy serves the reader well. But does it serve BT well? In terms of saving BT’s life, it would be better to question his agency, to make a play for sympathy, and to point to poverty, cognitive limitations, and a limited IQ. Insult BT, but save his life? Max asks:

“Is love possible to the life of a man I’ve described to this Court?” (1940: 401) 

The ability to love, to experience empathy for an Other, has been negated, annulled, killed, by the systematic racism of the entire community – this is soul murder. The short definition of soul murder (a distinction arguably implicit in Wright) is that it is the systematic lack of empathy that destroys the possibility of love, that destroys the very possibility of possibility. 

Max’s Jeremiad raises the text to the level of an early articulation of the key theses of the 1619 project (see Hannah-Jones 2019). Max argues to the court that BT is in so many double binds, that his agency is compromised, his empathy is mutilated, by soul murder. (For a sustained treatment of soul murder see Shengold 1989.) 

“But in conquering they [the early American settlers] used others, used their lives. Like a miner using a pick or a carpenter using a saw, they bent the will of others to their own. Lives to them were tools and weapons to be wielded against a hostile land and climate.” 

Given that BT was convicted by an all-white jury and the Governor, to whom an appeal for clemency was to be made, was a known racist, one might say Max was like Colonel Robert Gould Shaw and the 54th Massachusetts Infantry undertaking a full frontal assault on the Confederate Fort Wagner – it was a massacre:

“I do not say this in terms of moral condemnation. I do not say it to rouse pity in your for the black men who were slaves for two and one-half centuries [. . . .] It was the imperial dream of a feudal age that made men enslave others” (1940: 389)

Once again, Mr Max eloquently anticipates the 1619 project (Hannah-Jones 2019):

“If only ten or twenty Negroes had been put into slavery, we could call it injustice, but there were hundreds of thousands of them throughout the country [….] Injustice which lasts for three long centuries and which exists among millions of people over thousands of square miles of territory, is injustice no longer; it is an accomplished fact of life [….] What is happening here today is not injustice, but oppression, an attempt to throttle or stamp out a new form of life. And it is this new form of life that has grown up here in our midst” (1940: 391).

“Men once oppressed our forefathers to the extent that they viewed other men as material out of which to build a nation; we in turn have oppressed others to such a degree that they, fumblingly as yet, try to construct meaningful lives out of us!” (1940: 398).

“The hate and fear which we have inspired in him [BT], woven by our civilization into the very structure of his consciousness, into his blood and bones, into the hourly functioning of his personality, have become the justification of his existence” (1940: 400).

This is again an early version and invocation of the ideas that would become the 1619 project. One result of systematic oppression, not just the loss of possibility, but the loss of the possibility of possibility. If one cannot get a job, then that is the loss of possibility; but if one needs and cannot get a work permit, then that is the loss of the possibility of possibility. 

Max does not ask for sympathy for BT. Sympathy results in guilt, and people hate those who make them feel guilty, enacting aggression against them. Max asks for empathy, without, however, using the word, which, if granted, would result in community, in belonging, in relatedness. As Dostoyevsky pointed out, people will kill that which evoked in them the condemning sense of guilt (1940: 390) and sympathy does precisely that. Max address the court:

“If I should say that he [BT] is a victim of injustice, then I would be asking by implication for sympathy; and if one insists upon looking at this boy as a victim of injustice, he will be swamped by a feeling of guilt so strong as to be indistinguishable from hate.” 

[Max continues] “Of all things, men to not like to feel that they are guilty of wrong, and if you make them feel guilt, they will try desperately to justify it on any grounds; but failing that […] they will kill that which evoked in them the condemning sense of guilt (1940: 389–390)

BT’s act of murder becomes a cause célèbre in the narrative. The NAACP and the Communist Party get BT a powerful attorney, Mr Max, who resembles the historical Clarence Darrow, taking on unpopular causes. 

On background, the reader recognizes historical aspects of the Leopold/Loeb (1924) trial in which two wealthy, privileged University of Chicago students engage in a “thrill killing” of 14-year-old Bobby Franks for no good reason other than the killing itself. The perpetrators had near-delusional fantasies of über-man cognitive superiority and committing the perfect crime. Things do not go well. Leopold drops his reading glasses at the location where the victim’s body is dumped, connecting him to the crime scene. The dumbest mistake possible – and just possibly a “Freudian” slip. So much for cognitive superiority. Their defense attorney, Clarence Darrow, engages in a 12-hour presentation at the sentencing hearing, in which, with a penetrating critique of capital punishment, Darrow successfully saves the 18- and 19-year-old murderers from the death penalty (Stone 1971). Darrow’s arguments are still used to today to defend teenage offenders. On background, Loeb was murdered in prison in 1936. Leopold was paroled in 1958. 

Less well known is the case of Robert Nixon, who in May 1938 was arrested for murdering a woman with a brick in the course of robbing her apartment (1940: 504; 455 line 17). Nixon was poor and black – was not defended by Clarence Darrow, and was executed in August 1939. 

Mr Max talks to BT like a Mensch, like a fellow human being, asking about what he (BT) thought had happened. Max asks a lot of questions, trying to get a sense of what BT had to survive and what motivated him to do what he did. 

“Bigger [BT] knew that Max was trying to make him feel that he accepted the way he looked at things and it made him as self-conscious as when Jan had taken his hand and shaken it that night in the car. It made him live again in that hard and sharp consciousness of his color and feel the shame and fear that went with it, and at the same time it made him hate himself for feeling it. He trusted Max” (1940: 346–347)

BT gets in touch with his feelings. Max asks him if he raped Mary. The answer: 

“Naw. But everybody’ll say I did. What’s the use? I’m black. They say black men do that. So it don’t matter if I did or if I didn’t” [ . . . .] Mr Max, when folks says things like that about you, you whipped before you born. What’s the use? Yeah; I reckon I was feeling that way [hating Mary] when I was in the room with her. They say we do things like that and they say it to kill us. They draw a line and say for you to stay on your side of the line. They don’t care if there’s no bread over on your side. They don’t care if you die. And they say things like that about you and when you try to come from behind your line they kill you” (1940: 349, 351).

BT is coming from a life of no possibility – no personal space, no (limited) education, no career, no respect from the community, no self-respect – and living into an imminent future of capital punishment, the electric chair: “Over and over he [BT] had tried to create a world to live in, and over and over he had failed” (1940: 345). 

“He [BT] breathed softly, wondering about the cool breath of peace that hovered in his body. It was as though he was trying to listen to the beat of his own heart. All around him was darkness and there were no sounds. He could not remember when he had felt as relaxed as this before. He has not thought of it or felt it while Max was speaking to him; it was not until after Max had gone that he discovered that he had spoken to Max as he had never spoken to anyone in his life; not even to himself. And this talking had eased from his shoulders a heavy burden. [….] Max had not compelled him to talk; he had talked of his own accord […] by a curiosity about his own feelings. Max had only sat and listened, had only asked questions” (1940: 359 – 360).

Max gives BT a good listening – gives him empathy – and BT feels “better” – the “heavy burden” is lifted from his shoulders.. His hatred gets dialed down, though not completely extinguished. His inner conflict and hatred are lessened, even as he knows he is not going to get out alive from his self-made predicament: 

Max validates BT’s perspective of “no possibility” in a description that also validates how whites are also entangled in systematic racism that lives in unconscious bias, albeit with less harmful effects on whites than blacks: 

“And I know that almost every white face you’ve met in your life had it in for you, even when that white face didn’t know it. Every white man considered it his duty to make a black man keep his distance. He doesn’t know why most of the time, but he acts that way” (1940: 346). 

In acknowledging how hopeless is the situation, something shifts in BT. 

So far BT gets empathic receptivity – another person, Max, is able to take his point of view and have a vicarious experience of how he (BT) feels. In conversation with Max, BT comes to appreciate a new possibility – an empathic possibility. The Other – in this case Max – brings forth the BT’s own humanness, mutilated though it is, by taking the Other’s perspective. 

“He [BT] stood up in the middle of the cell floor and tried to see himself in relation to other men, and thing he had always feared to try to do, so deeply stained was his own mind with the hate of others for him. With this new sense of the value of himself gained from Max’s talk, a sense fleeting and obscure, he tried to feel that if Max had been able to see the man in him beneath those wild and cruel acts of his, acts of fear and hate and murder and flight and despair, then he too would have, if he were they, just as now he was hating them and they were hating him. For the first time in his life he felt ground beneath his feet [. . .]” (1940: 361).

BT experiences the emerging ability to “see himself in relation to other men [persons].” Being related to others requires the distinction “self-Other,” open up the possibility of the Other taking a point of view on oneself. This is what Max did for BT in seeing “the man in him [BT] beneath those wild and cruel acts of fear and hate.” If Max can be related to BT, it demonstrates to BT that he can do that for himself and for and with Others, too. 

“If he [BT] reached out with his hands, and if his hands were electric wires, and if his heart were a battery giving life and fire to those hands, and if he reached out with his hands and touched other people, reached out through those stone walls and felt other hands connected with other heart – if he did that, would there be a reply, a shock? Not that he wanted those hearts to turn their warmth to him; he was not wanting that much. But just to know that they were there and warm! [. . . .] And in that touch, response of recognition, there would be union, identity’ there would be a supporting oneness, a wholeness which had been denied him all this life” (1940: 362).

What makes the hands come alive in this image of electrical connection and the shock of the human is precisely “the response of recognition,” which brings strength, energy, and vitality to the human heart. This is the empathic moment for BT, which, however, arrives late in the day as he awaits almost certain execution for his crimes. 

Thus, the accusation of early critics (and James Baldwin) against Wright of didacticism and protest literature. Perhaps in our own time, but before the racist jury, judge, mayor, and governor, Max makes the best of a bad situation. The result?

BT gets his vitality and aliveness from the Other, in this case Max. Max is able to “see the man in him” and BT, in turn, is able to see that Max sees the man in him (BT), and that grounds him (BT). The Other brings forth empathy for the one, who, in this example, is trying to see himself in relation to other men. A new possibility opens up – the possibility of possibility – relatedness, connectedness – empathy.

Appendix: A Short “Ted Talk” on the Varieties of Prejudice

One may say, prejudice is prejudice and all prejudices are alike, and there would be truth to saying that. Yet when one looks at the dynamics of prejudice, one cannot simply substitute the underlying dynamics of racism against black people for antisemitism or sexism or for homophobia. A short “Ted Talk” on prejudice will again inform our historical empathy.

The fantasy of black hyper masculinity is repressed as a source of anxiety challenging the white male’s (imagined) inadequate sexual potency. It then gets reversed and projected onto the devalued other, who comes at the white man as white woman’s desire for the stereotyped hyper sexed black man. Elisabeth Young-Breuhl (1996: 367) writes in The Anatomy of Prejudices:

The white male’s mythological contractions of black male sexuality – the images of Negro phallic power, animal lust, and rapaciousness – signal the jealousy and resentment over the black’s defilement pleasure, and they also reflect the white male’s anxiety that white women really desire the black’s aggressive sexuality. 

In contrast to the hysterical fantasy of the over-dramatized black male, the Jewish person is made the target of an obsessional paranoid over-intellectualization – the totally fictional worldwide conspiracy of the Protocol of the Elders of Zion. Lies, damn lies, and total nonsense. The nonsense continues: In the case of homophobia, one stays with the dynamic of difference for one has to project that, in a certain sense, the boy finds other boys attractive, in that special sexual way, and must defend against being a “fag” by perpetrating acts of aggression. Nor should the sexism and misogyny be overlooked, for BT kills two women – Mary and Bessie – in the one case quasi-accidently and in the other in a cowardly fear of betrayal. In the case of the prejudices of racism (in the narrow sense against blacks) and antisemitism the devalued, despised Other becomes the target of projections one of own inner black and jew in every imaginable positive and negative sense. The differences collapse – inwardly I am the despised Other and get rid of the negative value by externalizing it. In sexism, the dynamic changes, and the anatomical difference between the sexes is such that the difference is impossible to deny, so the Other must be denied, deleted, “killed,” in order to reestablish integrity of the self. In the prejudices stereotype, the Other – the woman in this case – is hated for being inferior cognitively, physically, and so, even as the male harbors an unconscious fantasy of superiority, the power to create life, womb envy. 

References

Joseph Campbell. (1990). The Hero’s Journey. Novato, CA: The New World Library.

Nicole Hannah-Jones. (2019). The 1619 Project. New York: One World (NYT Magazine).

Jonathan Lear. (2008). Radical Hope. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP.

Thomas Mann. (1947). Doctor Faustus: The Life of the German Composer Adrian Leverkühn as Told by a Friend. Tr. H.T. Lowe-Porter. New York: Vintage Books, 1949.

J. Shay, (2014). Moral injury. Psychoanalytic Psychology, 31(2), 182-191. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0036090

Leonard Shengold. (1989). Soul Murder Revisited: Thoughts About Therapy, Hate, Love, and Memory. Hartford: Yale University Press. 

Irving Stone (1971). Clarence Darrow for the Defense. Signet. 

Richard Wright. (1940). Native Son. New York: Harper Perenniel, 1998.

Elisabeth Young-Breuhl. (1996). The Anatomy of Prejudices. Harvard UP

Shoshona Zuboff. (2018). The Age of Surveillance Capitalism. London: Profile Books. 

Photo image credit: Canada Lee as Bigger Thomas in the original Broadway production of Native Son (1941), photographed by Carl Van Vechten.

(c) Lou Agosta, PhD and the Chicago Empathy Project